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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The need for research in the economics of educa-
tion
Among the many developments that shaped societies over the course of the last
centuries, the surge in educational participation is certainly one of the most cru-
cial ones. On the individual level, education has been found to increase the pro-
ductivity and the returns to labor market activities. This makes education a pow-
erful tool in the economists’ “grand pursuit” to ﬁght individual poverty and to
enable a life in economic prosperity (see Nasar, 2012). The individual beneﬁts of
education do not only awake the interest of political decision-makers on a more
aggregated level, but many aspects of education are directly in their hands. Legis-
lators set the minimum school leaving age or the years of education an individual
is required to have, the government decides on the supply and funding of schools
and colleges and their autonomy, and it regulates the quality standards, such as
caps for the student-teacher ration and the qualiﬁcation of teachers. The pre-
sumably large returns and the government’s leverage make educational policies
an attractive instrument to fuel the development of societies further. Education
is considered to address important challenges: satisfying the need for human
capital set by new production technologies (Goldin and Katz, 2009), easing the
burden of the demographic change by allowing individuals to cope old age bet-
ter (Cervellati and Sunde, 2013; Rohwedder and Willis, 2010), and balancing in-
equalities by providing equal opportunities (Cunha and Heckman, 2009). Those
high hopes for education link future policies to past experiences: What can we
learn from the expansion of education in the past to improve the design of future
policies?
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While researchers have a rather good grasp of some returns to education (see,
e.g., Card, 1999, 2001, for reviews), our understanding of other returns and their
sources needs to be broadened in order to achieve of the full potential of educa-
tional policies. A growing body of research suggests that the scope of education
is not limited to individuals’ labor market productivity and monetary well-being
but also affects non-pecuniary factors like the production of health, preferences
and attractiveness for a partner, and even an individual’s personality traits. To
learn how education shapes those factors and whether this can contribute to our
understanding of the monetary returns to education, it is important to disentan-
gle the underlying causal pathway from a mere correlation. This doctoral disser-
tation aims at providing new quantitative evidence of how and which forms of
education determine an individual’s monetary and non-monetary well-being.
Both the potential and the need to learn from past experiences to shape further
policies is perhaps best described by Figure 1.1. The ﬁgure depicts the percentage
of the GDP that has been spent on education over time in the US and Germany,
respectively. While the US has spent about 2.8 percent of the GDP on education
in 1950, the corresponding number for Germany is 1.8 percent. More interest-
ing than the cross-country comparison of the spending is its development over
time: by 2014, the share of educational expenditures to the GDP rose to 5.6 per-
cent in the US and to 5.0 percent in Germany. Put differently, within 65 years,
the resources these societies are willing to devote to education have doubled.
For other industrialized economies the corresponding numbers exhibit a similar
trend. Putting these numbers into perspective, the importance of education be-
comes even more visible: the US, the world’s supreme military power, spends
less on its military (3.3 percent of the GDP, see World Bank, 2017) than on educa-
tion. Likewise, Germany spends more on education that its ﬂagship industry, car
manufacturing, produces in a year (4.5 percent of the GDP in 2015, see German
Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 2017) – although this may be taken with a grain of salt
as the spending and the production approach are different ways of assessing the
GDP. Moreover, it seems fair to assume that the spending on education has often
higher returns than, for instance, the spending on the military or health care.
The high level of educational expenditures as well as the upward trend do not
only affect legislators who pass educational policies but it also calls for a care-
ful economic evaluation. The sheer size of the education systems opens the door
for potentially substantial efﬁciency gains. Although it was not the zeitgeist in
the era prior to the industrial revolution to consider education as an investment
good, even Adam Smith was concerned with the efﬁciency of the education sys-
tem when he wrote The Wealth of Nations in 1776. His main critique was the gov-
ernmental involvement in education as a cause of inefﬁciency. The curriculum
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Figure 1.1: Educational expenditures as percentage of the GDP
Notes: Own illustration. Data for the US taken from US Government Spending (2017). For Germany, educational expen-
ditures and GDP 1950–1990 is taken from Diebolt (2000) and German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce (2016a), respectively, and
refer to West Germany. After 1990, data refer to the uniﬁed Germany and are taken from World Bank (2017).
set by the government may, for instance, not reﬂect the individuals’ or the mar-
ket’s demand for certain subjects and, thereby, causes an inefﬁcient allocation of
resources (see Diebolt, 2000). Although Smith’s efﬁciency concern is nearly 250
years old, it still applies in today’s knowledge-based economies. While the partly
technology-driven increasing demand for human capital makes investments in
education both necessary and potentially proﬁtable; purely input-based invest-
ments, that do not account for incentives, are shown to be potentially inefﬁcient
(see, e.g., Hanushek, 2003, and Woessmann, 2016). Both from an individual and a
policy point of view, the margin of education and the incentives in the education
system are likely to be important determinants of the success of investments in
further education. Should parents’, for instance, invest a given amount of money
in the preschool education of their youngest child or in the college education of
their oldest child? Should governments likewise invest in improving preschool
or college education? Research in the economics of education is potentially able
to address such questions and the ﬁndings of some studies already made their
way into legislation (see Gormley, 2011, for a more detailed account.)
To sum up, given the limited number of resources and the presumably low mar-
ginal returns to input-based educational policies, the trend depicted in Figure 1.1
cannot continue in the decades to come. Increasing the efﬁciency of the existing
education systems and investing in educational interventions that work the best
based on empirical evidence is necessary of a sustainable educational policy.
The growing importance of evidence-based policy advise in the economics of
education and the closely related disciplines of labor, health, and family eco-
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nomics (often summarized as applied micro) can be linked to two developments
in empirical research: the raise of the so-called “credibility revolution” aiming at
disentangling the causal pathway of education and an increased focus on non-
monetary returns to education (see Angrist and Pischke, 2010, and Oreopoulos
and Salvanes, 2011, respectively, for reviews). This thesis can be understood as
part of larger research efforts in applied micro that follows these stems of re-
search. Before I summarize the single chapters, I therefore brieﬂy describe the
general development of these “new” methods and data in applied micro.
1.2 Recent developments in the ﬁeld
1.2.1 The credibility revolution
Comparing the effect of a labor market training program on earnings in an experi-
mental design – where individuals were randomly assigned into program partici-
pation – with the effect in an observational study, LaLonde (1986) ﬁnds a substan-
tial difference in the estimated returns based on the research design. The reason
for this is likely to be a selection of, for instance, more curious and intelligent
individuals into the program in the observational study. However, only relying
on an experimental research design that overcomes such selection would restrict
the number of potential research question dramatically. It is often neither ethical
nor feasible to randomly assign individuals to certain treatments (although there
are some notable exceptions, for instance, the Perry Preschool Program discussed
below). While this holds true in all ﬁelds of applied microeconomics, the returns
to education are a primary example.
It is, for instance, not possible to randomly assign individuals to college educa-
tion: this would require to force some individual to take several years of college
education who do not want to, while withholding others from doing so. How-
ever, just comparing, say, the income of college graduates and non-graduates in
observational data is likely to be biased as more intelligence individuals are not
only more likely to study but would probably also earn more in absence of col-
lege education. Thus, even if the true effect of college education would be zero,
not taking such selection into account may lead to the false conclusion that in-
vestments in college education are favorable as college education is associated
with higher earnings. This example illustrates that it is not possible to draw reli-
able implications for individuals or policymakers based on evidence that is likely
to suffer a severe selection. In order to address this selection problem in obser-
vational data nevertheless, the microeconometric toolkit has been expanded by
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the development of new methods and the adoption of methods from other ﬁelds
like statistics and mathematics (see, e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2009, for a detailed
account). Most of those methods, like instrumental variables techniques, make
use of a quasi-experimental change in an individual’s environment that mimics
the research design of a controlled experiment (see the chapters of this thesis for
examples).
Besides methods that are, under the right circumstances, sufﬁcient to deal with
selection; the credibility revolution is characterized through a carefully investi-
gation of those circumstances (Angrist and Pischke, 2010). That is, at the heart
of the credibility revolution is the question whether the underlying identifying
assumptions are justiﬁed based on the institutional background and, if possible,
explorative empirical evidence. While, for instance, an instrumental variables ap-
proach using regional variation in the college availability (as, e.g., in the seminal
work of Card, 1995) is per se able to overcome a selection of more motivated indi-
viduals with higher earnings potentials into college, it only does so if the original
placement of the colleges was not in response to the individuals’ desire to take
college education. Thus, quasi-experimental methods can – and, under the right
circumstances, do – provide a plausible case for the identiﬁcation of the causal
effects of education.
More recently, a growing number of studies also concerns with the external va-
lidity of the empirical strategies and their implementations. They criticize that
exploiting exogenous variation may allow archiving a high internal validity; the
range of the variation (or the group that experienced the variation) is, however,
often too particular to generalize the resulting ﬁnding to a broader population
(see, for instance, the discussion in Deaton, 2010, Imbens, 2010, and Heckman
and Urzu´a, 2010). Taking this aspect into consideration, the chapters in this thesis
not only use state-of-the-art methods to archive a high internal validity, but the
policy relevance of the analyzed setting and the external validity are also care-
fully discussed. For the exact methods, their implementation, and a discussion of
their validity; see the chapters.
1.2.2 Non-monetary returns to education
While an unbiased effect of education, say, on earnings is a prerequisite of a
credible policy implication, it is unlikely that an individual’s earnings reﬂect the
entire range of beneﬁts. Gary Becker laid a theoretical foundation suggesting
5
that individuals select themselves in all kinds of non-market outcomes1 with
the same rational as they maximize their monetary well-being (Becker, 1993).
If more educated individuals earn more, this affects their opportunity costs of
activities other than paid work. When engaging in criminal behavior and risk-
ing a two-years incarceration, more educated and productive individuals forgo
more income in these two years than their less educated peers. This reduces
their expectation value of committing a crime mechanically. Moreover, education
may further alter preferences and increases the disutility from an incarceration.
Similarly, education-induced time constraints and preference changes may affect
an individual’s decision for a partner, the number of children, and the utiliza-
tion of health care and health behaviors (see Grossman, 1972, for the latter). As
the distribution of such non-pecuniary outcomes is also in the interest of poli-
cymakers, considering the non-monetary as well as the monetary returns to ed-
ucation allows a more informed policy implication. A large education-induced
increase in health behaviors may, for instance, compensate for a small earnings
premium. Moreover, this information is not only valuable in its own right, but
non-monetary returns may also constitute mechanisms through which education
transmits into monetary returns.
Besides Becker’s theoretical argument for the relevance of non-monetary returns
to education, new and more detailed data sources additionally favor the analysis
of non-monetary factors. This is especially true for cognitive and non-cognitive
skills (that is, personality traits). While the assessment of intelligence and per-
sonality types has a long history in psychometric research, those factors are the
textbook example of unobservable confounders of the education-earnings rela-
tionship in economics. Beginning with the early measures of skills in economic
applications taken from military enlistment records, the quality of the informa-
tion has rapidly increased. Most major socioeconomic surveys have incorpo-
rated test batteries to assess the respondents’ competencies and personality in the
last two decades. Germany’s longest running individual-level survey, the Socio-
economic Panel Study, for instance, launched a Big Five personality test battery
in its 22nd wave in 2005 and an “ultra-short intelligence test” was conducted two
years later for the ﬁrst time. Another rather recently available source of detailed
information on education and the development of human capital are large-scale
international assessment studies such as PISA and TIMSS. While early skill mea-
sures have been added to Mincer equations of earning on education to prevent
an omitted variable bias, the availability of rich skill information allows – in line
with Becker’s theory – distinguishing education from human capital.
1I use the terms non-monetary, non-market, and non-pecuniary outcomes interchangeably,
in spite of the view that some of the outcomes can be interpreted as the result of a market-kind
bargaining, such as the marriage market.
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Research on cognitive and non-cognitive skills was further advocated through
the work of James Heckman and co-authors laying a theoretical foundation and
providing compelling evidence for the efﬁciency of early childhood investments.
At an early stage, the brain structure can be shape more effectively, while the
longer time horizon and a self-fertilizing in skills – in that better skills in one
period beget the acquisition of skills in subsequent periods – have the potential
to make early investments particulary efﬁcient (see, among others, Cunha et al.,
2006; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Heckman, 2007). That is, a child with more de-
veloped language skills has an advantage in learning reading and writing when
entering elementary school compared to a child that ﬁrst needs to learn the basics
and the skill gap is likely to widen (so-called self-productivity of skills). More-
over, when the initial advantage is followed by a subsequent intervention, the
resulting gain in skills may be higher for the ﬁrst than for the second child (dy-
namic complementarity). Assessing such multipliers in the formation of skills
empirically is rather data demanding as the children need to be followed over
multiple periods. However, the availability of better data sources increasingly
enables such analyses. A leading example for both the importance of educational
interventions and the relevance of non-monetary returns is the analysis of the
Perry Preschool Program in Michigan. Being one of the few examples for an ex-
periment in the economics of education, treated children received high-quality
care two years, while children in the control group only received informal care.
Even after 30 years, treated children have a higher labor market attachment. Ev-
idence suggests that the driving force behind the labor market returns is the de-
velopment of non-cognitive skills – cognitive skills seem, in fact, less important
(Heckman et al., 2013). Furthermore, the non-monetary returns (especially, a re-
duced probability of involvement in criminal activities) exceed the monetary re-
turns to the intervention (Heckman et al., 2010a; Conti et al., 2016) and the overall
annual internal rate of return is up to 10 percent (Heckman et al., 2010b).
These recent advancements in the research agenda in applied micro – the careful
distinction of causation and selection, not only through state-of-the-arts methods
but the plausibility of their assumptions, as well as the consideration of non-
monetary outcomes – are key elements in all ﬁve essays of this thesis.
1.3 Overview and summary of this thesis
In the ﬁve essays of this thesis – each representing a stand-alone research paper – I
analyze the non-monetary and possibly monetary returns to different margins of
education. Figure 1.2 provides an overview over the margins, shows when indi-
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viduals are affected, and presents the considered outcome variables. The dashed
boxes in the center give the investigated margin of education. This is the vari-
ables of interest – reaching from the quality preschools to the decision to take
higher education. As the margin of education is potentially subject to individual
selection, I utilize information on factors that change the margin of education.
For instance, how does the college availability change the decision to take higher
education? Those changes in the education are given in the boxes on the left-hand
side of the ﬁgure. One might think of them as interventions (although I refer to
them more generally as “changes” because the student absence from school in
Chapter 2 is strictly speaking not an intervention). The solid boxes below the
margins indicate the considered short-term effects, while the solid boxes on the
right-hand side give the long-term outcome variables, for instance, the effect of
taking higher education on an individual’s cognitive skills in prime age. The na-
ture of the changes in education, how they affect the margin of education, and
how this is used to address selection differs across the chapters and depends on
the available data and the plausibility of the identifying assumptions. In the fol-
lowing I summarize the chapters (that is, the essays) in the order individuals are
affected by the margin of education, starting with the youngest age group.
Instruction 
grade 1 & 4 
Perfor-
mance 
Completed education, 
labor market 
performance, 
and mortality 
Individual 
absence 
from 
school 
Preschool 
quality 
Language skills 
Probability 
of receiving 
language 
training 
Chapter 2 
Years of 
upper 
secondary 
education 
Compulsory 
schooling 
and school 
density 
• Income, cognitive 
skills, and health 
 
• Fertility preferences 
College 
expansion 
Cognitive skills and labor 
market income 
Higher 
education 
Change in 
education 
Margin of education / 
stage of adolescence Adulthood 
Change in education  Margin of education Outcome variables Legend 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 4 
Chapters 5-6 
Figure 1.2: Overview over the chapters of this thesis
Notes: Own illustration.
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In the ﬁrst essay (Chapter 2) of the thesis, I consider the quality of preschool
education in Germany at the children’s age of three to four. About one-third
of the about 200 preschools with complete information in the key variables in
the data at hand, the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS), reports to rely
on a curriculum-based language training in their education. The language edu-
cation of the children in the remaining two-thirds of the preschools did not go
beyond basic childcare. In this chapter, I aim at analyzing the effect of the qual-
ity of preschool (language) education, measured through the implementation of
the curriculum-based language training, on the short- and medium-term forma-
tion for grammar skills – an important indicator for development and subsequent
learning. To address that either preschools implement the language training is
response to a greater need of the children or that parents enroll their child in a
preschool with language training because of the child’s individual need, I only
compare children with and without language training, if they have the same
probability of receiving the language training based on a large set of observable
characteristics (that is, I employ a propensity score matching approach). The un-
derlying identifying assumption is that those characteristics are sufﬁcient to ad-
dress all kinds of selection. Although this “selection on observables” is in many
cases a rather strong assumption, the application at hand makes an arguably per-
suasive case. On the one hand, the NEPS includes a large number of informa-
tion given by the parents, the preschool educator, and the preschool principal.
One the other hand, using information on an individual’s math skills available
in the NEPS allows removing unobservable characteristics that affect grammar
and math skills in the same way. The resulting effect of language training on the
short-term formation of grammar skills is remarkable stable around 14 percent
of a standard deviation. Compared to the literature this is a medium-to-large ef-
fect size. This ﬁnding holds for different sets of control variables (as chosen by
an algorithm adopted from the machine learning literature in order facilitate the
large array of potential confounders) and across the simple-difference and inter-
skill differences-in-differences speciﬁcations. Subsampe evidence for children in
grades 1 and 3 of elementary school indicates that the short-term effect is (at least
in the ﬁrst grade) persistent and even expanding in the medium-run perspective.
Given that the analyzed language training is rather easy to implement, improv-
ing the quality of preschool education through such an intervention seems to
provide an effective (and potentially efﬁcient) way to boost the development of
human capital from early childhood on.
In the second essay (Chapter 3), Sarah Cattan, Martin Karlsson, Therese Nilsson,
and I analyze the effect of missed instructional time in grades 1 and 4 of ele-
mentary school on the short-term academic performance at the end of the school
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year and long-term completed education, employment, labor market income, and
mortality. So far, only few studies consider the role of instructional time within
a school year in the educational production function and the literature on indi-
vidual absence from school is limited to short-term effects in the US. In order to
consider long-term outcomes, we combine self-digitized historical school records
for children born in the 1930s taken from Swedish archives with Census infor-
mation from 1960 and 1970 as well as tax register data from 2002. To account
for school and teacher characteristics as well as the students’ genetic endowment
that may cause a selection of children with certain backgrounds into absence, we
rely on school, teacher, and siblings ﬁxed effects. That is, we only use variation
in days of absence and the outcome variables between siblings, while controlling
for the school, the teacher, and other observable characteristics. The results indi-
cate a moderate and robust short-term effect of absence on performance in school.
In the long-run, this initial effect seems to fade away: while the results suggest
that absence is still relevant for the employment status in 1960; afterwards, the
effect size points toward the expected direction but is statistically indistinguish-
able from zero. This ﬁnding is in line with a broader literature that indicates an
early-career effect of education that fades out over time.
The third essay (Chapter 4) takes a leap to students at the end of their secondary
schooling and Hendrik Schmitz and I analyze the returns to an additional year
of education at this margin in Germany. Analyzing the same margin, Pischke
and von Wachter (2008) ﬁnd that the introduction of an additional ninth grade
in basic track secondary schools (the so-called compulsory schooling reform) be-
tween 1949 and 1969 (depending on the state), had no effect on the labor market
earnings of the affected students. While Pischke and von Wachter (2008) can em-
pirically rule out a number of reasons for the zero earnings returns, they can only
conjecture that heterogeneity along different groups of students and the forma-
tion of skills play a role. As the reform rose the legal minimum years of schooling
only for basic school students, it is questionable whether the zero returns can be
generalized to students in intermediate and academic schools that had always
more than eight years of schooling. To broaden the analysis to include inter-
mediate and academic school students, we instrument their years of schooling
with the relative supply of these schools. Controlling for the state and the birth
year, regional and temporal variation in the school density allows measuring ar-
guable exogenous variation in the decision to take additional years of schooling
in others than basic track schools. The results indicate that the zero returns are
persistent for intermediate and academic track students and cannot be related to
the particular group of students affected by the compulsory schooling reform.
To test Pischke and von Wachter’s second conjecture for the zero returns, that
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is, the absence of a skill effect that mediates schooling into wages, we employ
the same empirical strategy as before, but consider a measure of cognitive skills
taken from the German Socio-economic Panel Study as outcome variable instead
of labor market wages. Again, the results point toward a zero effect of years of
secondary schooling on cognitive abilities for students in all school tracks. Given
these results, it seems fair to argue that the formation of basic skills may take
place before the ninth grade in Germany; that it does, however, not seem to take
place after the eighth grade.
In the fourth essay (Chapter 5), joint work with Hendrik Schmitz and Matthias
Westphal, we consider the effect of tertiary education in Germany on the labor
market wage, cognitive skills, and health. To overcome a selection of, for instance,
smarter or healthier individuals into college education, we instrument the proba-
bility of going to college using the expansion in the number of colleges and their
sizes in the 1970s and ’80s. Based on administrative data, the number of colleges
doubled in the time under review and the number of students enrolled in higher
education increased from below 200K to over 1M. Using German Micro Census
data in an explorative analysis, college openings cannot be predicted based on
local economic characteristics. This is in line with qualitative evidence that the
college expansion was largely driven by political motives and did not systemat-
ically affect regions with a higher or lower average intelligence or health of the
population. Given this powerful variation in the individuals’ college decision at
hand, we are able to go beyond conventional two-stage least square estimation
and implement the so-called marginal treatment effect approach as developed by
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005). This approach has the advantage that it allows esti-
mating the returns to college education along the unobserved heterogeneity (that
is, the part of the college decision that cannot be explained through observable
characteristics). Combining the administrative data with information on adult
individuals observed in the NEPS, the resulting range of marginal effects enables
measuring the returns for distinct groups of individuals and is, thereby, more
informative than a single point estimate. We ﬁnd that individuals who study be-
cause of the college expansion although their observed probability of doing so is
rather low, strongly beneﬁt in terms of wage, skill, and health gains. In fact, in-
dividuals with a high observed probability of studying who comply with the in-
creased availability of college spots beneﬁt less from higher education (and some
not at all) compared to their more eager peers. This heterogeneity in the returns
to college education bears an important insight for policies that aim at increasing
the share of college graduates in the population (such as the Higher Education
Pact 2020 in Germany): it should not be taken for granted that college education
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is universally beneﬁcial – depending on the individuals that are affected by the
expansion of higher education, the returns may even be zero.
In the ﬁfth essay (Chapter 6) of the thesis, Matthias Westphal and I use the same
variation in the college availability as in Chapter 5 to investigate how college ed-
ucation affects a woman’s probability of becoming a mother and, conditioning
on being a mother, the number of children by the age of 40 (so-called completed
fertility). The effect of education on fertility has been empirically analyzed ever
since Becker suggested that familiesmay trade off a large number of childrenwith
more educated children (the quality-quantity trade-off). Still, most studies over-
come a preference-based selection by means of compulsory schooling reforms.
For the margin of college education that falls well into the prime reproductive
age, evidence on the education-fertility nexus is so far scarce. Combining admin-
istrative data on college availability with individual data taken from the NEPS,
we ﬁnd that women are about one-quarter less likely of becoming a mother be-
cause college education than non-college-educated women. However, once a
college-educated woman has decided to have children, the number of children
is slightly higher than the one of a woman without college education. Interest-
ingly, college-educated mothers postpone their ﬁrst birth about 6.5 years due to
the college education. Given a usual duration of college education around 4.5
years, the effect size indicates that the overall postponement is not only caused
by an “incarceration” in college but although through a further postponement
in the years immediately after leaving college, that is, the early-career stage. To
investigate the college effect on the timing of birth further, we unfold the proba-
bility of childbirth along the women’s age. While the probability of becoming a
mother increases slightly in the years after the college-educated women graduate,
the probability of childbirth is still below the one of women without college edu-
cation – reﬂecting the overall reduced probability of motherhood. Conditioning
the sample to women who have at least one child by the age of 40, however, the
results indicate a catch-up effect of college-educated mothers in the years after
leaving college. This college-induced early-career effect for non-mothers indi-
cates a limited compatibility between work and family life that may contribute
to the overall negative effect of college education on fertility. Policies that aim at
raising the compatibility, for instance, through more ﬂexible working hours, are
promising in unifying education-induced changes in career and fertility effects.
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Chapter 2
Language Training in Preschool and
the Formation of Grammar Skills
2.1 Introduction
The potential of early childhood interventions to shape the formation of human
capital from early on and, thereby, laying the foundations for an individual’s
long-lasting economic and social well-being evokes the interest of legislators and
researchers alike.1 Yet, our understanding ofwhy certain investments have higher
returns than others is far from being conclusive. While the quality of care is fre-
quently suspected to be an important determinant of the returns to the early in-
vestments, it is widely understudied. Large-scale universal childcare programs
do often not meet the high quality of successful experimental interventions (Wei-
land and Yoshikawa, 2013) and exhibit lower and sometimes even negative re-
turns (see, e.g., Ruhm and Waldfogel, 2012, and Cascio, 2015, for reviews). The
study at hand aims at broadening the understanding of the role of the quality of
care by investigating the effect of a curriculum-based language training program
in preschool at the child’s age of four on the short- and medium-term formation
of skills.
Besides a high plasticity in brain development at this stage (Couperus and Nel-
son, 2008), the long time horizon and complementarities in the formation of skills
provide strong theoretical arguments for interventions at an early age (Cunha
and Heckman, 2007). The empirically most-compelling evidence on the mer-
its of early investments comes from randomized controlled trials (RCTs), most-
prominently the High/Scope Perry Preschool Program in Ypsilanti, Michigan,
1See, for instance, the Obama Administration’s Zero to Five Plan and the 2011 Science Special
Issue on “Investing Early in Education.”
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starting in 1962 (see, e.g., Currie, 2001, for a review). Treated children received 2.5
hours of formal care every weekday for seven months a year, for two years. The
care consisted of a “child-centered, active learning curriculum” in small classes
and teachers had advanced degree, were paid a bonus, and offered regular parent-
teacher conferences (Mervis, 2011, p.953). The returns to this intervention are
large and long-lasting: treated individuals had both higher cognitive (language
and numeracy) and social-emotional skills and even up to 35 years after the treat-
ment, they exhibit a higher completed education, large labor market returns, are
healthier, and have a lower probability of being involved in crimes (see Heckman
et al., 2010a, 2013, and Conti et al., 2016). The estimated internal rate of return
is up to 10 percent p.a. (Heckman et al., 2010b). Compared to those beneﬁts, the
literature on the returns to universal childcare programs is much more ambigu-
ous. In spite of a substantial correlation (see, e.g., OECD, 2010), the evidence from
studies that seek to identify the causal relationship through exogenous variation
in childcare availability is less clear (see Ruhm and Waldfogel, 2012) and may de-
pend on the country-speciﬁc context (see, e.g., Cattan, 2016). While some studies
suggest positive effects of universal preschool education on both the short and
medium-term skill formation and long-term labor market performance2, others
indicate zero or even negative effects (see, e.g., Ku¨hnle and Oberﬁchtner, 2017,
for Germany; Cascio, 2009, for the US; Baker et al., 2008, and DeCicca and Smith,
2013, for Canada; and Datta Gupta and Simonsen, 2010, for Denmark).
A likely explanation for this divergence in the returns to RCT and universal child-
care is the quality of care. Besides of having a higher absolute quality of care than
large-scale universal childcare programs, the RCTs are also likely to differ from
universal programs in the relative quality, that is, the gap in the quality between
the formal care and the counterfactual informal care. The RCTs were targeted
on children from disadvantaged families who may have also faced a lower-than-
average quality of the learning environment at home or in other informal child-
care arrangements (see Cascio and Schanzenbach, 2014, for the formal argument).
This role of the relative quality is in line with recent evidence from Cornelissen
et al. (2017) for Germany. Estimating the effect of preschool education on school
entry examinations they ﬁnd that “children from disadvantaged backgrounds are
less likely to attend childcare than children from advantaged backgrounds but
have larger treatment effects because of their worse outcome when not enrolled
in childcare” (p.1). Considering complete education and labor market attachment
in Norway, Havnes and Mogstad (2011) ﬁnd heterogeneity in the preschool effect
2For school outcomes in adolescence, see, e.g., for the US Gormley and Gayer (2005) and Fitz-
patrick (2008) for Oklahoma and Georgia, respectively; Black et al. (2014) and Drange and Havnes
(2015) for Norway; and Berlinski et al. (2008, 2009) for Uruguay and Argentina, respectively. For
adult labor market performance, see Dumas and Lefranc (2012) for France.
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along the mother’s education. Even without accounting for the gap in the relative
care, adopting the quality standards of the RCTs in the existing universal child-
care programs in order to boost the development of human capital from early on
would nearly triple the average costs3 and can therefore be seen as “prohibitively
expensive” (Mervis, 2011, p.954). Evidence on how speciﬁc aspects of the qual-
ity of preschool education can potentially improve the success of the universal
programs is rather scarce.
The study at hand aims at narrowing this gap. Using survey information on
about 2,000 children (born between 2005 and 2006) and their families taught
by more than 800 educators in more than 200 preschools in Germany I analyze
the effect of the quality of the language education on the formation of gram-
mar skills.4 Although preschool education in Germany traditionally focuses on
overseeing rather than teaching children, about one-third of the preschools at
hand have implemented a curriculum-based language training. The curriculum
is developed by linguists and educational psychologists and consists of extensive
instructions for the educators and learning materials for the children, such as
board and card games and CDs. To my knowledge, there is no study that inves-
tigates the returns to such a low-key but well-deﬁned intervention. Most related
to the scope of this paper is study by Weiland and Yoshikawa (2013), who ap-
ply a day-of-birth-induced regression discontinuity design to compare children
in high-quality preschools with an entirely curriculum-based education and spe-
cially trained educators in Boston, Massachusetts, with children in other, lower
quality care arrangements. They ﬁnd positive effects on the short-term cognitive
functioning and socio-emotional skills of treated children.5 Moreover, linguistic
studies provide – independent of the preschool context – evidence on the effec-
tiveness of high-quality early childhood language training programs in improv-
ing language comprehension.6
To account for a potential selection of better preschools or children with greater
need into the treatment, I make use of comprehensive and ﬁne-grained survey
3The average per-child spending on early education in OECD countries is 6,800 dollars p.a.
(OECD, 2013) compared to 18,000 dollar in the Perry Program (Heckman et al., 2010b).
4Grammar skills (that is, listening comprehension at sentence level) form together with recep-
tive vocabulary (listening comprehension at word level) the broader concept of language skills
and are seen as an important element for subsequent learning (NEPS, 2011).
5Moreover, Neidell and Waldfogel (2010) and Currie and Neidell (2007) analyze the compo-
sition of peers and the level of regional spending in Head Start preschool education in the US
as determinants of quality, respectively. Other studies emphasize the importance of the quality
of elementary schooling in the US. See, for instance, Hoxby (2000) for the student-teacher ratio,
Chetty et al. (2014a,b) for teachers’ qualiﬁcation and incentives, and Chetty et al. (2011) for teacher
quality and peer effects.
6See, for instance, the UK Nufﬁeld Early Language Intervention Project, a targeted RCT run
by linguists (Bowyer-Crane et al., 2008).
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questionnaires – answered by the families, the preschool educators, and the prin-
cipals – to compare only the grammar skills of children with and without lan-
guage training who are equally likely to receive the treatment based on a large
number of observable characteristics. To allow for unobserved heterogeneity,
for instance, through innate abilities, I account for an individual’s mathematical
skills in a differences-in-differences setup. As long as potentially unobservable
factors do not systematically differ between grammar and math skills, this strat-
egy removes their confounding effect. The resulting estimator is a regression-
adjusted differences-in-differences propensity score matching approach. To facil-
itate for hundreds variables and their interactions on that preschools and families
potentially select into language training, I rely on machine learning techniques
that enable to restrict the analysis to factors that matter for the selection empir-
ically. The point estimates indicate that language training goes along with an
increase in grammar skills by about 14 percent of a standard deviation. Remark-
ably, the estimate are consistent across the simple-difference and the differences-
in-differences speciﬁcations. This consistency indicates that the observed char-
acteristics are sufﬁcient to account for skill-constant unobservable factors. This
ﬁnding puts, moreover, hope to the notion that the same holds for skill-variant
confounders that would otherwise bias the estimates. A placebo test (using other
skill domains) and a formal bounding exercise further support the validity of the
empirical strategy.
Moving beyond the short-term perspective, the positive association of language
training is persistent and even expanding two to three years after the treatment
at the children’s age of six in the ﬁrst grade of elementary school (even though
skill test scores are only available for a subset of children). The increased magni-
tude may be attributed to both a prolonged exposure to the treatment and a self-
fertilization of grammar skills – that is, higher skills in one period beget higher
skills in subsequent periods (Cunha and Heckman, 2007). At the age of eight, in
the third grade, the estimates still point toward better skills in a more broadly
measured language competence test but are rather imprecise. Although the data
does not allow to estimate the treatment effect beyond elementary school, Fig-
ure 2.1 exploits the association between language skills in adulthood and labor
market performance using data on about 2,000 individuals born between 1944
and 1986.7 The binned scatter plot gives the descriptive relationship between the
percentile of language skills and the average income (indicated by the circles).
In panel (a), the language test score and income are adjusted for basic sociode-
7Although the adults are unrelated to the children considered in the main analysis, the dataset
is part of the same survey, the National Education Panel Study (NEPS), and similar but age-
adjusted skill tests were conducted (see Figure O2.1 in the Online Appendix for empirical evi-
dence).
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mographic characteristics, such as gender, age, and parental education (see the
ﬁgure note for details). The linear ﬁt (depicted by the solid line) suggests that
a one standard deviation increase in adjusted language skills is associated with
an increase in the adjusted income by about 460 Euros (that is, 14 percent of the
average income). Panel (b) repeats the exercises when additionally adjusting for
an individual’s math test score. The declining but positive slop of the linear ﬁt
suggests an income premium of better grammar skills in spite of an individual’s
math skills. While this back-of-the-envelope exploration does not address the
selection problem or indicate that the treatment effect is persistent beyond the
individual’s age of eight, it does hint that, if there is a long-lasting effect of the
language training, the increased grammar skills are also likely to be reﬂected in
higher earnings.
Slope of linear fit = 462.6
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Slope of linear fit = 274.9
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Figure 2.1: Association between language skills and income in adulthood
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 6 (wave 4 from 2011/12) using observations for 2,049 individuals
with complete income and skill information. Following Chetty et al. (2011) the standardized language test score (mean
0, standard deviation 1) and monthly labor market income in Euros are, in an auxiliary step, regressed on a full set of
age ﬁxed effects and indicators for gender, East-German, native speaker, parental migration, and parental education. The
axes give the residuals plus the unconditional mean. The circles depict the average income on the y-axis corresponding
to the quantile of the language skills on the x-axis. The solid line gives the linear ﬁt between the individual-level skill
residual and the income residual using a simple linear regression. The ﬁgure is based on Michael Stepner’s Stata ado-ﬁle
binscatter (see Stepner, 2014). All errors are my own responsibility.
This study contributes to the literature is three ways: First, analyzing the for-
mation of early language skills can be seen as a contribution in its own right
given the importance of skills (see, e.g., Almond and Currie, 2011, for skills in
general and Figure 2.1 for language skills in particular). Second, improving lan-
guage education in preschool is a potentially efﬁcient way to increase the overall
quality of universal preschool programs that reduces the long-term ﬁscal strain
of the government. Third, the careful analysis of the selection using machine
learning techniques and partial identiﬁcation reveals that a preschool’s quality is
already reﬂected in its socioeconomic environment and that adding individual-
level information does not contribute to explaining the preschool’s quality. Simi-
lar, family-level controls seem to be sufﬁcient to account for skill-constant unob-
servable factors.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 brieﬂy summarizes early education in
Germany and describes the treatment. Section 2.3 outlines the empirical strategy
and the potential selection, while Section 2.4 introduces the survey data. Sec-
tion 2.5 presents the results and Section 2.6 shows sensitivity checks. Section 2.7
exploits the effect persistency before Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Day care in Germany
From the age of one until the age of three children in Germany are either in in-
formal care through parents or other relatives (home care) or in family-day care
(non-relative in-home care) or they are in formal care in Kinderkrippe day-care
centers.8 At the age of three, children usually enter Kindergarten day-care cen-
ters until the start of elementary school at the age of six. In Germany, Kinder-
garten centers are not considered as schools (and not part of the state-governed
school system) as their focus is traditionally on overseeing children rather than
curriculum-based education. In order to avoid confusion with kindergarten ed-
ucation in the US K–12 context, I nevertheless refer to the German Kindergarten
centers as preschools. In the preschools children are cared for by educators. Edu-
cators may have but (unlike school teachers) do not need an advanced degree in
education, and have at least completed a three-year part-time training-on-the-job,
part-time vocational school apprenticeship. Figure 2.2 summarizes early educa-
tion in Germany.
Up to the 
age of 3 
Informal care 
(home care, family care) 
Children 
aged 4-6 
Formal care 
(crèches) 
(Universal) preschool 
Elementary school 
Language program 
From age 
6 onwards 
Figure 2.2: Day care in Germany
Notes: Own illustration. This is a broad and simpliﬁed depiction of early childhood day care in Germany. Cre`ches refers
to the German Kinderkrippe and preschool to Kindergarten. Informal care includes home care as well as family day care
(Kindertagespﬂege).
8This margin of early care is subject to ongoing reforms (aiming at increasing formal care) and
research (see Felfe and Lalive, 2012, 2014).
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Not being part of the state-organized school systems, preschools are run by a
so-called provider (Tra¨ger). This is either a local non-proﬁt organization, such as
the church or the labor welfare, or one of the about 13,000 municipalities in Ger-
many (see OECD, 2004, for details).9 Although there is no central supervision
or assessment, a joint framework by the 16 federal states and the states’ youth
welfare ofﬁces regulates the educators’ qualiﬁcation and deﬁnes a set of “educa-
tional objectives” for certain “areas of education.” Preschool education should,
for instance, contribute the “development of the child’s physical, mental, emo-
tional and social abilities” in “language, writing, communication” (KMK, 2015,
p.103). However, the joint framework does neither deﬁne a curriculum nor crite-
ria, when an object is met. Instead, parents can freely choose preschools in any
municipality and may “vote with their feet” if they feel that a preschool does not
live up to their expectations. Preschools are co-ﬁnanced through the federal state,
the municipality, the provider, and parental fees. The latter are either directly set
or at least bounded by the state, are often means-tested, and constitute only a
small part of the overall funding (as of 2014, on average, 14 percent, see OECD,
2004, 2006).
2.2.2 The treatment
The treatment under review, the curriculum-based language training, goes be-
yond the level of learning language that is inherent to overseeing children. The
treatment effect I aim to identify is, therefore, the difference in the formation
of grammar skills between the curriculum-based language training and the lan-
guage skills that are acquired through regular childcare without any speciﬁc lan-
guage education (e.g., by reading to the child).
Several learning programs, that provide a curriculum-based native language train-
ing, are available for preschools in Germany (Neugebauer and Becker-Mrotzek,
2013). Table 2.1 summarizes the most often named programs in the data at hand
(see Section 2.4 for details). As the programs are rather similar to each other, most
preschools have, if any, only one of them. Out of the 214 preschools with com-
plete information in the data, 83 preschools have implemented at least one of the
programs, while four preschools report to have two programs. The programs are
offered by textbook companies and consist of instructions for educators how to
implement the curriculum and often include learning materials, such as board
games, word cards, CDs, and books, and can be purchased online separately or
as a set. The ﬁrst column in Table 2.1 gives the average costs of the programs for
9In-house day-care centers open for the children of employees of bigger companies and for-
proﬁt preschools do not play an important role for childcare in Germany.
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Table 2.1: Overview of the curriculum-based language training programs
Approx. Avg. duration Number of Number of
costs in months preschools children
Any program 83 718
Delﬁn 4* e 52 23 19 135
Ho¨ren, lauschen, lernen e 40–e 110 17 12 88
Kon-Lab e 159–e 428 24 10 112
Deutsch 240** free 22 2 17
Other 40 366
No program 131 1,193
In total 214 1,911
Treated (in %) 37.6 38.8
Notes: The costs in column 1 refer to a basic set of the learning materials and are based on online research. For the costs
of Delﬁn 4 two books with lessons and solution booklets are assumed. Columns 2 to 4 are based on own calculation
using NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 data. Numbers refer to the ﬁnal sample. In case a preschool reports to use more than one
program (four preschools do so), I only consider the ﬁrst-mentioned program.
* This program may be not confused with a assessment test for language competencies.
** Instructions are provided free of charge online by the Ministry of Education of the Stata of Bavaria and preschools
may print some materials, such as word cards, themselves.
the instructions and a basic set of learning materials. Compared to the overall
costs of running a preschool, the costs of the programs are rather humble and all
preschools should be able to afford a program. In fact, comparing the programs
it seems that the price is mainly driven by the amount learning materials they
include – the curriculum and the instructions for the educators are quite similar.
One of the most-often implemented programs, Ho¨ren, lauschen, lernen (this loosely
translates to “listen and learn”), for instance, consists of a 40 Euros textbook that
instructs educators when to schedule lessons and how to implement games and
activities – that is, the curriculum. The program was developed by linguists and
educational psychologists in order to promote the listening comprehension for
the children. This comprehension, in turn, should foster the ability to learn how
sentences are build and to apply this knowledge.10 One of the most expansive
programs, Kon-Lab, consists of several board games and CDs and sets are avail-
able ranging from 159 to 428 Euros, depending on the number of learning mate-
rials (see Figure O2.2 in the Online Appendix).
While the schedule of the lessons suggested by the developers may vary, the pro-
grams do not exhibit much variation in terms of the total time of instruction.
10The Ho¨ren, lauschen, lernen program has a ﬁx schedule and takes about 10 minutes a day
for 20 weeks. The educators are instructed to start every lesson at the same time and to imple-
ment a certain ritual, for instance, that the children ﬁrst sing an opening song and then engage
in games on a certain topic (e.g., the telephone game or ﬁnding words that rhyme with animal
names). After each lesson the children get a stamp in a booklet and are awarded a “certiﬁcate”
after completing all lessons.
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However, the actual time children spent participating in the programs reveals
some variation across the programs in the data at hand, see column 2 in Table
2.1. For instance, the program Ho¨ren, lauschen, lernen is, on average, used for 17
months while the developers suggest 12 months. This probably reﬂects that once
the learning materials are available and educators and children know and maybe
like some of the games, they will not stop engaging in them. It is more likely that
children outgrow the content after a while.
For the analysis to come, it is helpful to distinguish some broad factors or chan-
nels why some preschools have implemented a language training program, while
two-thirds did not. Although the list is not exhausting, four (not mutually ex-
clusive) reasons may channel a preschool’s decisions: (i) While a lack in ﬁnancial
means is a rather unlikely reason taken for itself, the preschool’s provider might be
more important. Church-run preschools may, for instance, prefer more religious-
themed (language) learning materials even though if those materials have a less
rigorous curriculum. (ii) Preschools may not see the need of student body for spe-
cial language training because the children enrolled are from well-off families
and already process good language skills when entering the preschool. (iii) Sev-
eral preschools in close proximity may compete for children (who, in turn, affect
ﬁnancial resources) may set an incentive to increase the quality of the education
by implementing a special language education. (iv) The educators’ and principal’s
engagement will certainly affect the treatment status as they need to implement
the language training. Educators might be reluctant to implement the language
training because of the additional workload and principals may not be able to
enforce the language training. On the other hand, a very experienced or engaged
educator might be convinced to do a better job in supporting language skills than
some program developed by academics.
Moreover, as families choose preschools, I can think of three broad groups of
factors at this level: (v) The availability of language training is likely to depend
on the child’s month of birth and the enrollment into the preschool (although
there a no systematically roll-out of the language training). Moreover, (vi) parents
may decide for a preschool with language training because of the child’s individual
need, that is, they may want to compensate for a lag in or reinforce good skills;
or (vii) because of their preferences for and their involvement in their offspring’s
education.
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2.3 Empirical strategy
2.3.1 The selection problem
Depending on the treatment status, a child’s grammar skills may take one out of
two values: treated grammar skills (that is, the level of grammar skills if she re-
ceives the language training) or untreated grammar skills. The effect of language
training participation is the difference between these two values. However, be-
cause a child either receives the language training or does not receive the training,
only one of the two potential outcomes is realized – the unrealized and, thereby,
unobserved outcome is the counterfactual. In order to overcome this identiﬁca-
tion problem, one would ideally wish to randomize language training participa-
tion, for instance, in form of a randomized controlled trial. If the assignment of
and the participation in the language training is indeed random with respect to
the level of grammar skills and only affects which level of skills is observed (the
treated or the untreated skills), the level of grammar skills of the control group
without the treatment (that can be observed) may serve as an appropriate proxy
for the unobservable grammar skills of the treatment group in absence of the
treatment.
However, in the observational data at hand, the language training is not (as-good-
as) randomly assigned but probably subject to selection – as outlined above. This
selection may emerge if children receive the language training because of unob-
served potential grammar skills. In an extreme case, only children with partic-
ulary low grammar skills are enrolled in preschools that have implemented the
language training. Comparing the mean values of the realized grammar skills of
treated and untreated children would then underestimate the true effect of the
language training. In the opposite extreme, only the children of parents who em-
phasize education receive the language training. If these children would also do
better in absence of the language training, the simple mean comparison would
overstate the true effect. In either case, the universe of untreated children does
not serve as a sufﬁcient control group to proxy the grammar skills of the treated
children in absence of the language training.
2.3.2 Regression-adjusted propensity score matching
In order to guard against such a selection, as far as this is possible, I seek to com-
pare only the grammar skills of children with and without language training who
are identical in all other aspects. In other words, I aim at identifying the subset
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of untreated children who constitute a suitable control group. This can be done
in two ways, either by controlling for all factors that are correlated with both
the treatment status and grammar skills in a regression model or by estimating
the probability of receiving language training (that is, the propensity score) and
only comparing the grammar skills of treated and untreated children with a sim-
ilar probability of receiving the language training in a propensity score matching
(PSM) approach. Both methods only yield the causal effect of the language train-
ing if all confounding factors can be observed. This assumption is referred to as
conditional independence assumption (CIA), unconfoundedness or selection-on-
observables.
Although I will present linear regression results as a benchmark, in the preferred
speciﬁcation I rely on “more sophisticated [matching] methods for adjusting for
differences in covariates” (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009, p.24). To implement
the matching approach I conduct a three step procedure: In the ﬁrst step, I esti-
mate the propensity score (PS) as the ﬁtted value from an auxiliary probit model
where language training participation is regressed on the covariates. Second, for
each child in the treatment group I assign kernel weights (using an Epanech-
nikov kernel) to all untreated children indicating the distance in the estimated
PS. The closer the estimated PS of the untreated child is compared to the esti-
mated PS of the treated child, the higher the weight the untreated child receives.
This procedure leaves me with a full set of weights for all untreated children for
each child in the treatment group. If the PS estimation is based on all variables
that confound the language training effect, reweighting the untreated children
mimics the control group under random treatment assignment. To guard against
outliers I only consider treated children and with a PS that is higher than the
minimum and lower than the maximum PS of the untreated children. That is, I
restrict the sample to children “on support.” Following the suggestion of Bang
and Robins (2005), I add a third step to the propensity score matching procedure:
I take the ﬁnal treatment effect (and the preschool-clustered standard errors) from
a weighted regression of grammar skills on the language training indicator and
the set of covariates that enters the PS estimation in the ﬁrst step. This additional
step ensures that the matching approach is “doubly robust” as it allows either the
selection or the outcome equation to be misspeciﬁed as long as the other equa-
tion is correctly speciﬁed (Bang and Robins, 2005). Besides the identiﬁcation and
exclusion of outliers and the doubly robust speciﬁcation, the PSM strategy has
another advantage compared to a linear regression controlling for the same co-
variates: The matching approach is semi-parametric in that it only assumes a
functional form between the covariates and the PS but not between the language
training and grammar skills.
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2.3.3 Differences-in-differences propensity score matching
To complement the (simple-difference) matching strategy, I additionally imple-
ment a regression-adjusted differences-in-differences propensity score matching
(DD-PSM) approach following the idea of Heckman et al. (1997). While the data
structure at hand prevents me from using pretreatment grammar skills to estab-
lish a before-after comparison, I instead follow Ju¨rges et al. (2005) and others and
compare the development of grammar skills with the formation of math skills.11
Notwithstanding the semi-parametric nature of the PSM approach, the formation
of grammar skills Ygra might be represented through the following stylized skill
production function12 (suppressing individual and preschool subscripts):
Ygra = β0 + β1D +X ′β
gra
2 + μ + ε
gra, (2.1)
where β1 is the effect of interest and ε denotes an i.i.d. error term. TheX variables
are observable and enter regression and the estimation of the PS, respectively.
The term μ summarizes unobserved determinants of the skill formation such as
innate abilities and preferences. If those factors are also correlated with the treat-
ment status, neither the regression nor the matching approach would yield the
causal estimate of β1. Nevertheless, if the unobservables in μ affect the forma-
tion of grammar and math skills in the same way, establishing a differences-in-
differences approach across both skill domains may still overcome the selection
problem. To see this, the formation of mathematical skills Ymath (measured on the
same scale as Ygra) may be represented analogous to the formation of grammar
skills:
Ymath = β0 +X ′βmath2 + μ + ε
math. (2.2)
If Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2) are correctly speciﬁed (that is, D does not enter Eq. (2.2) and
μ is independent from the skill domain), subtracting math skills from grammar
skills leads to the differences-in-differences notation:
Ygra −Ymath = β1D +X ′(βgra2 − βmath2 ) + (εgra − εmath). (2.3)
11Compared to the DD-PSM approach suggested by Heckman et al. (1997), my strategy dif-
fers in two dimensions. Besides establishing the second difference across skills instead of time
periods, continuously measured math skills do not allow to match on the exact value of math
skills. Following Ju¨rges et al. (2005) I instead use the skill difference as outcome variable in the
baseline analysis. As a robustness check, I condense the math skill measure to take fewer values
and condition on the exact value.
12Much research has been devoted to the arguments and the functional form of skill production
functions (see, e.g., Todd and Wolpin, 2003, 2007). Here, I rely on a very basic version for the
purpose of introducing the DD approach.
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Here, the unobserved component μ is cancelled out. Given Eq. (2.3) is correct,
this then yields the causal effect of language training. Taking the skill difference
as dependent variable alters the CIA as follows: in order to identify the causal
effect of language training all factors that simultaneously affect the treatment sta-
tus and the difference between grammar and math skills need to be observed. In
other words, while the simple-difference approach requires statistical indepen-
dence of the level of the potential grammar skills and the treatment status (given
controls); for the DD approach, it is sufﬁcient that the difference between the po-
tential outcomes (the grammar-math difference) is independent of the treatment
status.13
Although the plausibility of the CIA eventually depends on the quality of the con-
trol variables (that is, how plausible it is that all confounders are account for), it
might be useful to have a closer look what the CIA actually implies in the applica-
tion at hand. First, the DD approach (and, thereby, the relaxed CIA) requires that
language training does not enter the formation of math skills (D does not enter
Eq. (2.2)). This rules, for instance, out that treated children understand the math
test questions better because of better language skills. Although this assumption
is not directly testable, the design of the skill tests I use (see the next section) and a
placebo analysis using math skills as pseudo-outcome (see the sensitivity checks)
provide some evidence that this assumption might be justiﬁed in the application
at hand. The second requirement for the DD approach is that the unobservable
factors μ affect grammar and math skills in the same way and are, thus, cancelled
out. This boils down to the assumption that there are no skill-variant factors cor-
relating with the treatment status after conditioning on the observable factors. In
general, there are two categories of factors may violating this assumption: innate
factors and nurtured factors. An innate difference would arise if some children
are born with better language skills, while others have better innate math skills.
If parents systematically choose a preschool with language training in response
to such an innate difference, this would bias the estimated treatment effect in the
DD approach. However, relying on research in psychology, such a gap in innate
skills seems rather unlikely. Evidence indicates a substantial overlap across the
innate skills in different domains.14 This inter-correlation of ability tests allows
13This corresponds to the common trend assumption when establishing the DD approach by
comparing the treatment and control group over time.
14Psychological research distinguishes two theories of the heritability of cognitive skills: mod-
ularity (that is, speciﬁc abilities are also genetically distinct) vs. molarity (that is, “people who do
well on tests of one type of cognitive skill also tend to do well on tests of other cognitive abili-
ties,” Wright, 1998, p.64). Genetic research indicates that the development of all kinds of skills is
shaped through an underlying “general intelligence” (the so-called factor g in psychometrics, see
American Psychological Association, 1995), which speaks for a molarity of cognitive skills (see,
for instance, Plomin and DeFries, 1998 and Plomin and Spinath, 2002 for reviews).
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summarizing an individual’s performance using a single measure – the intelli-
gence quotient. If this unity of the inherited skills holds, a genetic component
confounding the relationship between language training and grammar skills is
removed by taking the difference between grammar and math skills. The sec-
ond concern, the existence of nurtured differences in the development of certain
skills, may arise if parents prefer one kind of skills over another kind and choose
the preschool accordingly. To accommodate for such a selection, I need to rely
on the observable factors to capture parental and preschool preferences for either
grammar or math skills.15
2.4 Data and variables
2.4.1 The National Education Panel Study
The data is taken from the German National Education Panel Study (NEPS), see
Blossfeld et al. (2011).16,17 The NEPS follows a multi-cohort sequence design, that
is, it samples six different populations in a longitudinal manner. The six popu-
lations are newborns, children aged four, ﬁfth graders, ninth graders, ﬁrst-year
university students, and adults. For each of the six samples, called “Starting Co-
horts,” the data exhibit a panel structure. Across all Starting Cohorts the data
collection is organized along ﬁve dimensions: competence development, educa-
tional process, educational decisions, educational acquisition, and returns to ed-
ucation. The questions are designed by sociologists and psychologists to ensure
comparability across the Starting Cohorts as far as this is possible.
For the purpose of the analysis, I use Starting Cohort 2 with data on children
aged four at panel entry.18 Staring with the ﬁrst wave in 2010/11 about 3,000
15In the robustness checks I condition on variables assessing child’s activities at home and in
preschool. If parents, for instance, prefer language skills over math skills (or see a bigger need
for improving language skills over math skills), this might be reﬂected in how often they read to
their child. This piece of information this assessed in the questions on the child’s activities.
16This paper uses data from the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS): Starting Cohort
Kindergarten, doi:10.5157/NEPS:SC2:5.1.0. From 2008 to 2013, NEPS data was collected as part
of the Framework Program for the Promotion of Empirical Educational Research funded by the
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). As of 2014, NEPS is carried out by
the Leibniz Institute for Educational Trajectories (LIfBi) at the University of Bamberg in coopera-
tion with a nationwide network.
17Extensive documentation in German and English lan-
guage may be found here: https://www.neps-data.de/en-
us/datacenter/dataanddocumentation/startingcohortkindergarten/documentation.aspx. The
examples of questions and test items I refer to are taken from the online resources.
18Figure 2.1 in the introduction is based on the adults sample of Starting Cohort 6 of the NEPS.
The analysis beneﬁts from the feature that the competence tests in all Stating Cohorts (but new-
borns) are designed to be comparable across the age groups (Weinert et al., 2011).
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four-year-olds in 279 preschools were sampled and followed throughout their
transition into elementary school (in the most recent release, wave 5 in 2014/15,
children are in the third grade). While the children themselves only participate in
competence tests, their parents and preschool educators answer extensive ques-
tionnaires about them and their own characteristics. Additionally, the preschools’
principals provide information on themselves and the preschool. Principals re-
port, for instance, in the ﬁrst wave, whether a curriculum-based language train-
ing has been implemented and, if so, which program. This information is avail-
able for 214 of the preschools19, resulting in about 2,000 observations on children
of whom about one-third are in a preschool that has implemented the language
training.
While the assessment of the treatment status in ﬁrst wave only does not allow
exploiting the panel structure to analyze a language training introduction, the
longitudinal nature makes it possible to investigate the persistency of the treat-
ment effect. However, due to the sampling of the preschools, elementary school
information is only available for about 300 children.20
2.4.2 Skill measures
To assess several domains of cognitive competencies, extensive test procedures
(about one hour in every wave) have been implemented in the NEPS, see Weinert
et al. (2011). Due to the long test duration not each skill domain is tested in every
wave, instead the different domains are usually repeated every other wave. The
skill tests are designed along two principals: ﬁrst, allowing a comparison across
Starting Cohorts (that is, the difﬁculty and topics are adjusted for the age groups)
and, second, the items are constructed to avoid overlapping between the different
skill domains. In the Starting Cohort under review, the tests are conducted in one-
to-one situations with specially trained interviewers who visit the preschool and
elementary school of the child, respectively.
Grammar skills. The main outcome variable is the grammar test score in the ﬁrst
wave at the children’s age of four. The grammar test takes 10 minutes and covers
48 items. The questions are based on the German version of the internationally
established “Test for Reception of Grammar” (see Bishop, 1989, and Fox-Boyer,
2006, for the German adoption). An example of one of the items is depicted in
19Following the suggestion of Stuart (2010), missing values in the covariates are recoded to
non-missing values and a variable indicating this is added to the analysis.
20The preschools are sampled through a register of all elementary schools and enter the sample
if an elementary school reports to take children from the preschool. Only children enrolled in one
of the originally sampled elementary schools are followed.
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Figure O2.3 of the Online Appendix. In this example, the sentence “The cats are
looking at the ball” is given by CD and the child is asked to point to one out
of four pictures shown by the interviewer that depicts the situation described in
the sentence the best. The resulting test score is the number of correct answers.
A similar test, covering 40 items in 15 minutes, was conducted in wave 3 (ﬁrst
elementary school grade). In wave 5, the than-eight-year-olds answered a more
broadly measured language test that covers reading speed and text understand-
ing. Figure A2.1 in the Appendix depicts the distribution of the grammar test
score in the ﬁrst wave by treatment status. The ﬁgure suggests, on average, nei-
ther a reinforcing nor a compensating selection into the treatment.
Math skills. Math skills are assessed in the second wave (about six months after
the ﬁrst wave) alongside basic cognitive functioning (e.g., perceptional speed).
The math test takes about 30 minutes and covers 26 items. In one of the questions,
for example, the interviewer shows the child a bowl with four stones, covers the
bowl under a blanket, and adds three stones. The child is asked to name the total
number of stones in the bowl. Again, the total test score is the number of correct
answers. An age-adjusted math test is repeated in second grade of elementary
school (wave 4) at the children’s age of seven.21
2.4.3 Potential confounders
Table A2.1 in the Appendix summarizes the potential confounders mapping the
seven channels of a potential selection. Variables for the provider of the preschool
(indicators for the municipality, the church or another non-proﬁt as well as the
number of children) and the availability (the child’s gender, age-in-months ﬁxed
effects, an East Germany indicator22, and the number of months the child vis-
its the preschool) are rather easy to measure. Controlling for a selection on the
other channels discussed above is less straightforward as many factors poten-
tially capture those channels but only a few of the factors will actually confound
the analysis. I address this by using a variable selection approach to reduce the
dimensionality of the controls in the next section. Note, that the credibility of the
21Panel (a) of Figure A2.2 in the Appendix shows the raw correlation between the grammar
test score in wave 1 and the math test scores in wave 2. As one might expect – and as it is a prereq-
uisite for the DD strategy – an individual’s grammar and math skills are highly correlated. This
holds true even after adjusting the test score for the observables introduced in the next subsection
in panel (b). This indicates that math skills capture indeed factors that are not reﬂected in the
observables – however, those factors do not necessarily correlate with the treatment decision.
22While data protection makes it impossible to control for municipality ﬁxed effects, the
preschool-level variables on the composition of the socioeconomic background of the children
– I am going to present in the following – should capture a lot of the variation that would also be
removed through the inclusion of municipality ﬁxed effects.
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(DD-)CIA depends on the quality of the variables that can be controlled for and
not necessarily their empirical relevance. In fact, the more variables are available
and the fewer actually enter the model, the less likely it appears that unobserv-
able factors confound the relationship of interest.
To capture the need of the student body for better language education, the NEPS
data includes information on the share of children in the preschool from families
with a low/middle/ high SES (as assessed by the principal), the share of children
with migrational background, and the share of children from families where at
least one parent has higher education. Information on the number of children
and educators allows calculating the boys-girls as well as the child-educator ra-
tio (similar to the student-teacher ratio in school). Moreover, information on the
preschool’s competition that may incentivize increasing the quality of education
is available: the number of preschools within 5km and indicators for no, little,
some, or strong competition. To capture the role of the educators and the principal,
I make use of their sociodemographic characteristics (gender, age, migrational
background) as well as variables that may reﬂect their engagement and quality
(job experience, educational degree, number of times and hours spend in further
training). An educator or principal having herself or himself a migrational back-
ground might, for instance, be more eager to implement the language training.
To assess the child’s individual need for language training, I consider the child’s,
the parents’, and the grandparents’ mother tongue and their country of birth
through several indicators (e.g., German, Turkish, Russian, etc., see Table A2.1
for the complete list). Using exact information on the mother tongue accounts
for the “language distance” to German (see Isphording and Otten, 2013, 2014).
To capture the child’s general development, I include the child’s birth weight
and height as well as the weight and the height at the age of four. Especially
birth weight and height are shows to be important proxies for the child’s devel-
opment and parental SES (see Currie, 2009). For this reason I also consider an
indicator for premature birth. To capture parental preferences for education the
data includes several information on the family’s SES: family income, mother’s
and father’s employment status at the child’s age of four, indicators whether the
parent’s occupations require higher education, years of education, the number of
younger and older siblings, the number of books in the household (see Brunello
et al., 2017, for the potential relevance), and the living arrangements at child’s age
of four.
As evident from Table A2.1, preschools with the language training have, on aver-
age, more children with migrational background, less children from parents with
higher education, more children coming from low-SES families (as assessed by
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the principal), and more educated educators. Given that the identiﬁcation relies
on the ability to control for all factors that confound the relationship between lan-
guage training and grammar skills, having such a large number of variables is a
desirable feature for the analysis.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Covariate selection and propensity score estimation
While having many control variables at the disposal is desirable from an identi-
ﬁcation point of view, using all of the variables to estimate the PS provokes two
pitfalls. First, not all potential confounders actually confound the relationship of
interest. Fitting the PS using variables that enter the prediction with a non-zero
coefﬁcient by chance decreases the accuracy of the estimated probability of receiv-
ing language training. Such overﬁtting might additionally reduce of common
support. Second, with only about 2,000 observations, including all interactions
between the 100+ linear control variables is not feasible. To address these prob-
lems some kind of regularization is necessary. While many approaches of regu-
larization have been suggested (see, e.g., the overview of Caliendo and Kopeinig,
2008), I apply the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (Lasso) as a
“modern” tool for variable selection (Belloni et al., 2014a, p.640). This is in line
with an increasing number of studies that demonstrate how machine learning
techniques originally developed for “big-data” problems can improve the analy-
sis in small-data program evaluation applications (see, e.g., Belloni et al., 2014b,
Athey, 2017, and Athey and Imbens, 2017). The Lasso variable selection is used
in an auxiliary step before estimating the PS. The Lasso can be seen as penalized
OLS estimation and has the feature to set the coefﬁcients of variables, that do
not contribute to the prediction of the PS, to exactly zero (Varian, 2014).23 I refer
to the variables with non-zero coefﬁcients as “Lasso-chosen” or “Lasso-selected”
variables. To protect against omitted variables, I follow Belloni et al. (2014a) and
employ the Lasso strategy to select the predictors of the PS as well as of grammar
skills. This approach is known as “double Lasso selection” and the union of the
Lasso-chosen variables that affect the treatment or the outcome enter the analysis
outlined in Section 2.3 as control variables.
23I rely on the Stata ado ﬁle lassoShooting provided online by Christian Hansen to con-
duced the Lasso analysis (see Hansen, 2014). All errors are my own responsibility. The penalty
level, that affects how many coefﬁcients are set to zero, is assessed through cross-validation,
where the out-of-sample prediction error is minimized by the penalty level.
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Figure 2.3: Channels of selection and their empirical implementation
Notes: Own illustration. The channels on the left-hand side correspond to channels (i)–(vii) discussed in Section 2.2.2.
On preschool level, variables on the provider are treated as basic covariates that enter the model in spite of statistical
considerations. On family level, covariates on the availability of language training, such as age-in-months indicators, are
basic variables. Variables for the other ﬁve channels are chosen using Lasso regularization in order to avoid overﬁtting.
Basic variables enter the model ﬁrst, afterwards variables on preschool and family level are chosen by Lasso regression
sequentially, starting with preschool variables and conditioning on the basic variables. The smaller boxes for the chosen
variables indicate that only a subset of all variables is chosen to enter the ﬁnal propensity score estimation.
Instead of using a “throwing-it-all-in approach” – that is, applying the double
Lasso selection to all potential confounders at once, I follow the suggestion of
Mullainathan and Spiess (2017) and combine the Lasso tool with knowledge of
the decision-making process that determines the treatment status. Figure 2.3
shows the utilization of the covariates for the seven channels of selection. The
provider and availability channels are not subject to the selection procedure. Vari-
ables that account for these channels are fairly easy to measure and I deem them
as too important to be left out (one may think, for instance, about the importance
of the child’s age for grammar skills). Imbens and Rubin (2015) refer to such fac-
tors as basic variables. Given the basic variables, I then, in turn, ﬁrst, choose the
confounders on preschool level and, second, on family level using double Lasso
selection. Finally, I select the pairwise interaction terms of the chosen linear vari-
ables in the same way (see Imbens, 2015).
Because the stepwise selection could, again, cause an overﬁtting problem, Fig-
ure 2.4 shows the accuracy of the PS estimation and the share of “off-support”
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observations along the Lasso-chosen covariate blocks. The prediction error rate
is given on the left y-axis (see the ﬁgure note for the calculation) and the share
of observations off-support is given on the right y-axis. The ﬁgure depicts the
expected trade-off between a large number of included variables and a strong
common support. Still, even in the most accurate speciﬁcation that includes the
highest number of variables (the model with interactions), less than 10 percent
of the observations are off-support.24 Table 2.2 shows both the selected linear
covariates and their unmatched and matched sample means by treatment status.
Following the structure of Figure 2.4, the table presents the variables in the order
they enter the model, starting from the top. After including the basic covariates,
I ﬁrst choose the predictors of the treatment on preschool level. The Lasso ap-
proach indicates seven variables as important predictors (that is, the coefﬁcients
of these seven variables in the Lasso estimation are different from zero).25 Only
three variables on preschool level are chosen as predictors of the outcome. Given
the nine variables on preschool level chosen in this step (the share of children with
migrational background is chosen to predict the treatment and the outcome), I
next select the covariates on family level. Interestingly, given the preschool-level
variables, no family-level variable contributes to predicting the treatment status.
In other words, there seems to be no parental selection of children into the lan-
guage training after conditioning on preschool characteristics and some basic so-
ciodemographics of the child. However, seven family-level characteristics still
contribute to explaining the child’s grammar skills.
If the matching is successful, the means of the covariates should not signiﬁcantly
differ across the treatment and the control group, given the estimated PS. To as-
sess this, Table 2.2 compares the mean of treated and untreated individuals before
and after the matching. Columns 3 and 6 report the p-values of a t-test of equal
means for treated and untreated individuals before after the matching, respec-
tively. The high p-values after the matching indicate that the null of hypothesis
of equal means cannot be rejected at the conventional levels. Hence, conditioning
on the estimated PS seems sufﬁcient to balance the sample. The bottom of the
table additionally gives the median standardized bias before and after the match-
24Figure A2.3 in the Appendix gives a similar plot when all variables introduced in Section
2.4.3 are taken for the PS estimation. The ﬁgure bears three lessons that underline the advantage
of the Lasso approach compared to no regularization: the share of off-support observations in
Figure A2.3 is higher, the ﬁt is worse (in fact, the error rate indicates that family-level variables
should not be used), and the large number of linear variables prevents including all pairwise
higher-order terms.
25The Lasso algorithm is not able to reveal the underlying data generating process, different
samples (or folds of the original sample) may yield a distinct sets of covariates (see Mullainathan
and Spiess, 2017). For this reason I only discuss how many variables are chosen from the different
blocks, but I do not interpret the choice in the light of some theory, why exactly those variables
enter the model.
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Figure 2.4: Error rate of the estimated propensity score across different sets of
covariates
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 using 1,911 observations. For each of the ﬁve speciﬁcations the
propensity score is estimated using a probit model. The error rate (left axis) is calculated as the share of falsely assigned
treatment statuses, formally Err = 1n ∑
N
i=1  (Di = Dˆi), where  (·) takes the value 1 if Di = Dˆi and Dˆi is set to 1 if the
estimated probability of being treated exceeds 0.5, otherwise Dˆi = 0. Beside the in-sample error rate, the out-of-sample
error rate is calculated using 5-fold cross-validation ﬁve times. For the use of cross-validated error rates in prediction,
see, e.g., James et al. (2013, chapters 5-6). For the three speciﬁcations on the right-hand side double post-Lasso selection
is applied before the probit model. The share of off-support observations (right axis) is calculated using Epanechnikov
kernel matching with a bandwidth 0.06.
ing (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985, for the calculation). Balancing the sample
reduces the median standardized bias from 7.5 to 3.0 percent. Although there is
no clear theoretical indication, a standardized bias below 5 is usually considered
a successful matching approach. Figure A2.4 in the Appendix plots the resulting
PS distributions by treatment status. As one might expect, untreated children are
less likely to receive language training than treated children. The estimated PS
has a common support up to 0.93 (that is, a 93 percent probability of receiving the
treatment).
2.5.2 Baseline results
Table 2.3 presents the baseline results.26 Columns 1 and 2 show the benchmark
linear regression effect of language training on grammar skills and the difference
between grammar and math skills, respectively. As the models rely on the Lasso-
selected control variables, I refer to them as “post-Lasso” speciﬁcations. Both skill
measures are standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation (SD) 1. The associ-
ation between the treatment and grammar skills in column 1 is 14.5 percent of a
26Table O2.1 in the Online Appendix gives the full estimation output for the selection equation
estimated with OLS and probit as well as for the outcome equation assessed by OLS and PSM.
35
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of selected linear covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unmatched sample Matched sample
Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value
untreated treated diff. untreated treated diff.
Basic covariates preschool
Num. of children 80.82 85.22 0.54 68.84 79.28 0.09
Provider: municiplaity 0.28 0.39 0.00 0.34 0.31 0.80
Provider: church 0.39 0.40 0.84 0.41 0.43 0.82
Provider: other 0.17 0.18 0.95 0.18 0.17 0.94
External supervision 0.25 0.27 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.47
Basic covariates family
Age-in-months ﬁxed effects (omitted from output)
C: female 0.47 0.50 0.24 0.50 0.49 0.87
East-Germany 0.19 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.24
Current care 24.31 22.27 0.81 21.17 22.61 0.22
Preschool covariates selected for treatment
Boys/girls ration 1.02 1.13 0.06 1.07 1.10 0.74
Share migration 18.77 26.97 0.05 20.81 21.44 0.89
Child/educator ratio 10.07 13.01 0.03 13.84 13.37 0.84
Competition: none 0.14 0.28 0.04 0.14 0.20 0.48
Competition: high 0.13 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.60
Princ.: further training 0.37 0.57 0.01 0.55 0.54 0.93
Princ.: college educ. 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.69
Preschool covariates selected for outcome
Preschool: fee 95.89 87.57 0.30 92.01 93.68 0.88
Share higher education 17.66 14.65 0.32 12.56 15.38 0.39
Share migrants (see above)
Family covariates selected for treatment (no variables selected)
Family covariates selected for outcome
Books at home: 11–25 0.09 0.10 0.49 0.09 0.08 0.86
M: years educ. 10.95 10.71 0.57 11.00 11.10 0.88
M: acad. job 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.78
F: acad. job 0.18 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.17 0.79
C: German 0.71 0.68 0.41 0.70 0.71 0.84
M: German 0.65 0.61 0.31 0.65 0.65 0.96
German mother–father 0.08 0.23 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.81
Median stand. bias 7.5 3.0
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 using 1,911 observations. Letters in front of the variables give
the person to whom the variables refer: C=child, M=mother, F=father. Columns 1 and 2 report the mean values of the
Lasso-chosen covariates for treated and untreated individuals, respectively, in the unmatched sample. Columns 4 and
5 state the corresponding numbers for the matched sample. The matched sample refers to the observations on-support
weighted by the linear index of the propensity score. Columns 3 and 6 give the p-values of a t-test of equal means
between the treated and the untreated individuals for the unmatched and the matched sample, respectively. A high p-
value indicates that the null (equal means) cannot be rejected at the conventional levels. Age-in-months ﬁxed effects,
missing value indicators, and higher-order terms are omitted for brevity. The bottom of the table reports the median
standardized bias for before and after the matching. The median standardized bias includes all variables.
SD and statistically signiﬁcant different from zero at the 5 percent level. Going to
the DD model in column 2, the coefﬁcient is remarkable similar with 13.1 percent
of a SD. Columns 3 and 4 of give the regression-adjusted simple-difference PSM
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and DD-PSM results, respectively. The point estimates are 14.1 and 13.8 percent
of a SD, respectively.
Table 2.3: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-Lasso Regression-adj.
regression matching
Simple
DD
Simple
DD
diff. diff.
Effect of language training program
Coefﬁcient 0.148∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.141∗∗ 0.138∗∗
S.E. (0.055) (0.063) (0.059) (0.054)
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 using 1,911 observations, 1,794 on-
support. Every cell states the estimated effect of language training on the grammar skills (odd
columns) and the grammar-math skill difference (even columns), respectively. Outcome variables
are standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. To perform the matching I use the Stata
ado-ﬁle psmatch2 by Edwin Leuven and Barbara Sianesi (see Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). All
errors are my own responsibility. The matching algorithm is Epanechnikov kernel matching with
a bandwidth of 0.06. Preschool-level clustered standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance:
∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
While comparing the linear regression with the matching estimates reveals that
there is no non-linear effect captured through the semi-parametric nature of the
matching approach, the comparison of the simple-difference and DD results is
more interesting as this sheds light on the role of the covariates. If skill-constant
unobservable factors on individual level, such as motivation or general intelli-
gence (if not entirely captured by parental characteristics), would bias the simple-
difference estimate, the DD estimate would differ. As this is not the case, con-
ditioning on the covariates seems sufﬁcient for removing skill-constant unob-
servable factors. Although this comparison does not rule out the existence of
skill-variant unobservable factors that would cause a bias, I interpret it as rather
unlikely that the control variables are sufﬁcient to capture skill-constant but not
skill-variant unobservable factors. In other words, a large difference between
the simple-difference and DD estimates would not only contradict the simple-
difference CIA but would also cast doubt on the validity of the DD-CIA. This ar-
gument is referred to as subset-unconfoundedness (see Imbens and Rubin, 2015,
chapter 21).
An effect size of about 14 percent of a SD seems moderate to large compared to
the literature on the quality of education. Weiland and Yoshikawa (2013), ﬁnd
that one year of curriculum-based education in special preschools improves re-
ceptive vocabulary by 0.38–0.44 SD. Analysing students in grades 3–8, Chetty
et al. (2014a) estimate that a one SD increase in the teacher value-added increases
the reading test scores by 0.1 SD. Looking at grades 3–7, Rivkin et al. (2005) ﬁnd
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that a one year increase in teacher experience increases the students’ reading per-
formance by 0.06 SD.
To verify the ﬁndings I conduct two kinds of robustness checks. First, Table O2.2
in the Online Appendix shows the estimates when no kind variable selection is
used and when Lasso selection is applied to all potential confounders at once,
respectively. Although the DD estimates exceed their OLS counterparts, both are
rather close the baseline estimates. Second, Table O2.3 in the Online Appendix
gives the results for 5-to-1 and 2-to-1 nearest neighbour caliper matching with
replacement, respectively, and Epanechnikov kernel matching with a bandwidth
of 0.02 and 0.10, respectively. The baseline results are stable across these speciﬁ-
cations.
2.5.3 Effect heterogeneity
Program heterogeneity. As the treatment is not uniform over all preschools but
the language programs vary in some aspects, program-speciﬁc effects might be
more informative than the average effect presented above. With more than ﬁve
programs and only about 700 treated children estimating separate effects using a
treatment group that consists only of children that receive the same program does
not seen reasonable. Instead, column 1 in Table A2.2 in the Appendix gives the
estimates when regressing grammar skills on the treatment indicator and interac-
tion terms between the treatment status and indicators of the three most common
programs (and controls). Signiﬁcant interaction terms (statistically or economi-
cally) would indicate an effect heterogeneity across the programs. However, this
does not seem to be the case here. Column 2 of the table shows the heterogeneity
when individuals are matched on the treatment status (without differentiating
between programs) and interaction terms are included in the weighted regres-
sion. Again, there seems to be no heterogeneity.
Heterogeneity along math skills. In the baseline model, I use the grammar-math
difference as outcome instead of conditioning on the exact math test score (as
originally proposed by Heckman et al., 1997), because math skills are measured
on a continuous scale. Before having a look at the heterogeneity along the math
skills, column 1 in Table A2.3 in the Appendix, I show the DD-PSM results when
conditioning on the tercile of the math test score (instead of using the grammar-
math difference as outcome). That is, indicators for the math test score terciles
enter the matching approach. As evident from Table A2.3, this does not change
the interpretation of the baseline result. To access heterogeneity, columns 2 to 4
show the treatment effect when matching on the exact tercile. Unlike to column 1,
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here all individuals in the treatment and the control group are in the same math
test score tercile. Interestingly, only individuals in the second tercile seem to ben-
eﬁt from the language training. For individuals in the lowest and highest terciles,
the effect size is less than one-tenth and one-ﬁfth, respectively. A potential reason
for this pattern might be that children who perform well in the math test have
also proper language skills and do not learn new things through the language
training. On the other hand, children with poor math skills may struggle with
learning in general and learning language even in a structured way is too hard or
too fast for them as they would need an even more intensive care instead.
Heterogeneity along observables. Table A2.4 in the Appendix shows separate esti-
mations by gender, mother tongue, and occupation of the father. Interestingly,
boys seem to beneﬁt stronger from language training than girls. In the regres-
sion and the matching models in panel (a), the treatment effect for boys is about
7 percentage points higher than for girls. The effect for girls is not statistically
signiﬁcant different from zero due to the smaller effect size (the standard errors
are about the same for boys and girls). The opposite is the case when comparing
German native speakers with non-native speakers in panel (b): the effect size is
rather similar but the standard errors are higher for the latter group (this may
be attributed to the smaller sample size). Otherwise, non-native speakers do not
seem to beneﬁt stronger than native speakers. Assessing a heterogeneity along
the family’s SES in panel (c) reveals that children from families, where the father
has an occupation that does not require higher education, beneﬁt stronger. Again,
this indicates that the language training does not improve the skills of children
who already process a high level of language skills.
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2.6 Sensitivity analysis and discussion
So far, it seems fair to interpret the ﬁndings as suggestive evidence that the CIA
is not violated: the data at hand allows accounting for all potential channels of
selection, only few variables seem to confound the training-skill relationship em-
pirically, and the point estimates are stable across the various speciﬁcations. To
get a more complete picture, this section provides two kinds of supplementary
evidence: ﬁrst, I investigate the two additional assumptions necessary for estab-
lishing a plausible case for the DD approach (that is, math skills are indepen-
dent of language training and the difference between grammar and math skills is
constant in absence of the treatment) and, second, I go beyond point estimation
toward partial identiﬁcation.
2.6.1 Exogeneity of math skills
Math as pseudo-outcome. In column 1 in Table 2.4, I regresses math skills on the
language training and controls (similar to column 1 in Table 2.3 for grammar
skills) and receive a coefﬁcient of -0.009. In column 2 in Table 2.4, I apply the
PSM strategy (analogous to column 3 in Table 2.3) and get a coefﬁcient of 0.003.
I interpret these economically small estimates as evidence that language training
has no direct effect on math skills.27
Table 2.4: Estimates for math skills as pseudo-outcome
(1) (2)
Post-Lasso Regression-adj.
regression matching
Effect of the language training program on math
Coefﬁcient −0.009 0.003
S.E. (0.064) (0.059)
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 using 1,911
observations, 1,794 on-support. Math skills are standardized to mean 0
and standard deviation 1. The matching algorithm is Epanechnikov ker-
nel matching with a bandwidth of 0.06. Preschool-level clustered stan-
dard errors (S.E.) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05,
∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
Alternative DD speciﬁcations. Test scores on perceptual speed and reasoning skills
in the NEPS enable establishing the DD approach using these so-called nonver-
27Similar to the baseline OLS estimates, the analysis may suffer an omitted variable bias
through the unobservable component μ in Eq. (2.2). This leads to the possibility of a bigger ef-
fect that does not allow rejecting a non-zero effect. Therefore, the pseudo-outcome test should be
taken as suggestive rather than ﬁrm evidence.
40
bal skills instead of math. Table A2.5 in the Appendix shows the regression and
matching results of the DD speciﬁcations. Although the perceptual speed and
reasoning tests are shorter and exhibit less variation (26 items in 90 seconds and
12 items in 6 minutes, respectively) and are based on a smaller sample, the co-
efﬁcient of language training ranges between 9 and 11.5 percent of a SD. Even
if one is not willing to assume that the difference between grammar and math
skills is the same in absence of the treatment, if one is willing to assume that,
for instance, parents do not systematically selected their child into the language
training based on the difference between grammar and nonverbal skills, the inter-
pretation of the treatment effect does not change. Put differently, if unaccounted
nurturing (or genes) causes grammar and math skills to differ and is correlated
with language training (that is, the DD-CIA is violated), the estimates of Table
A2.5 indicate that such difference in the skills would not exist between percep-
tual speed/reasoning skills and math but between perceptual speed/reasoning
skills and grammar skills.
Additional preference measures. To investigate skill-speciﬁc preferences, I add con-
trol variables for the child’s activities at home and in the preschool (e.g., the ques-
tion “How often does the child play games involving dices or cards?”) as well as
the parents’ activities together with their child (e.g., “How often do you read
to your child?”). Table O2.4 in the Online Appendix summarizes the additional
preference measures. Table A2.6 in the Appendix shows the treatment effect after
controlling for these factors. The effects are similar to the baseline results, this
indicates that there is no selection on such preferences.28
All in all, the supplementary results presented here, do neither support that lan-
guage training directly affects math skills nor that omitted preferences in the
baseline speciﬁcation cause a selection into the treatment. Thus, establishing
the DD strategy via math skills in order to remove skill-constant unobservables
seems to be empirically justiﬁed.
2.6.2 Selection and partial identiﬁcation
Coefﬁcient movement along covariate blocks. To gain better understanding of how the
Lasso-chosen blocks of covariates change the estimated effect, Figure 2.5 depicts
28The activity and preference indicators might be better on the left-hand side than on the right-
hand side, that is, as outcomes (see Pei et al., 2017) as they are potentially “bad controls.” Tables
O2.5 and O2.6 in the Online Appendix show the association between language training and the
activities and preferences, respectively. As only the child’s activities in the preschool are statisti-
cally related to the treatment, there seems to be no crowding-out or compensation on family level.
In fact, the positive association between the treatment and the child’s activities in the preschool
indicate that preschools with language training put in general more emphasis on education and
therefore are also better at teaching math.
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the evolution of the treatment effect when the covariates are added stepwise. The
raw correlation between language training and grammar skills in the topmost line
in panel (a) is negative, indicating a compensating selection of poor-performing
children into the treatment. Interestingly, the correlation becomes positive when
either looking at the grammar-math difference in the topmost line in panel (b)
or when adding covariates in panel (a). Adding, on the other hand, controls to
the DD speciﬁcation does not change the estimated effect much. This underlines
that accounting for math skills does not remove a further selection into the treat-
ment once the relationship is adjusted for the observable factors. Adding activity
and preference indicators increases the precision of the estimate and slightly in-
creases the R2 (indicated by the size of the marker), but does change the economic
interpretation.29
Bounding. To get a better grasp of how selection affects the treatment effect, I
additionally implement a formal bounding exercise following the idea of Altonji
et al. (2005) that the selection on observables serves as a guide for the selection
on unobservables. I allow the treatment effect to be biased due to a selection on
unobservable factors that is as strong as the selection on observed factors. To
assess this, Oster (forthcoming) proposes the following bound:30
β∗ ≈ β˜ − δ(β˙ − β˜)Rmax − R˜
R˜− R˙ , (2.4)
where β˜ is the treatment effect in the baseline model that includes all Lasso-
selected control variables. This effect is compared to the treatment effect of a
restricted model, β˙, where grammar skills are only regressed on the treatment.
The movement of the language training coefﬁcient between the models is evalu-
ated against the corresponding change in the R2. This change in the R2 caused by
omitting the control variables (that is, R˜− R˙) is up-scaled by the highest plausible
change in the R2 (Rmax − R˜). That is, I allow the unobserved variables to explain
as much of the variation in grammar skills as an inclusion of math skills would
29Following the approach of Ichino et al. (2008) Figure O2.4 in the Online Appendix plots the
contribution of each of the Lasso-chosen linear covariates to the overall selection and outcome
effect. Because an overestimation of the treatment effect is potentially more harmful from a policy
point of view than an underestimation, one may think of “dangerous” confounders as having a
selection and outcome effect that goes in the same direction. For instance, if more needy children
receive the language training less often, or well-off children being more often treated. Figure O2.4
shows that this is only the case for ﬁve of the covariates: the indicators for the church as provider,
female children, no competition, and a principal with further training have a positive selection
and outcome effect, while for the boys-girls ratio both effects are negative. This absence of a clear
selection pattern in the confounders makes it unlikely, that there are unobserved confounders that
matter more.
30This expression is only an approximation, see Oster (forthcoming) for the exact calculation.
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Figure 2.5: Coefﬁcient movement along the covariate blocks
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 using 1,911 observations. Each marker gives the linear re-
gression point estimate the of effect of language training on the grammar skills in panel (a) and the grammar-math skill
difference in panel (b), respectively. The included covariate blocks are stated on the left-hand side. The Lasso-chosen
blocks are in italics. The R2 of the regression is indicated by the marker size and ranges from 0.0004 to 0.2817. Standard
errors clustered on preschool-level. The spikes around the point estimates give their 95 percent conﬁdence interval.
do.31 The parameter δ in Eq. (2.4) denotes the degree of proportionality of selec-
tion on unobservable variables relative to the selection on the observed (and in β˙
omitted) variables. As reasonable values for δ Oster suggests 1 and -1. That is,
the selection on unobserved factors is exactly as strong as the (adverse) selection
on observed factors. Given the extensive survey information at hand, it seems
31The resulting ceiling of the R2, denoted by Rmax, is the R2 value of a regression of grammar
skills on the treatment, the Lasso controls, and the individual’s math skills. Oster (forthcoming)
advises to ceil the R2 as a value of 1, that is, the variation in grammar skills can be explained
entirely, is rather unrealistic. Using an individual’s math skills to ceil the movement in the R2 is,
for instance, in line with Durevall et al. (2015) who use the R2 of an individual ﬁxed effects model
as Rmax.
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Table 2.5: Bounds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariates
Restricted Unrestricted Bound Bound
model β˙ model β˜ for δ = 1 for δ = −1
All covariates 0.0188 0.1451 0.2783 0.0647
(0.0784) (0.0558)
[0.0001] [0.2680]
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 using 1,911 observations.
Columns 1 and 2 state the treatment effects for the restricted and the baseline model, re-
spectively. Calculation of the bounds is based on Emily Oster’s Stata ado-ﬁle psacalc
(see Oster, 2017a). All errors are my own responsibility. Preschool-level clustered standard
errors in parentheses. Model ﬁt (R2) in brackets.
plausible that the analysis does not miss more of the selection than it accounts
for. Hence, a degree of proportionality of | δ |= 1 should be appropriate.
Table 2.5 gives the estimated treatment effect for the restricted and the unre-
stricted model in column 1 and 2, respectively. As already indicated by Figure
2.5, the language training coefﬁcient of the unrestricted (baseline) model exceeds
its restricted counterpart. Put differently, the union of the control variables in
the baseline model captures a compensating selection – that would cause an un-
derestimation of the true effect if missed. Column 3 bounds the treatment effect
when the same degree of compensating selection is missed. In this scenario, the
treatment effect increases to 27.8 percent of a SD. Column 4 gives the bound when
the selection on unobservables is adverse to the selection on observables (that is,
the selection moves the treatment effect toward zero). The resulting estimate of
the treatment effect still amounts to 6.5 percent of a SD. Thus, even if the baseline
estimates miss as much selection as they account for, the treatment effect is still
positive and rather large in size.
2.7 Effect persistency
Age-six grammar skills. Table 2.6 repeats the baseline analysis using grammar skills
in the ﬁrst grade of elementary school at age six. Although the sample size is
much smaller (87 treated and 214 untreated children, see Section 2.4 for reasons),
the positive association between the treatment and grammar skills increases in all
speciﬁcations.32 The estimated treatment effect in the simple-difference model in-
creases from 14 percent of a SD in grammar skills in the baseline results to more
than 30 percent in columns 1 and 3. The DD approach (the skill difference is
32Table O2.7 in the Online Appendix gives the baseline estimates for the this sample. The
estimates are in line with Table 2.3.
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established by subtracting wave-2 math skills from wave-3 grammar skills) ex-
hibits a similar pattern. In fact, for the DD regression model in column 2, the
coefﬁcient even exceeds 40 percent of a SD. The increase in the effect size may be
due to two (not mutually exclusive) reasons. First, a prolonged exposure to the
treatment: once a preschool has the learning materials, children may use them
until entering the elementary school at the age of six (or until they outgrow the
content). Second, following the argumentation of, e.g., Heckman (2007), the in-
creased treatment effect may reﬂect that a higher level of grammar skills begets
the acquisition of subsequent grammar skills (for instance, because learning is
easier with a sound understanding of the basics).
Table 2.6: Results for grammar skills at age six
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-Lasso Regression-adj.
regression matching
Simple
DD
Simple
DD
diff. diff.
Effect of language training program
Coefﬁcient 0.336∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗
S.E. (0.138) (0.163) (0.103) (0.141)
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 using 301 observations, 221 on-
support. Every cell states the estimated effect of language training on the grammar skills at age
six (odd columns) and the grammar-math skill difference (even columns; grammar skills age six,
math skills age four), respectively. Outcome variables are standardized to mean 0 and standard
deviation 1. The matching algorithm is Epanechnikov kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.06.
Preschool-level clustered standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05,
∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
Placebo test. Similar to the previous section, it is possible to use math skills in
the second grade as pseudo-outcome. Table A2.7 in the Appendix gives the re-
sults. Regressing math skills on the treatment yields a coefﬁcient of -0.001; for the
matching approach, the coefﬁcient is 0.070. Although the matching coefﬁcient is
rather large, the linear regression indicates that there is no association between
the treatment effect and math skills. Thus, if there are long-term complementar-
ities between grammar skills and other skills (as suggested by Figure 2.1), those
cross-skill complementarities seem to arise after the second grade of elementary
school.
Age-eight language skills. Table A2.8 in the Appendix gives the treatment effect
on text understanding and reading speed in the third grade – about four years
after the treatment. The coefﬁcients are still positive but smaller in size and not
statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level. The drop in the precision
may either indicate that the treatment effect is fading out over time (as suggested
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by Cascio and Schanzenbach, 2013) or simply reﬂect that the language test in
wave 5 measures grammar skills more broadly. 33,34
All in all, the medium-term perspective points toward a persistency of the pattern
found for the short-run. Although only a subsample of observations is available,
the impact of language training is quite precisely estimated and the effect size
even exceeds the short-term one at the child’s age of six. Even at the age of eight,
the curriculum-based language training seems beneﬁcial even though the analy-
sis lacks the statistical power to rule out a zero effect.
2.8 Conclusions
Although the returns to preschool education are well-studied, it is not entirely
understood why the beneﬁts of the experimental interventions, such as the Perry
Program, are much higher than the returns to large-scale roll-outs of universal
programs where some studies ﬁnd even zero and negative effects. Both the su-
perior absolute quality and the higher relative quality of the formal childcare
compared to the informal alternatives are conjectured to shape the differences in
the long-lasting effects. Closing the gap between the beneﬁts of the experimental
programs and universal preschool programs by adopting the more comprehen-
sive quality of the former is rather infeasible with average costs per child and
year exceeding the sending on universal programs by the factor of three. Given
the large potential that goes along with quality improvements, surprisingly little
is known about the determinants of the overall preschool quality.
The study at hand aims at shedding light upon the quality of preschool educa-
tion by analyzing the short- and medium-run returns to a curriculum-based lan-
guage training. This not only contributes to the understanding of what shapes
the returns to preschool education but it may also give an example of how pol-
icymakers can efﬁciently increase the quality of the existing universal preschool
programs through a rather low-key but well-deﬁned intervention. Using infor-
mation on nearly 2,000 children in more than 200 preschools, I compare the stan-
dardized grammar test score of children who receive the language training with
33Table O2.8 in the Online Appendix gives the association between the treatment and perfor-
mance in school. While the latter is originally assessed by the teacher on a 5-point scale, the
outcome is a binary indicator that is 1 if an individual’s performance is rated as above average,
and 0 otherwise. Again, the ﬁndings point toward the expected direction but are statistically
indifferent from zero.
34As Heckman et al. (2013) ﬁnd that behavioral aspects mediate the long-lasting effects of the
Perry Program, I also consider the children’s Big Five personality traits as assessed by their par-
ents and educators as outcomes (results are available upon request). However, there seems to be
consistent pattern. This might be explained by more narrower cognitive focus of the language
training intervention.
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the one of children who do not receive it despite of having the same probability
of doing so. Children who receive language training have, on average, about 14
percent of a standard deviation higher grammar test scores – a large-to-moderate
effect size compared to the literature of school quality. This point estimate re-
mains stable in a differences-in-differences approach established by considering
an individual’s difference between grammar and math skills. The constant ef-
fect size provides suggestive evidence that the observed probability of receiving
language training captures all factors relevant for the treatment decision and is,
thereby, able to successfully address selection. To deal with the large array of po-
tential confounders I apply techniques adopted from the machine learning litera-
ture. A placebo regression of an individual’s math skills on the language training
indicator and controls suggests both that the treatment effect does not capture
an unobserved selection of better-doing individuals into the treatment and that
establishing the differences-in-differences approach using math skills is justiﬁed.
Moving towards partial identiﬁcation by means of a bounding exercises further
indicates that even an omitted variable bias, that causes the estimates to miss as
much of the selection as they account for, would not change the interpretation of
the results. Various robustness checks conﬁrm this ﬁnding.
Subsample evidence on the lasting effects of the curriculum-based language train-
ing in preschool on grammar skills at the time the children are in the ﬁrst and
third elementary school grade indicates a persistent relationship. In fact, the ef-
fect size even increases over time. This hints that early investments in preschool
quality can indeed have long-lasting consequences and that the quality of the
provided childcare may contribute to explaining the large returns found for ex-
perimental interventions like the Perry Program.
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Figure A2.1: Distribution of grammar test score by treatment status
Notes: Own illustration based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 using 1,911 observations.
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(b) Residual correlcation
Figure A2.2: Correlation between grammar and math skills
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2. Observations: 1,911. The left plot gives the raw correlation
between the grammar and the math test score. For each grammar test score value on the x-axis the mean math test score is
calculated and plotted on the y-axis. The ﬁtted line results from a linear regression of the math test score on the grammar
test score. For the right plot, both test scores are in an auxiliary step regressed on the observable characteristics that enter
the baseline model and the unconditional mean is added to the residuals. The the residual grammar test score on the x-axis
is rounded to the next integer and for each value the mean residual math test score is calculated and plotted on the y-axis.
The size of the markers indicates the number of observations in the grammar test score bin. Following the Frisch-Waugh-
Lovell Theorem (see, e.g., Lovell, 2008), the ﬁtted regression line in right plot gives the gives the association between
grammar and math skills when the math test score is regressed on the grammar test score and the control variables.
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covariates without Lasso selection
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 using 1,911 observations. Epanechnikov kernel with band-
width 0.06. used as matching algorithm.
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Figure A2.4: Distribution of the propensity score by treatment status
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 using 1,911 observations. Epanechnikov kernel with band-
width 0.06. used as matching algorithm. Treated observations are off-support if the estimated PS exceeds the highest or is
lower than the lowest PS of all untreated observations.
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Tables
Table A2.1: Potential control variables and means by treatment status
Variable Deﬁnition Child
with w/o
treat- treat-
ment ment
Preschool provider (assessed by the principal)
Num. of children Number of children in preschool 85.22 80.82
Provider: municipality =1 if preschool is run by the municipality 0.34 0.28
Provider: church =1 if preschool is run by the church 0.41 0.39
Provider: other =1 if preschool is run by another provider 0.18 0.17
External supervision =1 if preschool provider employs an external
supervisor
0.27 0.25
Need of student body (assessed by the principal)
Preschool: fee Average parental fee preschool receives 87.57 95.89
Boys/girls ration Ratio of male to female children in preschool 1.13 1.02
Share low SES Share of children in preschool from families
with a low socioeconomic background
18.00 14.28
Share middle SES Share of children in preschool from families
with a medium socioeconomic background
45.86 48.67
Share high SES Share of children in preschool from families
with a high socioeconomic background
12.12 13.72
Share higher education Share of children in preschool from families
where at least one parent has higher educa-
tion
14.65 17.66
Share migration Share of children in preschool from families
with a migrational background
26.97 18.77
Competition (assessed by the principal)
Child/educator ratio Ratio of children to educators 13.01 10.07
Competition: none =1 if preschool faces no competition 0.28 0.14
Competition: low =1 if preschool faces low competition 0.45 0.50
Competition: middle =1 if preschool faces medium competition 0.21 0.23
Competition: high =1 if preschool faces high competition 0.06 0.13
Num. preschools within
5km
Number of preschools within 5km 6.08 6.45
Educator and principal
Educ.: female =1 if educator is female 0.91 0.86
Educ.: age Age of the educator 37.41 37.17
Educ.: middle school =1 if educator has middle school education
(German Realschule)
0.49 0.51
Continued on next page
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Table A2.1 – continued
Variable Deﬁnition Child
with w/o
treat- treat-
ment ment
Educ.: high school =1 if educator has high school education
(German Gymnasium)
0.34 0.25
Educ.: other educ. =1 if educator has other school degree 0.03 0.02
Educ.: principal =1 if educator is also the principal of the
preschool
0.09 0.08
Educ.: migration =1 if educator has migrational background 0.04 0.04
Educ.: further training 1 =1 if educator participated in further training
once in the 12 months prior to the interview
0.16 0.18
Educ.: further training 2+ =1 if educator participated in further training
twice or more in the 12 months prior to the
interview
0.04 0.02
Educ.: further training ¿20
hrs.
=1 if educator participated in further training
with a total duration of more than 20 hours in
the 12 months prior to the interview
0.42 0.37
Princ.: female =1 if principal is female 0.96 0.97
Princ.: age Age of the principal 48.87 50.13
Princ.: migration 1st gen. =1 if principal has a migrational background 0.03 0.06
Princ.: migration 2nd gen. =1 if principal’s parents have a migrational
background
0.05 0.04
Princ.: yrs. experience Years of experience as principal 15.91 14.67
Princ.: further training =1 if educator participated in further training
in the 12 months prior to the interview
0.57 0.37
Princ.: college education =1 if principal has a college degree 0.17 0.25
Availability (C=child)
C: age in years∗ Child’s age in years 4.11 4.17
C: female =1 if child is female 0.50 0.47
East Germany =1 if family lives in East Germany 0.09 0.19
Current care Number of months in current preschool 22.27 24.31
Child’s individual need (C=child, M=mother, F=father)
C: German =1 if child’s mother tongue is German 0.68 0.71
C: Russian =1 if child’s mother tongue is Russian 0.03 0.02
C: Turkish =1 if child’s mother tongue is Turkish 0.04 0.03
C: other lang. =1 if child has another mother tongue 0.25 0.24
M: German =1 if mother’s mother tongue is German 0.61 0.65
M: Russian =1 if mother’s mother tongue is Russian 0.06 0.03
M: Turkish =1 if mother’s mother tongue is Turkish 0.04 0.03
M: other lang. =1 if mother has another mother tongue 0.28 0.28
F: German =1 if father’s mother tongue is German 0.52 0.57
Continued on next page
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Table A2.1 – continued
Variable Deﬁnition Child
with w/o
treat- treat-
ment ment
F: Russian =1 if father’s mother tongue is Russian 0.04 0.02
F: Turkish =1 if father’s mother tongue is Turkish 0.05 0.03
F: other lang. =1 if father has another mother tongue 0.39 0.38
Other language with
mother
=1 if spoken language between the child and
the mother is manly not German
0.08 0.05
Other language with father =1 if spoken language between the child and
the father is manly not German
0.09 0.08
Other language mother–
father
=1 if spoken language between the mother
and the father is manly not German
0.11 0.08
Other language with sib-
lings
=1 if spoken language between the child and
siblings is manly not German
0.02 0.02
C: German-born =1 if child was born in Germany 0.80 0.79
M: German-born =1 if mother was born in Germany 0.64 0.67
M: Arab-born =1 if mother was born in Arabic country 0.01 0.02
M: Polish-born =1 if mother was born in Poland 0.01 0.02
M: Russian-born =1 if mother was born in Russia 0.02 0.02
M: Turkish-born =1 if mother was born in Turkey 0.04 0.02
M: other =1 if mother was born in another country 0.28 0.26
F: German-born =1 if father was born in Germany 0.54 0.58
F: Arab-born =1 if father was born in Arabic country 0.02 0.02
F: Polish-born =1 if father was born in Poland 0.01 0.01
F: Russian-born =1 if father was born in Russia 0.02 0.01
F: Turkish-born =1 if father was born in Turkey 0.05 0.02
F: other =1 if father was born in another country 0.37 0.35
M: mother non-German =1 if mother’s mother was not born in Ger-
many
0.06 0.05
M: father non-German =1 if mother’s father was not born in Ger-
many
0.05 0.06
F: mother non-German =1 if father’s mother was not born in Ger-
many
0.04 0.04
F: father non-German =1 if father’s father was not born in Germany 0.03 0.04
Preschool fee: family Preschool fee paid by the family 72.38 74.08
C: current weight (in kg) Child’s weight at the age of four 15.08 14.88
C: current height (in cm) Child’s height at the age of four 87.55 87.80
C: birth weight (in g) Child’s birth weight 2635 2638
C: birth height (in cm) Child’s birth height 39.80 39.59
C: premature birth =1 if child was born prematurely 0.11 0.08
Parental preferences
Family income Family income in 100 Euros 20.90 22.95
Continued on next page
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Table A2.1 – continued
Variable Deﬁnition Child
with w/o
treat- treat-
ment ment
Num. younger sibl. Number of younger siblings 0.50 0.51
Num. older sibl. Number of older siblings 0.36 0.33
Books at home: 0–10 =1 if number of books at home: 0–10 0.04 0.03
Books at home: 11–25 =1 if number of books at home: 11–25 0.10 0.09
Books at home: 26–100 =1 if number of books at home: 26–100 0.27 0.25
Books at home: 101–200 =1 if number of books at home: 101–200 0.17 0.17
Books at home: 201–500 =1 if number of books at home: 201–500 0.14 0.18
Books at home: ¿500 =1 if number of books at home: ¿500 0.08 0.08
M: years educ. Mother’s years of education 10.71 10.95
F: years educ. Father’s years of education 9.40 9.77
Both parents live at home =1 if both parents live in household 0.84 0.84
Mother’s partner is not fa-
ther
=1 if the partner of the mother is not the
child’s father
0.05 0.06
M: age Mother’s age in years 28.92 29.10
F: age Father’s age in years 27.49 27.78
M: employed =1 if mother is employed at the child’s age of
four
0.46 0.49
F: employed =1 if father is employed at the child’s age of
four
0.65 0.65
M: acad. job =1 if mother has an occupation that requires
higher education (ISCO code’s ﬁrth digit is 2)
0.14 0.17
F: acad. job =1 if father has an occupation that requires
higher education (ISCO code’s ﬁrth digit is 2)
0.15 0.18
Care: mths. in other
preschool
Number of months the child spent in other
formal care arrangement (also Kinderkrippe
centers)
23.28 25.08
Care: mths. family day care Number of months the child spent in family
day care
3.95 3.77
Care: mths. home care Number of months the child spent in home
care
7.58 7.60
Number of observations 718 1,193
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2. This table shows all variables that enter the Lasso speciﬁcation.
If a variable is chosen the enter the post-Lasso analysis, I also include a variable indicating whether missing information
where replaced with non-missing values in order to allow considering the observation. Please note that I use the terms
“mother” and “father” for simplicity. I refer to the interviewee as “mother” because it is almost always the mother.
However, it could also be the father or another legal guardian. I refer to the partner of the interviewee as “father.”
Because I control for the exact status, this simpliﬁcation only affects the labels of the mean values but has no consequences
for the analysis.
∗In the analysis I control for the child’s age using indicators for each month.
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Table A2.2: Heterogeneity along treatment programs
(1) (2)
Post-Lasso Regression-adj.
regression matching
Treatment status 0.141∗∗ 0.153∗∗
(0.065) (0.066)
Treatment×Deﬂin 4 0.001 −0.019
(0.090) (0.105)
Treatment×Ho¨ren −0.024 0.032
(0.106) (0.103)
Treatment×Kon-Lab 0.049 −0.073
(0.116) (0.152)
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2. 1,911 observations, 1,794 on-
support. Outcome variables are standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The
matching algorithm is Epanechnikov kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.06. Preschool-
level clustered standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05,
∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table A2.3: Heterogeneity along math skills
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regression-adj. DiD model
Tercile of math test score
All 1st 2nd 3rd
Effect of language training program
Coefﬁcient 0.107∗∗ 0.021 0.261∗∗∗ 0.036
S.E. (0.054) (0.098) (0.075) (0.073)
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2. 1,911 observations in total, observa-
tions on-support 1,529 (all), 483 (1st tercile), 542 (2nd tercile), 504 (3rd tercile). The outcome is the
grammar test score standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The matching algorithm
is Epanechnikov kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.06. Preschool-level clustered standard
errors (S.E.) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
Table A2.4: Heterogeneity along observable characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-Lasso Regression-adj. Post-Lasso Regression-adj.
regression matching regression matching
(a) Gender (b) Mother tongue
Female German
Treatment 0.107 0.064 0.161∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.071) (0.080) (0.071)
Observations 855 853 1277 1234
Male Other
Treatment 0.170∗∗ 0.135∗ 0.146 0.180
(0.074) (0.080) (0.126) (0.119)
Observations 947 814 569 514
(c) Academic occupation
Yes
Treatment 0.053 0.085
(0.128) (0.103)
Observations 287 256
No
Treatment 0.172∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.069)
Observations 842 738
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2. The number of observations in the column 1 refers
to observations with complete information, column 2 gives observations on-support. The father’s occupation
refers to a ﬁrst-digit ISCO classiﬁcation of 2 of the partner of the interviewed parent, which is however usu-
ally the father. When the ISCO classiﬁcation is missing, individuals are excluded. The outcome variable is the
grammar test score standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The matching algorithm is Epanech-
nikov kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.06. Preschool-level clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table A2.5: DiD approach using perceptual speed and reasoning
(1) (2)
Difference between Post-Lasso Regression-adj.
grammar and... regression matching
perceptual speed 0.106∗ 0.087∗∗
(0.061) (0.060)
reasoning 0.102 0.116∗
(0.065) (0.060)
Observations 1905 1651
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2. Speciﬁcations as
in the baseline results but indicator for language- and math-related activi-
ties in preschool and at home are taken into account as additional covariates.
Preschool-level clustered standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance:
∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
Table A2.6: Treatment effect when controlling for language- and math-related
activities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-Lasso Regression-adj.
regression matching
Simple
DiD
Simple
DiD
diff. diff.
Effect of language training program
Coefﬁcient 0.130∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
S.E. (0.060) (0.072) (0.058) (0.064)
Observations 1341 1341 1168 1168
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2. Speciﬁcations as in the baseline results
but indicator for language- and math-related activities in preschool and at home are taken into
account as additional covariates. Preschool-level clustered standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table A2.7: Estimates for grade-2 math skills as pseudo-outcome
(1) (2)
Post-Lasso Regression-adj.
regression matching
Effect of the language training program on math
Coefﬁcient −0.001 0.070
S.E. (0.142) (0.119)
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 using 303
observations, 236 on-support. Math skills are standardized to mean 0
and standard deviation 1. The matching algorithm is Epanechnikov ker-
nel matching with a bandwidth of 0.06. Preschool-level clustered stan-
dard errors (S.E.) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05,
∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
Table A2.8: Results for language skills at the age of eight (grade 3)
(1) (2)
Post-Lasso Regression-adj.
regression matching
Text understanding
Coefﬁcient 0.049 0.100
S.E. (0.138) (0.102)
Reading speed
Coefﬁcient 0.112 0.173∗
S.E. (0.144) (0.103)
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2
using 276 observations, 250 on-support. Every cell states
the estimated effect of language training on the grammar
skills at age 6 (odd columns) and the grammar-math skill
difference (even columns; grammar skills age 6, math skills
age 4), respectively. Outcome variables are standardized to
mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The matching algorithm
is Epanechnikov kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.06.
Preschool-level clustered standard errors (S.E.) in parenthe-
ses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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(a) Skills distributions by sex and mother tongue
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(b) Skill distributions by sex and father's education
Skill Starting Cohort Age 4 Skills Starting Cohort Adults
Figure O2.1: Conditional distributions of grammar skills in four-year-olds and
adult samples
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 and NEPS–Starting Cohort 6.
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(a) Kon-Lab set for €159 (b) Kon-Lab set for €428 
Figure O2.2: Example of the Kon-Lab language training program
Notes: Illustrations taken from LOGO (2014).
 
„the cats are looking at the ball“
Distractors: 
• the cat is looking at the ball
• the cats are looking at 
the butterfly
• the boys are playing with 
the ball
Figure O2.3: Example of a grammar test question implemented in NEPS
Notes: Illustration taken from Skopek et al. (2013). Example based on the German version of the “Test for Reception of
Grammar” (see Bishop, 1989, and Fox-Boyer, 2006, for the German version).
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-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
German mother-partner
M: German
C: German
P: acad. job
M: acad. job
M: years educ.
Books at home: 11-25
Share higher education
Preschool: fee
Princ.: college education
Princ.: further training
Competition: high
Competition: none
Child/teacher ratio
Share migration
Boys/girls ration
Current care
East-Germany
C: female
External supervision
Provider: other
Provider: church
Provider: municiplaity
Num. of children
Selection effect Outcome effect
Figure O2.4: Selection and outcome effect of the covariates
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 using 1,911 observations. Following Ichino et al. (2008), the
selection effect is calculated as s =
(
Pr(U = 1 | D = 1,Y = 0)× Pr(Y = 0 | D = 1) + Pr(U = 1 | D = 1,Y = 1)× Pr(Y =
1 | D = 1))− (Pr(U = 1 | D = 0,Y = 0)× Pr(Y = 0 | D = 0) + Pr(U = 1 | D = 0,Y = 1)× Pr(Y = 1 | D = 0)),
where U is the binary confounder of interest, D the treatment, and Y the binary outcome variable. The outcome effect is
d = Pr(U | D = 0,Y = 1)− Pr(U | D = 0,Y = 0). Non-binary variables are recoded to 1 if their value exceeds the mean
values, and 0 otherwise.
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Tables
Table O2.1: Full regression output for outcome and selection regressions
Outcome equation Selection equation
Grammar Skill Treat- Treat-
skills diff. ment ment
OLS OLS OLS Probit
Num. of children 0.001 0.000 −0.003 −0.014
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Provider: municipality −0.217 −0.061 0.328 −0.072
(0.145) (0.167) (0.192) (0.503)
Provider: church −1.994
(0.866)
Provider: other −0.214 −0.255 0.089 −0.868
(0.167) (0.201) (0.215) (0.768)
External supervision −0.113 −0.152 0.040 0.215
(0.065) (0.072) (0.088) (0.298)
C: female 0.066 0.258 0.018 0.084
(0.038) (0.046) (0.016) (0.061)
East Germany 0.072 0.047 −0.170 −1.938
(0.162) (0.143) (0.120) (0.720)
Current care 0.004 0.001 0.000 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Boys/girls ration 0.149 0.118 −0.346 −1.546
(0.108) (0.127) (0.147) (0.583)
Share migration −0.006 −0.002 −0.001 −0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Child/teacher ratio −0.001 −0.013 0.013 0.044
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.019)
Competition: none 0.323 −0.168 −0.552 −3.344
(0.181) (0.156) (0.191) (1.055)
Competition: high 0.151 0.233 −1.032 −4.992
(0.326) (0.437) (0.394) (1.916)
Princ.: further training 0.056 −0.061 −0.046 −0.578
(0.113) (0.135) (0.117) (0.531)
Princ.: college education 0.304 0.277 −0.725 −3.233
(0.205) (0.207) (0.223) (0.944)
Preschool: fee 0.001 0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Share higher education 0.006 0.002 −0.002 −0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
Books at home: 11–25 −0.301 0.022 −0.005 −0.024
(0.074) (0.084) (0.039) (0.148)
M: years educ. 0.032 0.002 −0.003 −0.010
Continued on next page
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Table O2.1 – continued
Outcome equation Selection equation
Grammar Skill Treat- Treat-
skills diff. ment ment
OLS OLS OLS Probit
(0.012) (0.014) (0.005) (0.018)
M: acad. job 0.127 0.011 −0.004 −0.045
(0.059) (0.075) (0.029) (0.103)
F: acad. job 0.206 −0.167 −0.027 −0.116
(0.056) (0.068) (0.030) (0.107)
C: German 0.192 0.304 −0.014 0.003
(0.130) (0.141) (0.054) (0.215)
M: German 0.294 0.189 −0.048 −0.234
(0.086) (0.112) (0.044) (0.151)
German mother–partner −0.179 0.155 0.004 −0.016
(0.129) (0.136) (0.060) (0.236)
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 using 1,911 observations.
Columns 1 and 3 give the regression results of grammar skills and the grammar-math
difference on the language training indicator, respectively. In column 3, the language
training indicator is regressed on the covariates. Column 4 reports the corresponding
coefﬁcients of the probit model used for estimating the propensity score. All speciﬁ-
cation in include the basic covariates as well as the Lasso-chosen covariates (see text).
Age-in-months ﬁxed effects, indicators for missing values, and higher-order terms
are not reported for brevity.
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Table O2.2: Robustness checks for Lasso variable selection
No variable selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-Lasso Regression-adj.
regression matching
Simple
DiD
Simple
DiD
diff. diff.
Effect of language training program
Coefﬁcient 0.081∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
S.E. (0.047) (0.061) (0.045) (0.056)
Observations 1,894 1,894 1,894 1,894
Throwing-it-all-in double Lasso selection
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Post-Lasso Regression-adj.
regression matching
Simple
DiD
Simple
DiD
diff. diff.
Effect of language training program
Coefﬁcient 0.090∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.080 0.208∗∗∗
S.E. (0.052) (0.064) (0.052) (0.061)
Observations 1,862 1,862 1,862 1,862
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2. The given number of observations
refers to observations on-support, the total number of observations is 1,911. Every cell states the
estimated effect of language training on the grammar skills (odd columns) and the grammar-math
skill difference (even columns), respectively. Outcome variables are standardized to mean 0 and
standard deviation 1. Preschool-level clustered standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance:
∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table O2.3: Robustness checks for matching speciﬁcations
Nearest neighbor matching
(1) (2) (3) (4)
5-to-1 NN 2-to-1 NN
matching matching
Simple
DiD
Simple
DiD
diff. diff.
Effect of language training program
Coefﬁcient 0.138∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗
S.E. (0.064) (0.061) (0.069) (0.063)
Observations 1,180 1,180 1,000 1,000
Kernel matching
(5) (6) (7) (8)
bandwidth 0.02 bandwidth 0.10
Simple
DiD
Simple
DiD
diff. diff.
Effect of language training program
Coefﬁcient 0.141∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
S.E. (0.061) (0.056) (0.059) (0.054)
Observations 1,473 1,473 1,794 1,794
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2. The given number of observa-
tions refers to observations on-support, the total number of observations is 1,911. Every
cell states the estimated effect of language training on the grammar skills (odd columns)
and the grammar-math skill difference (even columns), respectively. Outcome variables are
standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Nearest neighbor (NN) matching was
conducted with replacement with a caliper of 0.25 standard deviations of the estimated
propensity score. Preschool-level clustered standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses. Signiﬁ-
cance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table O2.4: Questions about child activities and parental preferences
Share at
least daily
Question treated untreated
Child’s activities
In preschool (assessed by teacher)
How often does the child occupy itself with picture books, word
games and the like?
0.53 0.48
How often does the child occupy itself with number games, dice
and the like?
0.39 0.31
At home (assessed by parents)
How often does the child use picture books, word puzzles and
similar things?
0.73 0.75
How often does the child use number games, dice and similar
things?
0.38 0.38
Parental preferences (activities together with child)
How often do you or someone else in the household read aloud
to the child at home?
0.79 0.79
How often do you or someone else in the household show the
child individual letters or the ABC, for example when looking at
picture books?
0.39 0.38
How often do you or someone else in the household practice in-
dividual numbers or counting with the child, for example when
playing with a dice or cards?
0.42 0.41
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2.
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Table O2.5: Crowding-out through child activities
(1) (2)
Activity
Effect of the
in preschool at home
treatment on...
language-related 0.078∗ −0.022
activities (0.042) (0.025)
math-related 0.103∗∗∗ −0.021
activity (0.038) (0.029)
Observations 1829 1528
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2. Every cell
states the estimated effect of language training on the activity given in
the row. The outcome variables take the value 1 if the child engages
in the activity at least once a day, and 0 otherwise. The mean values
are: language-related activities in preschool 0.50 and at home 0.74, math-
related activities in preschool 0.34 and at home 0.38. Preschool-level
clustered standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1,
∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
Table O2.6: Crowding-out through parental preferences
(1) (2) (3)
Activities with child
Reading Teaching Playing
to child alphabet dice or cards
Treatment 0.014 0.009 0.016
(0.026) (0.031) (0.033)
Observations 1529 1529 1526
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2. Every cell states the
estimated effect of language training on the activity given in the row. The out-
come variables take the value 1 if the child engages in the activity at least once
a day, and 0 otherwise. The mean values are: reading to child 0.79, teaching al-
phabet 0.39, and playing dice or cards 0.41. Preschool-level clustered standard
errors (S.E.) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table O2.7: Baseline results for the wave-3 sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-Lasso Regression-adj.
regression matching
Simple
DD
Simple
DD
diff. diff.
Effect of language training program
Coefﬁcient 0.063 0.165 0.122 0.148
S.E. (0.140) (0.117) (0.103) (0.097)
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2 using 281 observations, 224 on-
support, for that wave-3 information are available. Every cell states the estimated effect of
language training on the grammar skills (odd columns) and the grammar-math skill difference
(even columns), respectively. Outcome variables are standardized to mean 0 and standard de-
viation 1. The matching algorithm is Epanechnikov kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.06.
Preschool-level clustered standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05,
∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
Table O2.8: Results for performance in elementary school
(1) (2)
Post-Lasso Regression-adj.
regression matching
Overachieving language skills in grade 2
Coefﬁcient 0.059 0.073
S.E. (0.063) (0.047)
Overachieving language skills in grade 3
Coefﬁcient −0.051 −0.027
S.E. (0.069) (0.061)
Overachieving writing skills in grade 2
Coefﬁcient 0.089 0.132∗∗∗
S.E. (0.080) (0.046)
Overachieving writing skills in grade 3
Coefﬁcient 0.013 0.048∗∗∗
S.E. (0.067) (0.051)
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Starting Cohort 2
using 234 observations for language skills in grade 2 and 203
in grade 3 as well as 221 observations for writing skills in
grade 2 and 205 in grade 3. The binary outcome variables
take the value 1 if the teacher rates the child’s perfromance
as overachieving. The matching algorithm is Epanechnikov
kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.06. Preschool-level
clustered standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance:
∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Chapter 3
The Short- and Long-term Effects of
Student Absence: Evidence from
Sweden
Joint work with Sarah Cattan, Martin Karlsson, and Therese Nilsson
3.1 Introduction
Student absence from school is pervasive around the world. In 2015, 19 percent
of fourth-graders in the US were absent from school for three or more days in
the last month. Students from low-income backgrounds are more likely to be
absent than their more afﬂuent peers, and this is the case for both excused and
unexcused absences (Child Trends, 2015). As school attendance correlates with
academic achievement and is generally viewed as an important input in the ed-
ucation production function, reducing school absences has become a challenging
matter for schools and a high priority for local and national governments. Indeed,
absence has reached such an alarming level in some schools that commentators
talk about an “empty-desk epidemic.”1
Despite the relatively uncontested importance of reducing school absence in the
policy arena, there is little causal evidence of the effect of absence on achieve-
ment and beyond. Identifying such impact is difﬁcult for several reasons. First,
it requires individual-level panel data on school absences, school performance,
and any other outcome of interest. Such data rarely exist as many countries
only started collecting absence records recently. Second, it requires a credible
1See Chicago Tribune (2012).
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strategy to identify the causal impact of absence from the vast array of unob-
served confounding factors. Students who miss school may be less motivated,
in poorer health, or attending schools that fail to promote student engagement,
which could lead to spurious correlations between absence and achievement.
The few papers that credibly estimate the causal effect of student absence focus on
standardized test scores in the US context (Goodman, 2014, Aucejo and Romano,
2016). To our knowledge, there does not exist comparable evidence for a context
outside the US, although high rates of student absences are prevalent in many
countries. Moreover, these studies focus on the short-term impact of student ab-
sence on academic outcomes. Yet, in the presence of dynamic complementarities
in the production function of human capital, the adverse effects of absence on
the formation of skills could persist and even widen over the long-run (Cunha
and Heckman, 2007). Assessing the long-term effects of individual absences is
thus crucial to assess the potential beneﬁts of policies aimed at reducing student
absences.
An analysis of such long-run effects will meet several challenges. First, data that
link student absence and performance to later labor market outcomes are rare
to ﬁnd. Second, the follow-up period needs to be long enough to allow for a
reasonable approximation of life-cycle earnings. This second point is important
given that there are several examples in the literature of early-career advantages
either fading relatively fast (such as the effect of the business cycle on earnings,
cf. Genda et al., 2010; Oreopoulos et al., 2012; Altonji et al., 2016) or becoming
more pronounced at higher ages (such as the effects of schooling, cf. Bhuller et al.,
2011). An analysis based only on early-career labor market outcomes may thus
be biased in an unknown direction.
This paper ﬁlls this gap by providing evidence of the short- and long-term im-
pact of student absence using a unique panel following a representative sample
of cohorts born between 1930 and 1935 in Sweden. This novel dataset links dig-
itized school records of absence and performance to adult socio-economic out-
comes measured up to 60 years later from Census and tax register data. This
combination of historical and administrative data allows us to investigate a wide
array of outcomes. Speciﬁcally, we analyze the effect of student absence in grade
1 and grade 4 (at ages 7–8 and 10–11, respectively) on student performance in
these grades, as well as its effect on ﬁnal education, employment (at ages 25–30
and 35–40), labor market income (at ages 35–40), pensions from past labor market
activity (measured at ages 67–72) and mortality.
To deal with the potential endogeneity of absence, we exploit two features of the
data. First, the sample includes pairs of siblings, which we use to implement a
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sibling ﬁxed effect (FE) strategy and control for all time-invariant, family-level
characteristics that could simultaneously drive absence and our outcomes of in-
terest. Second, we exploit the fact that absence and achievement were collected
for two grades (grade 1 and grade 4) to control for individual FE when looking
at short-term impacts. Finally, we also implement two approaches as sensitivity
checks: a bounding approach following Altonji et al. (2005) and an instrumental
variable (IV) strategy exploiting local and temporal changes in weather condi-
tions as source of exogenous variation for absence.
In line with the existing literature, we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant impact of
student absence on academic performance in elementary school equivalent to 3.3
percent of a standard deviation for ten days of absence (the average number of
absences in our sample). To address the arbitrariness of test score scales, we take
advantage of our long panel to translate the effect on performance in school into
its association with adult earnings. Anchoring the test scores to long-term income
this way conﬁrms a moderate effect size.
Our ﬁndings for long-term effects suggest that the consequences of absence in
elementary school fade out over time. While absence negatively correlates with
ﬁnal educational achievement, employment, income and longevity, only the rela-
tionship between employment at ages 25–30 and school absence remains strongly
signiﬁcant when we include sibling ﬁxed effects. In this case, the impact of ab-
sence is rather large, as ten days of absence lead to a 4 percent reduction in em-
ployment. Ten years later however, the impact of absence on employment is less
precisely estimated and we cannot reject that its effect is no longer distinct from
zero.
Our paper makes several contributions to a broad literature examining the im-
pact of instructional time on educational achievement and later socio-economic
outcomes. Although school absence is an important determinant of the total in-
dividual amount of time spent in school, most existing studies exploit exogenous
variation in the length of the school year as source of exogenous variation in in-
structional time. Among others, such studies use laws and law changes that cause
variation in the school year length (e.g., Leuven et al., 2010, Pischke, 2007, Sims,
2008, Agu¨ero and Beleche, 2013, and Fischer et al., 2016)2; variation in test dates,
where the total amount of education the students receive is eventually the same
but some students are tested earlier than others (see, e.g., Carlsson et al., 2015,
and Fitzpatrick et al., 2011); and unscheduled school closures resulting from ex-
2Other examples include Battistin and Meroni (2016, evidence for Italy), Huebener and Mar-
cus (2015, Germany) and Bellei (2009, Chile) who use structural reforms that expand instructional
time.
71
treme weather events (e.g., Marcotte, 2007, Marcotte and Hemelt, 2008, Marcotte
and Hansen, 2010, and Hansen, 2011).
When it comes to school absence, two recent studies, Goodman (2014) and Aucejo
and Romano (2016), analyze short-run effects of individual school absence in the
US. Using Massachusetts data (school years 2003–2010) for students attending
grade 3 onwards and North Carolina data (school years 2006–2010) for grade 3 to
5 students, respectively, they show that school results are negatively affected by
absence. Both studies control for institutional heterogeneity using school, teacher
and individual ﬁxed effects. To corroborate their results, both studies also im-
plement an IV approach using local variation in snowfall (Goodman, 2014) and
infectious diseases (Aucejo and Romano, 2016) to instrument school absence.
Our paper contributes to the above literature by providing new evidence on the
effect of student absence as one determinant of instructional time. Our paper is
the ﬁrst to present estimates of the impact of days of absence on long-term out-
comes, including ﬁnal education, labor market outcomes, and mortality. More-
over, we study individual-level changes in instructional time in a context outside
the US. The literature examining the effect of region- or school-level changes in
instructional time suggests that the educational system is an important factor for
the observed effects, but individual changes in instructional time have not yet
been analyzed outside the US.
Our results show that these innovations matter for our understanding of the
impact of school absences. In fact, considering effects throughout the life-cycle
sheds new light on previous ﬁndings regarding the role of school absence. Our
short-term point estimates are remarkably close to those of Goodman (2014) and
Aucejo and Romano (2016) – even though we analyze the relationship in another
country and in another decade. The long-term estimates indicate that the short-
term effects – although substantial at the beginning – slowly fade away over
time. This highlights the importance of having outcomes measured at different
points of the career, as impacts measured early in the career do not reﬂect impacts
found later in the working life. A declining effect of missed instruction in school
throughout the life-cycle is in line with Pischke (2007) who ﬁnds a negative effect
of school years with reduced instructional time on subsequent schooling but no
long-lasting labor market consequences.3
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides some back-
ground on the schooling system in Sweden in the 1930s. Section 3.3 describes the
3More broadly, the absence of long-lasting consequences of the amount of schooling an indi-
vidual receives is also in line with studies that ﬁnd zero returns to compulsory schooling, e.g.,
Stephens and Yang (2014) for the US and Pischke and von Wachter (2008) for Germany.
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data and some descriptive statistics. Section 3.4 discusses our empirical strategy,
while Section 3.5 presents our results. Section 3.6 includes our sensitivity analysis
and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Elementary education in Sweden in the 1930s and 1940s
The Swedish education system as it appeared in the 1930s has a long history.
Compulsory schooling was introduced in 1842 when all parishes of the country
had to offer basic education. In the 1930s and 1940s all children went to a com-
mon, public, and free school, Folkskola4, and the country was divided into 2,400
school districts responsible for primary education. It was compulsory to enter the
ﬁrst grade at the age of seven and complete at least six years of schooling.
A clear majority of school districts offered six years of compulsory schooling, but
a clause introduced in 1921 allowed school districts to introduce seven years of
compulsory schooling. The clause was followed by a government decision on
July 1, 1936 to increase compulsory schooling by one year over a twelve year pe-
riod. Accordingly, a mandatory seventh grade was introduced stepwise across
districts in the following years. Similarly, the length of the school year corre-
sponded to 34.5 weeks in most districts, but in the period under review, the school
year length was increased stepwise to 39 weeks.5
Although the responsibility for providing primary education was decentralized,
the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs provided clear nationwide standards that
applied to all school districts. The most central decree was the 1919 Educational
Plan (Utbildningsplanen), which included the full curriculum of the Folkskola. Stu-
dents attended elementary school full time, six days a week.6 Instruction was
generally done in classes separated by grade. When the number of students was
4We use the terms Folkskola and elementary school interchangeably.
5See Fischer et al. (2013) for an analysis of the seven-year reform, and Fischer et al. (2016)
for an examination of the changes in term length. In principle it would be possible to compare
the effect of more instructional time due to the school year length increase with the effect of less
instructional time because of absence in school. However, we would not expect the former to
affect performance in the same grade. Teachers could have adjusted their expectations because
all students were affected by the school year length expansion. Moreover, we do not expect long-
term effects because the curriculum remained unchanged.
6Instruction ended at noon on Saturdays. Following an exception rule, schools in rural areas
had the possibility to offer half-time reading (students went to school every second day or only
during certain periods of the year) but this option was very limited in the 1930s and only 0.5
percent of our sample took half-time reading.
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low, schools were also allowed to pool students in different grades into one class-
room, so that a teacher instructed, for instance, students of grade 1 and grade
2 in the same room during the same lesson. The content of the education was
grade-speciﬁc, however, as stated in the Educational Plan.
The educational system of the 1930s exhibited several features of a modern ed-
ucational system – like absence of tuition fees and joint instruction of boys and
girls at all educational levels (Erikson and Jonsson, 1993) – but education was
very selective (Fischer et al., 2016). Students who decided to take more than com-
pulsory education followed a tracking system and generally left Folkskola after
grade 4 to enter lower secondary school (Realskola). All other students remained
in Folkskola until they reached the compulsory years of schooling. From 1939 and
onwards the admission to Realskola was based on grades received in elementary
school. The system also offered a second alternative where a student could pro-
ceed to lower secondary school after ﬁnishing Folkskola. After four or ﬁve years
of lower secondary schooling, students either entered upper secondary school
(Gymnasium) or ﬁnished their educational career. In the birth cohorts that we
consider 87.5 percent of students only have compulsory education7, and until the
1940s only about 5 percent of a cohort continued with upper secondary schooling
(Fredriksson, 1971).
3.2.2 Historical records of student absence and achievement
As their main organizational tool teachers kept daily records in an exam cata-
log called Dagbok med examenskatalog (see Appendix Figure A3.1 for a picture).
In these catalogs, the teachers recorded students’ performance and absences, and
noted whether absences were due to sickness, natural obstacles (e.g., heavy snow-
fall), inappropriate clothes and shoes, other valid reasons for absence, or no valid
excuses (that is, truancy). They also included general information about the
school and the school year length.
Regarding student performance teachers were encouraged to take notes on the
student’s performance throughout the entire school year. At the end of the school
year, the teachers summarized the days of absence by reason and the ﬁnal grades
by subject in a separate column for end-of-school-year information. Unlike tests
that take place on a certain date, the frequent recording of student performance
ensures that teaching-to-the-test behavior of teachers and factors on the day of a
test did not affect the grades. Moreover, regular record-keeping makes recall bias
of the teacher unlikely.
7Based on own calculation for the birth cohorts 1930–1935 using the Census 1970, see Table
3.3 in the next section.
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3.2.3 Grading standards
Three theoretical subjects were taught in Folkskola: math; reading and speaking;
and writing. Although grades recorded in exam catalogs were not based on stan-
dardized tests and hence may partly reﬂect teachers’ subjective impressions of
students, a 1940 Royal Commission established precise guidelines for teachers to
evaluate and grade their students’ performance relative to that of the classmates.
For example, to assess a student’s math performance, teachers were to take both
the ability to solve “standard problems” and more sophisticated ones into ac-
count. For reading and speaking, grades were supposed to reﬂect loud and silent
reading and the ability to express a familiar topic in own words. For writing,
grades were supposed to assess both the form and content of essays.
The highest possible grade was A (“passed with great distinction”) and the poor-
est grade was C (“not passed”). Teachers were also allowed to add a plus or
minus sign in order to express the strength or weakness of the grade. While
the grading scheme remained unchanged in the time under review, the grading
guidelines changed slightly. From the school year 1940/41 onwards, teachers
were advised to award the grade BA (“passed with credit”) for an average per-
formance. One-third of the students in the class should receive a better grade and
one-third a poorer grade. Before the school year 1940/41, teachers were more
likely to award a student with the grade B for an average performance. The high-
est grade A was reserved for exceptional students and less than 1 percent of all
students should receive this grade.8 As we show in the next section, the distri-
bution of grades observed in our sample is remarkably in line with the Royal
Commission’s guidelines. This gives us conﬁdence that, even though our main
measure of academic performance is not a standardized test score, it is a valid
measure to compare students’ achievement with each other.
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
The data we use for analysis combines several historical and administrative data
sources. This section provides information about these sources and presents some
descriptive statistics on student absence and the main outcomes of interest.
8In the empirical analysis, the point estimates between speciﬁcations with only parish and
school ﬁxed effects and with additional teacher ﬁxed effects (that account for subjective grad-
ing) do not differ noteworthily. We also change the baseline outcome (performance measured
on the 15-point grading scale) to the 7-point grading scale and into a binary indicator that takes
the change in the Royal Commission’s guidelines into account. The ﬁndings do not change our
interpretation of the results.
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3.3.1 Data sources
Base data The base foundation for our dataset is individual-level data from ad-
ministrative church records covering all 30,150 children born between 1930 and
1935 in a representative sample of 133 out of about 2,500 Swedish parishes.9 Fig-
ure 3.1 presents the spatial distribution of the sample parishes across Sweden.
The church records contain individual information on name, gender, date of birth
and parish of birth. The records also provide information on the child’s parents’
birth date, whether the child was born in a hospital (8 percent of the individuals
in our sample), whether the birth was a twin birth (4.2 percent), and whether the
child was born out of wedlock (4.4 percent). We also know the occupation of the
parents at the time of birth. For the empirical analysis we generate an indicator
for mothers being employed (2.4 percent) and a set of indicators for the family’s
socio-economic status based on the main category of the father’s occupation ac-
cording to the ﬁrst digit of the Historical International Standard Classiﬁcation of
Occupations (HISCO) code10 (see Table A3.1 in the Appendix).
Schooling data Individual schooling informationwas collected in local archives.
Speciﬁcally, we collected the exam catalogs in which teachers made systematic
notes about types of absence and reported grades for each student, for each ele-
mentary school of the 133 parishes in our base dataset. As shown in Figure A3.1
each student is listed with their ﬁrst name, surname, date of birth and parents’
name. Using this information, we merged the schooling information onto the
base dataset. We were able to match schooling information for 17,999 out of the
30,150 children in at least grade 1 or grade 4.11
9The base dataset was originally collected and digitized to evaluate an infant and maternal
health program that the Swedish Government introduced between 1931 and 1933. See Bhalotra
et al. (forthcoming) for details on the construction and representativeness of the data.
10The HICSO code is historical version of today’s International Standard Classiﬁcation of Oc-
cupations (ISCO) code, see van Leeuwen et al. (2002). The HISCO occupations coding does not
allow ranking jobs according to their prestige or any other criterium. The only group of occupa-
tions that can be related to a higher socio-economic status is service workers. If the father had an
agricultural occupation, we additionally consider whether he was a farmer, ﬁsherman or hunter
(one HISCO category) because this is potentially related to both the family’s subsistence as well
as the need that children in the household help with reaping the harvest (although we ﬁnd no
evidence that was systematically the case).
11The reasons why we are not able to get a perfect match are that (1) exam catalogs were
destroyed or cannot be found in the archives, (2) there is insufﬁcient information for identifying
an individual, (3) an individual left the sample parish and moved before the age of seven, and/or
(4) an individual passed away before reaching school age. The ﬁrst two reasons are due to the
data collection and operationalization and not subject to individual selection. The decision to
move and an early death are, however, likely non-random with respect to (sickness) absence
and skills. If an early death is health-related, attrition due to mortality may bias the estimates.
However, the long-term effect of absence on mortality does not exhibit a noteworthy association
between the two factors: see the results section. To address selection due to moving we tried to
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Figure 3.1: Spatial distribution of 133 sample parishes within Sweden
Notes: Own illustration. The plot on the left shows the map of Sweden in its regions (La¨n) and the plots in the center
and on the right show Northern and Southern Sweden, respectively, in parishes in the time under review. The left plot
indicates which regions belong to the Northern and Southern Sweden in the plots in the center and on the right. Parishes
belonging to our sample are depicted darker in the plots in the center and on the right.
We focus on grade 1 and grade 4 (the last grade in which all students attend Folk-
skola) and digitize the end-of-school-year summary information of the exam cata-
logs.12 With cohorts born in 1930–1935 the schooling data covers the school years
1936/37 to 1946/47.13 Table 3.1 gives an overview over the data structure and
corresponding sample sizes by birth cohort. Out of the 30,150 individuals born
in the sampled parishes in 1930–1935, we have complete exam catalog records
for about 14,000 individuals in either grade 1 or 4. For about 10,000 individuals
we have both grades. Reassuringly there is no difference in the matching quality
with respect to the birth cohort or the school grade. Using information on the par-
trace down exam catalogs for individuals who have moved to a different parish before enrolling
into Folkskola using ofﬁcial registers on movers. For the very few children leaving Sweden before
enrolling into Folkskola we have no information after they left the country. The assumption we
have to make is that the decision to migrate out of Sweden is unrelated to absence in school and
educational performance given the socio-economic background. The Online Appendix Table O9
compares the mean value of characteristics in the church records data (that are available of all
individuals) between the full sample of all 30,150 individual and the subsample of the individual
with schooling information. The results do not indicate a systematic difference in socio-economic
factors. Table O10 gives the baseline results separately for individuals that moved between the
birth and schooling and individuals that did not move. The coefﬁcients are similar.
12Therefore, the data at hand do not allow us to identify the length of absence spells but only
the total number of days missed per grade.
13The WWII falls in the time under review. Sweden was neutral in the war and we have not
found any historical sources suggesting that the war caused major disruptions in education, nor
do the war years reduce the probability that we found exam catalogs in the local archives. In fact,
children from Finland were sent to and educated in Sweden because Sweden was less affected by
the war, see Santavirta (2012).
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Table 3.1: Number of individuals by birth cohort and sample
# of individuals...
Birth cohort
Total1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
...born in sample 5, 355 5, 095 5, 116 4, 743 4, 775 5, 066 30, 150
...in grade 1 2, 513 2, 438 2, 491 2, 409 2, 360 2, 136 14, 347
...in grade 4 2, 734 2, 653 2, 647 2, 315 2, 378 1, 864 14, 591
...in grades 1 and 4 1, 929 1, 875 1, 887 1, 805 1, 735 1, 448 10, 679
...with sibling info. 821 748 818 777 738 567 4, 469
Notes: Own calculations based on church records and exam catalog information. For 17,999 out of the 30,150 children born
in our sample parishes children we could at least ﬁnd exam catalog information on one grade. For 10,679 individuals exam
catalog information on both grades are available (that is, the individual panel consists 21,358 observations). 4,469 of these
individuals have siblings we also observe in both grades (the siblings panel includes 8,938 observations).
Table 3.2: Grading scale
Grade
Passed...
with great with with great with without Not
distinction distinction credit credit credit passed
Observed symbols A A- a a- AB+ AB AB- BA+ BA BA- B+ B B- BC C
15-points scale 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7-points scale 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Notes: Own illustration based on historical records. The ﬁrst line states the original grade as denoted in the exam catalog. Lines 2 and 3 give our
translation into numerical values on a 15-point and 7-point scale, respectively. The baseline models use the 15-point scale, the Online Appendix
includes results for the 7-point scale.
ents, we can also identify sibling pairs born between 1930–1935. Our ﬁnal sample
includes 4,469 siblings for whom we have information on both grades (resulting
in 8,938 observations).
As discussed in Section 3.2, educational performance is measured with the grades
teachers assign to students at the end of the school year. Each grade is assigned a
numerical value which we refer to as grade point. In our baseline speciﬁcation we
use a scale that takes into account that teachers could assign a plus and a minus
sign to a student’s grade, ranging from 1 (poorest grade) to 15 (excellent grade).
Table 3.2 gives the mapping of the potentially ordinal grades into cardinal grade
points. To facilitate interpretation we standardize the grade points to have mean 0
and standard deviation 1. In our baseline speciﬁcation, we measure achievement
as the average grade across all subjects. While all students had to take math and
reading and speaking, writing was not always graded in the ﬁrst school year. For
the 31.3 percent of students in our sample with missing writing grade points in
the ﬁrst grade, we calculate the average grade points using the grade points in
the other two subjects.
To gain an economically meaningful interpretation of the effect size we “anchor”
the raw grades in later-life earnings potential (see Bond and Lang, 2013). Perfor-
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mance anchored in earnings potential should not be confused with the effect of
absence on income. The anchored effect of absence still gives the short-term effect
on educational performance, but scaled in units of Swedish krona (SEK, in values
of 2002) instead of the somewhat hard-to-interpret numerical grade points. In
the analysis we exchange the grade points as dependent variable with the ﬁtted
value of the following auxiliary anchoring regression14:
yanchorig = ω0g +
13
∑
j=1
ω1g,jmathig +
13
∑
j=1
ω2g,jreadingig +
13
∑
j=1
ω3g,jwritingig + ξig,
where yanchorig is individual i’s pension income in 2002, mathig, readingig and
writingig are her grade points in the particular subject in school grade g, and ξ
denotes the estimation error.15 The anchoring is performed separately for grade-1
grade points and grade-4 grade points. The estimates for the anchoring regres-
sions are reported in the Online Appendix.
Subsequent education data Information on subsequent education beyond ele-
mentary school is taken from the highest educational degree as stated in the 1970
Census. Given that individuals are aged 35–40 in 1970, this reﬂects ﬁnal educa-
tion. In our baseline speciﬁcations we measure educational attainment with an
indicator that takes the value 1 if an individual attains a more advanced track
than Folkskola, and 0 otherwise.16
Labor market data We follow our sample over the life-cycle by using infor-
mation from the 1960 and 1970 population censuses and tax registers available
from 2002 onwards. These sources give long-term information on employment,
earnings and pensions. Speciﬁcally we identify 11,570 of the individuals in the
schooling dataset in the 1960 Census which includes information on individual
occupation, and 10,246 individuals in the 1970 Census where we observe em-
ployment status and labor market income.17 While the tax register data include
several types of income, we use the income coming from labor market activity.
14The grade points in each subject enter the regression through full sets of dummy variables.
Grade points of 14 and 15 are omitted as these grades are very rare.
15Using the labormarket income from the Census 1970 for anchoring the performance in school
does not change our interpretation of the ﬁndings throughout the analysis.
16That is, the indicator is 1 if an individual leaves Folkskola after grade 4 and attends Realskola
or if the individual leaves Folkskola after the compulsory years of schooling and enrolls into sec-
ondary education afterwards. Realskola dropouts, Folkho¨gskola or Folkskola with 8 or 9 years of
compulsory schooling are treated as Folkskola, see Fischer et al. (2016).
17The effective number of observations used in the ﬁnal analysis of the long-term effects is
lower as we restrict ourselves to empirical strategies that require information on both grades and
only consider individuals with siblings in the data.
79
As individuals in our sample are well into their retirement ages, this income re-
ﬂects pensions and, thereby, constitutes a proxy for lifetime earnings.18 Missing
information on labor market outcomes might be due to individuals passing away
or migrating from Sweden before 1960. We try to trace down individuals that
have migrated (see Appendix) and directly investigate mortality.
Mortality data The exact date of death is taken from the Swedish Death Index
of Federation of Swedish Genealogical Societies (see Federation of Swedish Ge-
nealogical Societies, 2014). The data includes information on all individuals that
passed away between 1901 and 2013.
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Our main explanatory variable of interest is the number of missed school days in
grade 1 and in grade 4. The data allows us to distinguish between absences due to
sickness and absences due to other reasons.19 Figure O3.1 shows the distribution
of individual days of absence and sickness absence in grade 1 and 4, respectively.
In grade 1, 64 percent of all students miss less than 10 days and 6 percent of all
students have no absence. The average number of missed days in grade 1 is 11
days (median 7 days). In grade 4, students tend to miss slightly more days (mean
11.6 days, median 8.5 days). 59 percent of all students miss 10 or less days and 5
percent never miss school. Despite a very different context and time period, the
distribution of total days of absence is comparable with that reported in recent
US studies (Goodman, 2014; Aucejo and Romano, 2016). We observe a slightly
higher density of very high number of absent days than these studies report, but
unlike Goodman (2014) who excludes observations with more than 60 days of
absence, we do not cap absence days.
Figure O3.1 illustrates that most absences are sickness absences. Compared to
sickness absence, other types of absences only play a minor role – the average
number of missed days is 1.6 in grade 1 and 3.3 in grade 4. In grade 1 and 4,
60 percent and 38 percent of all students never miss a day for other reasons than
sickness, respectively.20
18For the cohorts considered here, full pensions require thirty years of contributions and the
level of the pension is based on the best ﬁfteen years (Sunde´n, 2006). Widows were in some cases
entitled to a certain share of their spouse’s earnings after their death and these widow pensions
represent the most important deviation from the general rules.
19Although the exam catalogs include columns for several reasons for non-health related ab-
sence, teachers often only noted other absence without naming the reason.
20The Online Appendix additionally plots the within-family and within-individual distribu-
tions of total days of absence and days of sickness absence.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of (sickness) absence by grade
Notes: Own calculations based on exam catalog information. 8,938 observations.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of average grade points across math, reading and
speaking, and writing
Notes: Own calculations based on exam catalog information. 8,938 observations.
Turning to school achievement, Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of the raw aver-
age grade points over math, reading and speaking, and writing by school grade.
In line with the suggestion of the Royal Commission, only a few students receive
a very low or a very high grade point and the variance of the grade points is
higher in grade 4 than in grade 1.21
Table 3.3 presents the long-term outcomes. The highly selective nature of the
education system in the time under review, is reﬂected in only 13 percent of the
individuals in our sample having more than Folkskola. Interestingly, this number
does not differ by gender. Employment is measured in 1960 and 1970, when
our sample is aged 25–30 and 35–40 respectively, and corresponds to a binary
indicator equal to 1 if an individual is employed.
21The Online Appendix shows the distributions of grade points by subject and school grade.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics on long-term outcomes
Mean
Age range All Female Male # obs % female
Education
More than Folkskola
(in %)
12.51 12.99 12.02 3,565 50.29
Employment status
in 1960 (in %) 25–30 65.08 36.51 93.96 4,129 50.28
in 1970 (in %) 35–40 57.93 43.00 72.89 4,469 50.06
Earnings
in 1970 35–40 23,924 14,989 30,555 2,932 42.60
in 2002 67–72 150,816 128,175 175,138 3,072 51.79
Mortality at age 70
passed away (in %) 20.70 16.45 24.96 3,072 50.06
Notes: Own calculations based on the ﬁnal sample of siblings. Age range gives the individual’s age at which the variable
is measured. Education is taken from the Census 1970 but is likely to refer to completed schooling for most individuals.
Employment in 1960 and 1970 is taken from the Census information in these years. Labor market income 1970 and
pensions 2002 are based on Census 1970 and tax registers, respectively, and measured in Swedish krona in the year the
information refers to. The mortality information is taken from the Swedish Death Index.
Income measures are available for 1970 and 2002. The 1970 income measure refers
to the labor market income recorded in the 1970 Census when individuals in our
sample were in prime working age (35–40 years old). Table 3.3 states the original
values in SEK in the year in which income is measured. With individuals born
1930–1935, the 2002 income measure refers to pension income mirroring previous
labor market participation (in the baseline speciﬁcation we do not consider non-
labor market income). Looking at longevity, 16 percent of women and 25 percent
of men in our ﬁnal sample passed away before reaching the age of 70.
3.3.3 Correlations between absence, academic and socio-economic
outcomes
To set the stage for the empirical analysis we document the associations between
the number of days of absences and the outcomes of interest. As expected, the
correlation between absence and academic performance is negative, see Figure
3.4. The linear ﬁts indicate that it is more strongly negative for sickness absence
than total absence.
Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of the income measures by grouped days of
absence. While the visual difference between the income distributions for indi-
viduals who have missed below 5 days and between 5 and 20 days is rather small,
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Figure 3.4: Descriptive relationship between (sickness) absence and performance
Notes: Own calculations based on exam catalog information. 8,938 observations. Grade points are collapsed on the integer
of the days of absence. The size of the marker indicates the relative number of observations in the days-of-absence cell.
Only cells with 15 or more observations are plotted. The ﬁtted line is taken from a simple linear regression of performance
on total absence and sickness absence, respectively, without restricting to the number of observations per cell.
individuals who missed more than 20 days because of sickness seem to earn less
later in life. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of the distributions in-
dicates that all conditional distributions but the 5-to-20-days and more-than-20-
days distributions for income 1970 differ signiﬁcantly at the 10 percent level (see
note to the ﬁgure). Figure 3.6 shows the survival rate of individuals who have
missed less than 5 days, 5 to 20 days or more than 20 days. The differences be-
tween the lines are small (and statistically insigniﬁcant), although individuals
who missed more than 20 days seem more likely to die younger.
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Figure 3.5: Income distributions by total days of absence
Notes: Own calculation based on exam catalog, Census 1970 and tax register 2002 information.
The Census labor market income is limited to values> 0. Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
for the equality of the distributions yields that the <5-days distribution of the 1970 income is
statistically different from the 5–20-days distribution (corrected p-value 0.025) and the >20-days
distribution (p-value 0.006). The 5–20-days and the >20-days distributions do not differ at the
conventional levels (p-value 0.223). For 2002 pensions, all three conditional distributions differ
statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level (p-values for<5 days and 5–20 days: 0.007,<5 days
and >20 days: <0.001, 5–20 days and >20 days: 0.086).
83
0.
00
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
0 20 40 60 80
Age passed away
Absence < 5 days
Absence 5-20 days
Absence > 20 days
Figure 3.6: Kaplan-Meier survival function by total days of absence
Notes: Own calculations based on exam catalog and Swedish Death Index information. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for
the equality of the distributions indicates that the conditional distributions to not differ signiﬁcantly (corrected p-values
for <5 days and 5–20 days: 0.209, <5 days and >20 days: 0.985, 5–20 days and >20 days: >0.999).
These ﬁgures show raw correlations and we should refrain from interpreting
them as evidence of a causal link. Indeed, students who are more likely to miss
school may also be those of lower ability or those of frailer nature. To start ex-
ploring the extent to which such selection may exist, Table 3.4 reports the average
number of days of absence across groups of students deﬁned by observable char-
acteristics. Students whose father is a service worker are more likely to be absent
than children whose fathers are agricultural and production workers. Children
who have fewer siblings are also more likely to be absent. Based on the avail-
able observables it is not obvious whether we should expect students to select
positively or negatively into absence. We now turn to the empirical strategy we
propose to deal with the potential selection on unobservables.
3.4 Empirical strategy
3.4.1 The effect of absence on short- and long-term outcomes
The aim of our analysis is to estimate the causal effect of absence during elemen-
tary school on later outcomes, but absence is inherently endogenous as it likely
relates to individual unobservable characteristics, including personal health. In
addition, our ‘treatment variable’ – number of days of absence – is a count vari-
able, implying varying treatment intensity. As noted above, most absence days
are due to illness, which means that our ‘treatment’ is in fact typically deﬁned as
the combination (sick, absent from school). Taken together this calls for a careful
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics of absence by type and individual characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grade 1 Grade 4
All Sickness All Sickness
absences absence absences absence
Overall 10.9 (12.0) 9.3 (10.8) 11.6 (11.9) 8.3 (10.3)
Gender
Female 11.1 (11.9) 9.4 (10.7) 11.9 (12.8) 8.8 (11.3)
Male 10.8 (12.1) 9.2 (11.0) 11.2 (10.9) 7.8 (9.1)
Year of birth
1930 10.2 (12.5) 8.7 (11.5) 12.0 (12.4) 8.5 (11.2)
1931 9.5 (11.4) 7.8 (9.4) 11.6 (11.6) 7.8 (10.3)
1932 10.9 (10.9) 8.9 (9.6) 12.3 (12.6) 7.9 (10.9)
1933 14.3 (13.2) 12.0 (12.0) 12.8 (12.5) 8.9 (10.1)
1934 11.2 (12.0) 9.2 (10.7) 11.6 (11.5) 8.3 (9.7)
1935 9.2 (11.2) 9.2 (11.2) 8.0 (9.1) 8.0 (9.1)
Occupation of father
Agricultural
worker
10.8 (11.5) 8.7 (10.0) 12.5 (12.0) 8.0 (10.1)
Production
worker
10.8 (11.5) 8.7 (10.0) 12.5 (12.0) 8.0 (10.1)
Service worker 12.7 (14.1) 11.2 (13.3) 11.5 (10.7) 9.2 (10.0)
Number of siblings in sample
0a 12.3 (13.8) 11.0 (13.3) 11.1 (11.6) 9.1 (10.7)
1 11.4 (12.2) 9.8 (11.0) 11.6 (11.8) 8.6 (10.1)
2 or more 10.3 (11.8) 8.7 (10.7) 11.5 (12.0) 7.9 (10.5)
Born out of wedlock
yes 13.7 (13.8) 11.2 (11.6) 14.2 (15.0) 9.7 (11.4)
no 10.8 (11.9) 9.2 (10.8) 11.5 (11.7) 8.2 (10.3)
Born in hospital
yes 11.3 (12.5) 9.9 (11.7) 11.4 (11.1) 9.0 (9.2)
no 10.9 (12.0) 9.3 (10.8) 11.6 (12.0) 8.2 (10.4)
Notes: Own calculations based on church records and exam catalog information. Observations: 8,938. Columns 1 and
5 give the mean value of the days of absence in total (that is, for all reasons) in grade 1 and 4, respectively. Columns 3
and 7 give the mean value of days of sickness absence in grade 1 and 4, respectively. Standard deviations are given in
parentheses in even columns refer to the mean in the odd column on the left.
aInformation based on the individual panel not restricted to siblings.
deﬁnition of the treatment effect (and counterfactual treatment) we are seeking
to estimate.
In a standard model of a situation with a multi-valued treatment, we would
denote potential outcomes under different treatment intensities w by Yi (w) (cf.
Athey and Imbens, 2017), from which we may derive various treatment effects
τw1,w2 for different levels of treatment w1 and w2. Such a speciﬁcation would
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require the assumption that the potential outcomes Yi (w) are insensitive to the
source of variation in w. This is a reasonable approximation in many cases,
but when most absence is due to illness this assumption may not be warranted.
We therefore introduce a second argument, s, in the potential outcome function
Yi (w, s) where s is the number of days of illness during the school year.22
Having deﬁned potential outcomes, we may deﬁne the causal effect we seek to
estimate. In all speciﬁcations, we seek to estimate the incremental effect of one
additional day of absence from school within a school year. This causal effect
corresponds to
τ =
W
∑
w=1
πw−1E [Yi (w, sw)−Yi (w− 1, sw−1)] , (3.1)
where πw−1 represents the empirical frequency of total absence days being equal
to w − 1. τ captures the effect of one additional day of absence averaged over
the entire distribution of absence. However, we have not yet made any assump-
tions regarding s, the number of days the student is ill. Should we keep s con-
stant when comparing different levels of absence, or should we allow it to adjust?
When short-term perspectives are concerned, we probably do not want to keep s
constant between different levels of w. Doing so would lead to the policy ques-
tion “Should children go to school when ill?” rather than the seemingly more
relevant policy question “Should we try to keep children healthy so that they do
not miss school?”. Put differently: in the short-term perspective, we may think
of s as generating variation in absence days, based on which we can estimate the
effects of absence.
For long-term outcomes, it is less clear that we want to allow s to vary in the def-
inition of the treatment effect. Indeed, in the long-run perspective, we are more
concerned that a health shock during elementary school may have persistent ef-
fects on health, which in turn would affect adult outcomes.23 In terms of potential
outcomes, we would have Yi (w, s) = Yi (w, s′) for s = s′, and any attempt to use
variation in s to identify the effect of absence from school would also pick up an
indirect effect operating via the dependence of adult health on childhood health.
Thus, for long-term outcomes, we would prefer to deﬁne the incremental effect
of a day of absence as Yi (w, s)− Yi (w− 1, s) for some suitably chosen s. How-
ever, if the child’s health is the main source of variation in w, it will be difﬁcult to
22The days of illness s should not be confused with the days of sickness absence, which also
depend on the choice of going to school or not when ill.
23The literature on the dynamics of child health suggests that shocks to a child’s health have
persistent effects. See for example: Currie and Stabile (2003), Contoyannis and Li (2011), Fletcher
and Wolfe (2014) and Conti (2013).
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estimate such an effect in the data – because irrespective of the level at which we
ﬁx s, some combinations of (w, s) will be very rare in the data. In order to address
this potential issue, we try to rule out the possibility that short-term variation
in health has an independent effect on outcomes by comparing the estimated ef-
fects of absence due to different reasons. If sickness absence has a similar impact
on outcomes as other types of absence, it seems safe to conclude that the main
component of the treatment is not poor health, but rather the absence. Such an
interpretation is plausible despite persistence in health as long as health persis-
tence is related to unobservables (such as genetic traits or family background)
that our empirical strategy adequately controls for.
3.4.2 Estimation
In order to estimate the incremental effect of absence days, denoted τ in equation
(3.1), a natural starting point is to estimate a model in which the achievement of
an individual i in grade g, denoted by yig, is assumed to depend linearly on the
number of days he or she was absent from school in grade g, denoted by Wig,
a set of individual-speciﬁc controls X1,i, a set of of school-speciﬁc controls X2,ig,
and a vector of parish ﬁxed effects Pig:
yig = β0 + τWig + β1X1,i + β2X2,ig + Pig + εig, (3.2)
where εig captures the unobservables affecting student performance. Given our
data, the vector X1 includes students’ characteristics taken from the church records:
gender, full sets of year and month of birth dummies as well as interaction terms
between the year and the month of birth, age-in-month ﬁxed effects, mother and
father’s year of birth dummies, father’s occupation at the time of birth, and indi-
cators for whether the child was born out of wedlock, whether the child was born
in hospital and whether he or she has a twin. The vector X2 of school-speciﬁc
factors includes an indicator for grade 4 (in the pooled speciﬁcation), class size
as well as lowest and highest grade taught to students in the same classroom.24
Finally, the vector of parish ﬁxed effects Pig controls for time-invariant factors
that are common to all students going to school in the same parish and that affect
their performance in school, for instance compulsory years of education and term
length.
The key problem with interpreting the OLS estimates of τ in equation (3.2) as the
causal effect of days of absence is that days of absence likely correlate with the
24Class size is taken into account through spline variables. That is, we include variables that
group the number of classmates in bins of ﬁve, where the bins for more than ﬁve classmates only
give the marginal number relative to the previous bin.
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unobservables εig and the exogeneity assumption E(ε|W, X1, X2, P) = 0, which
is necessary to interpret τˆ as a causal effect, is likely to be violated. For exam-
ple, days of absence may be correlated with unmeasured school factors, such as
school resources and teacher quality, which we are not able to control. These fac-
tors are presumably positively correlated with performance and negatively corre-
lated with absence as they determine students’ engagement in school. Neglecting
them would therefore overestimate the impact of absence in the OLS model.
A common approach to address this concern is to augment the above equation
with school and teacher ﬁxed effects, thus effectively relating the absences and
performance of students attending the same school and taught by the same teacher.
This is one of the strategies implemented by Goodman (2014) and Aucejo and
Romano (2016). While this approach controls for all school-speciﬁc and teacher-
speciﬁc time-invariant factors that may be confounding the effect of absence on
performance, there may well be other individual-speciﬁc unobservable charac-
teristics that distinguish students who are more frequently absent than others.
If, conditional on the observables included in the model, these characteristics are
correlated with performance in school, the effect of days of absence on perfor-
mance will still be biased. Students who are less able, less motivated or whose
parents place less emphasis on education may be absent more frequently. If these
students also perform worse in school, then this unobserved difference result in
a downward bias in the effect of days of absence on performance.
To address this further concern, we take advantage of two key features of our
dataset: that we observe sibling pairs and that we observe students’ absence and
performance twice. Exploiting the fact that we observe sibling pairs we augment
equation (3.2) not only with school and teacher ﬁxed effects, but also with family
ﬁxed effects. That is, our estimating equation becomes the following siblings
ﬁxed effect model:
yi( f ),g = β0 + τWi( f ),g + β1X1,i( f ), + β2X2,i( f ),g + Pi( f ),g + Si( f ),g + Ti( f ),g
+λ f + εi( f ),g, (3.3)
where Si( f ),g is the school ﬁxed effect, Ti( f ),g the teacher ﬁxed effect, and λ f the
family ﬁxed effect for individual i in family f . This design controls for any unob-
served individual characteristics that has the same additive effect on outcomes of
both siblings. While siblings ﬁxed effects remove innate genes and other family-
constant factors with certainty, parental involvement could per se differ between
siblings. Given that siblings in our sample are born in a relatively tight time span
of ﬁve years (1930 to 1935) the underlying parenting style is less likely to differ
across offspring compared to siblings born farther apart. Moreover, in the time
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period we study, parental involvement in their offspring’s education was quite
low in Sweden (Fredriksson, 1971).
When analyzing the impact of absences on short-term attainment, we strengthen
the strategy even further by exploiting the fact that we observe student’s absence
and performance twice. We pool observations on grade 1 and grade 4 for each
individual and include individual ﬁxed effects in the estimating equation:
yi( f ),g = β0 + τWi( f ),g + β1X1,i + β2X2,i( f ),g + Pi( f ),g + Si( f ),g + Ti( f ),g
+αi( f ) + εi( f ),g, (3.4)
where αi is an individual ﬁxed effect. This design controls for any unobserved
individual characteristic that has the same linear effect on achievement in grade
1 and grade 4. Even if unobserved ability, motivation or parental taste for ed-
ucation differs between siblings, αi will absorb this as long as the difference is
constant between grades 1 and 4.
To implement this equation we effectively estimate the following within-student
model:
Δyi( f ) = τ
FEΔWi( f ) + β
FE
2 ΔX2i( f ) + ΔP
FE
i( f ) + ΔS
FE
i( f ) + ΔT
FE
i( f ) + Δεi( f ),
with Δyi( f ) ≡ yi( f ),4 − yi( f ),1, ΔWi( f ) ≡ Wi( f ),4 −Wi( f ),1, etc., and Δεi( f ) ≡ εi( f ),4 −
εi( f ),1. The intercept β0, the vector of time-constant observables X1 as well as
the time-constant unobservables αi will be removed from the estimation. The
parish, school and teacher ﬁxed effects will only be identiﬁed from students that
move to another parish, switch schools and/or are assigned to a new teacher
between grades 1 and 4. As an individual always belongs to the same family, the
individual ﬁxed effects model nests siblings ﬁxed effects at the same time. As
long as E(Δεi|Δ (W, X2, P, S, T)) = 0, τˆ will be unbiased.
While the individual ﬁxed effect strategy is arguably more valid than a strategy
only relying on within-school or within-teacher variation, it is not without limi-
tations. First, it requires us to assume that the effect of absence on performance is
the same in grade 1 and grade 4. A priori, it is unclear if these effects are the same,
but in Section 3.5 we present suggestive evidence supporting this assumption.
Second, the individual (siblings) FE estimates do not recover τ if there are indi-
vidual-speciﬁc (family-speciﬁc) factors of student achievement that vary over
time (across siblings) and are correlated with the student’s absence. An exam-
ple of such a threat to the identiﬁcation would be changes in class size – which
may lead to increased absence and to changes in student performance. In order to
address this potential issue, we include class size as a control variable. Another
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issue is dynamic parental investments: parents may adjust their own inputs in
response to a child’s absence which can lead to biased estimates. In our case,
however, spillover effects of this kind can only occur in the rare cases that two
siblings are observed in the same school year. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out
all threats to identiﬁcation. To address this, we provide in Section 3.6 a compre-
hensive sensitivity analysis where we bound our estimates against unobservable
confounders and complement our main analysis with an instrumental variables
(IV) strategy.
3.5 Estimation results
3.5.1 Short-term effects of absence in school
Table 3.5 reports the pooled estimates of the effect of days of absence in grade 1
and grade 4 on performance in the same grade.25 The rows of the table indicate
the different ways of measuring average performance. In column 1, we regress
average performance on days of absence and control variables (including parish
FE, but not family or individual FE). These estimates show that one additional
day of absence is signiﬁcantly associated with a 0.35 percent of a standard devi-
ation (SD) decrease in average performance. Once school, teacher and siblings
ﬁxed effects are added in the model (column 2), the negative effect of days of ab-
sence becomes slightly larger in magnitude, 0.40 percent of a SD. This is in line
with the hypothesis that students whose parents invest less in their children’s ed-
ucation may also be more likely to miss school, but the fact that these estimates
are so close to the OLS estimates suggests that selection on family unobservables
may not be very important in this context.26 When including individual ﬁxed ef-
fects to the model (column 3), the point estimate returns to the magnitude of 0.33
percent of a SD.27
The effect of absence is of moderate size and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 per-
cent level in all speciﬁcations. Assuming linearity, the effect of 10 days of absence
– about the average in our sample – corresponds to around 3 percent of a SD in
25Appendix Table A3.2 reports the coefﬁcient estimates associated with all the control variables
included in these speciﬁcations.
26The same seems to hold true if we include school and teacher FE stepwise in Table A3.2 in
the Appendix. Given the conditioning variables in the OLS model, particularly the full sets of
year-of-birth, age and parish indicators, the coefﬁcient of absence does not change noteworthily
across the school, teacher and siblings FE speciﬁcations.
27We restrict the individual FE sample to contain individuals with siblings in the dataset. The
Online Appendix shows the effect when all observations are used. The point estimates are quite
similar, suggesting that siblings and singletons react in the same way to an additional day of
absence.
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Table 3.5: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3)
OLS
Sibl. Indi.
FE FE
Average grade points in units of SD
(mean: 0, SD 1)
Days of absence −0.0035∗∗∗ −0.0040∗∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Average grade points in units of pension 2002
(mean 2002 pension in sample: 150,816 SEK)
Days of absence −56.1501∗∗∗ −39.7389∗ −45.1403∗∗
(14.7496) (20.2815) (20.5733)
Conventional controls
Time-variant   
Time-invariant  
Fixed effects
Socio-economics  
Parish   
School  
Teacher  
Siblings 
Individual 
# observations 8,938 8,938 8,938
# families/individuals 1,988 4,469
Notes: Each cell states the coefﬁcient of days of absence for a separate regression. The rows give different measures of
the dependent variable average grade points. In the ﬁrst row average performance overmath, reading and speaking,
and writing is standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The second row measures average grade points
in units of pensions 2002, see the data description in the text for details. Time-variant conditional variables: grade,
range of grades instructed in the same classroom, length of the school year in weeks. Time-invariant conditional
variables: female, born out of wedlock, twin birth, mother employed at the time of birth, born in hospital. Socio-
economics ﬁxed effects include full sets of ﬁxed effects for the year and month of birth, year and month interactions,
age, parent’s year of birth, and the family’s socio-economic status based on the ﬁrst-digit HISCO code of the father.
Parish-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
student performance. Interestingly, despite analyzing absence in a very differ-
ent context and literally in another century, our results measured in SD units are
comparable to those in Goodman (2014) and Aucejo and Romano (2016). Using a
similar identiﬁcation strategy with recent US data Goodman (2014) ﬁnds an effect
0.8 percent of a SD in math and English and Aucejo and Romano (2016) ﬁnd ef-
fects of 0.55 percent of a SD in math and 0.29 percent in reading in their preferred
speciﬁcations.
This effect size is also comparable to what has been found in the literature ex-
amining the effect of teacher quality on performance. For instance, Chetty et al.
(2014a) ﬁnd that a one SD increase in teacher Value Added improves students’
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math test scores by 0.14 SD and English test scores by 0.1 SD. Rivkin et al. (2005)
ﬁnd that a one-year increase in teacher experience increases student performance
by up to 0.13 SD in math and 0.06 SD in reading.
An advantage of our study is that we can anchor student performance, which is
measured on a somewhat arbitrary scale, to adult outcomes. In other words, we
can translate the short-term effect of absence on school performance into its effect
on earnings potential. This still measures the short-term effect of absence, but in a
unit (SEK) that is economically more meaningful than standardized grade points.
In the individual FE speciﬁcation the impact of ten additional days of absence on
school performance translates into a decrease in earnings potential of 451 SEK (in
values of 2002). Given that the average pension is about 150,000 SEK, this effect
seems rather humble.
3.5.2 Long-term effects of absence in school
Table 3.6 reports the effects on our long-term outcomes of the average number of
absences across grades 1 and 4 in columns 1 (OLS) and 2 (siblings FE) as well as
the effects of the number of absences in each grade by grade in columns 3 (OLS)
and 4 (siblings FE), respectively.
Our estimates suggest there is a robust negative effect of absence on secondary
school enrollment, but we are unable to attribute it to a certain school grade.
The point estimates are negative for both grades and of at most 0.1 percentage
points – which can be compared to a baseline probability of 12.5 percent. For
comparison, our estimates of the effect of school performance, as measured by
average grade points, on secondary schooling enrollment range between 0.05 and
0.13 (results available upon request). Multiplying this estimate with the estimated
effect of absence on school performance of around -0.003 (cf. Table 3.5 above),
we would expect an effect of absence on enrollment of between -0.0003 and -
0.0005. Our estimates of the impact of absence on enrollment are in general larger
and typically twice as large as this indirect estimate, even though the differences
between the two are insigniﬁcant.
Turning to employment, the results are mixed. When it comes to early-career em-
ployment (as measured in the 1960 Census when individuals are between 25 and
30 years old), our results suggest that there is a negative relationship driven by
absences in grade 1. Indeed, when siblings FE are included in the model, ten days
of absence in grade 1 leads to a decrease in the probability of being employed at
ages 25–30 by 2.6 percentage points, and this estimate is strongly signiﬁcant. Rel-
ative to the average employment at the time (65 percent), this corresponds to a 4
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percent reduction, which is a rather large effect. On the other hand, for employ-
ment in 1970 (at ages 35–40) the estimates again have the expected negative sign,
but the point estimates are smaller and noisier. The 95 percent conﬁdence interval
for the effect of ten days of absence (across both grades) on employment in 1970
ranges between -0.017 and -0.002, suggesting that there may still be a negative
effect of absences on employment at 35–40, but this effect is unlikely to be large
and is rather getting smaller over time.
With respect to labor market earnings, the association between income and ab-
sence is negative for most speciﬁcations. For 1970 labor market income the esti-
mates are not statistically signiﬁcant and rather small in size – in most speciﬁca-
tions ten days of absence correspond to less than 1 percent of the average income.
Besides the long time horizon (27 to 32 years after grade 1 and 24 to 29 years after
grade 4), the lack of a relationship between absence and income at ages 35–40
may also be due to the Swedish wage structure being extremely compressed at
this time, so that individual productivity had a very limited impact on earnings
(Bhalotra et al., 2016). For 2002 pensions the pooled and fourth-grade estimations
are negative (while the coefﬁcients for grade 1 absences are close to zero). The
OLS estimate of the effect of grade 4 absence on pensions 2002 is signiﬁcant at the
10 percent level. When adding siblings ﬁxed effects, the point estimate increases
in magnitude, but becomes less precise.28 Finally, for mortality the coefﬁcients
alternate around zero and do not exceed 0.01 percentage points. This indicates
that there is no effect on mortality.29
Overall, the results presented so far suggest that absence in elementary school has
a robust negative impact on short-term performance of small but non-negligible
magnitude. Absences in elementary school also have a detrimental impact on
early-career employment, but this effect fades out with increased labor market
experience. Broadly speaking, the ﬁndings are very much in line with those of
Pischke (2007) and Dustmann et al. (forthcoming) who ﬁnd that initial differ-
ences in the quantity and quality of schooling have no long-lasting labor market
effects. The fact that the effect of absence on labor market outcomes are signiﬁ-
cant early in the career but not later on underscores the value of having access to
data on outcomes at different points of the life-cycle in order to get an unbiased
perspective of the full impacts of absence.
That being said, it is possible that the above results mask some heterogeneity
between certain groups or for speciﬁc causes of absences (e.g., sickness absences)
28In the baseline speciﬁcation we only consider income and pension values >0. The Online
Appendix gives the results for alternative income measures. The alternative measures do not
change our interpretation of the baseline results.
29The missing association between absence and longevity indicates that sample attrition due
to selective mortality is not a major concern when interpreting the other long-term effects.
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Table 3.6: Long-term effect of absence in school
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled effect Separate effects
OLS Sibl. OLS Sibl.FE FE
More than Folkskola (1=yes)
Total abs. (avg. both grades) −0.0012 −0.0013
(0.0010) (0.0009)
Total absence in grade 1 −0.0003 −0.0011∗
(0.0006) (0.0007)
Total absence in grade 4 −0.0010∗ −0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0005)
Employment 1960 (1=yes)
Total abs. (avg. both grades) −0.0016∗∗ −0.0016∗
(0.0007) (0.0009)
Total absence in grade 1 −0.0014∗∗ −0.0026∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006)
Total absence in grade 4 −0.0003 0.0008
(0.0007) (0.0008)
Employment 1970 (1=yes)
Total abs. (avg. both grades) −0.0010∗ −0.0020
(0.0006) (0.0015)
Total absence in grade 1 −0.0006 −0.0008
(0.0005) (0.0009)
Total absence in grade 4 −0.0004 −0.0012
(0.0006) (0.0009)
Labor market income 1970
Total abs. (avg. both grades) −54.4802 −13.9569
(36.9846) (57.2241)
Total absence in grade 1 −18.5468 −1.3469
(21.2133) (40.3369)
Total absence in grade 4 −36.0149 −12.2763
(23.2125) (28.5027)
Pensions 2002
Total abs. (avg. both grades) −124.6255 −186.0209
(126.1594) (264.0324)
Total absence in grade 1 0.1536 46.2308
(125.6788) (169.5014)
Total absence in grade 4 −120.9218∗ −215.0359
(72.6683) (147.7769)
Passed away before the age of 70 (1=yes)
Total abs. (avg. both grades) −0.0001 0.0011
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Total absence in grade 1 0.0002 0.0008
(0.0005) (0.0006)
Total absence in grade 4 −0.0003 0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Notes: Number of observations: More than Folkskola 3,019 (in 1,373 families), employment 1960 3,902 (1,750), employment
1970 4,469 (1,988), income 1970 2,137 (985), pensions 2002 2,363 (1,080), passed away before age 70 4,469 (1,988). Parish-
clustered standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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or that absence only has adverse effects if it occurs with large frequency (non-
linearities). We now explore these different margins.
3.5.3 Heterogeneity
Subgroup analysis Table 3.7 reports the estimates for academic performance in
elementary school where we allow the impact of the total number of days of ab-
sence to vary between males and females, as well as between children of agricul-
tural and non-agricultural workers. For each panel, the ﬁrst row reports the main
effect of the number of days of absence, while the second row reports the coefﬁ-
cient on the interaction. Overall, we ﬁnd little evidence of heterogeneous impacts.
With respect to gender heterogeneity, the individual FE model estimates suggest
that the effect of absences may be worse for men than for women’s achievement,
but the difference between the two groups is statistically not different from zero.30
While absence is more strongly negatively correlated with the performance of
children of agricultural workers than with the that of other children, differences
in the impact of absences wash away once we account for unobserved hetero-
geneity at the family level. This lack of a clear effect heterogeneity along the
socio-economic status is in line with Goodman (2014), while Aucejo and Romano
(2016) ﬁnd evidence of some heterogeneous impacts between students of differ-
ent abilities. This result also underlines the educational and societal context of
the analysis. In the setting we investigate, textbooks were, for instance, provided
by the parish if families could not afford them otherwise.
Table 3.8 reports the results of a similar subgroup analysis for our long-term out-
comes. As the difference in labor market participation and earnings between men
and women is quite substantial in the time under review (see Table 3.3), interact-
ing pooled days of absence with the female indicator yields rather remarkable
ﬁndings. Although not statistically signiﬁcant, ten days of absence associate with
a decrease in probability of being employed in 1960 for women by 6.6 percent,
while the corresponding number males is less than one-tenth.31 The long-term
effect of absence on pensions in 2002 seems to be stronger for females as well.
Looking at the social gradient along the father’s occupation indicates some het-
erogeneity on this dimension, where the effect of absences on 1970 income is sig-
niﬁcantly larger for children of agricultural workers than other children.
30One should keep in mind the gender difference is only identiﬁed through a variation in days
of absence in the individual FE model. Similarly, the interaction term between father’s occupation
and absence in the individual FE model is only identiﬁed through variation in absence.
31For women the effect is
(
(10 days × −0.0004) + (10 days ×
−0.0020))/0.3651 baseline probability = −0.0657 ≈ −6.6 percent and for men
(10×−0.0004)/0.9396 = −0.0043 ≈ −0.4 percent.
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Table 3.7: Heterogeneity in the short-term effects by subgroup
(1) (2) (3)
OLS
Sibl. Indi.
FE FE
Gender
Absence −0.0028∗ −0.0037∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0013)
Absence×female −0.0013 −0.0004 0.0017
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0016)
Father’s occupation
Absence −0.0024∗∗ −0.0041∗∗∗ −0.0031∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0016)
Absence×agri. worker −0.0027∗ 0.0002 −0.0005
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0026)
Grade
Absence −0.0040∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0014)
Absence×grade 1 0.0009 0.0014
(0.0016) (0.0017)
Notes: Each panel states the coefﬁcient of total days of absence as well as of an interaction between total days of absence
and the subgroup indicator. 8,938 observations. Control variables as in the baseline speciﬁcation. Parish-clustered
standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
Grade-speciﬁc effects An assumption underlying our individual FE strategy
is that the impact of absence in grade 1 and in grade 4 is the same. While we
cannot test for this assumption in the context of the individual FE model, we
present suggestive evidence that this assumption holds by estimating a model
where we allow for different effects of absence in grade 1 and grade 4 and control
for teacher, school and siblings FE. The results presented in the bottom panel
of Table 3.7 indicate that the effect of absence in grade 1 cannot be statistically
distinguished from the effect of absence in grade 4 on any academic performance
measure.
3.5.4 Sickness vs. non-sickness absences
Our data allows us to distinguish between absences due to sickness and absences
due to other reasons. Table 3.9 reports the estimates of the short-term effects of
days of absences on attainment, when we allow the effect to be different for ab-
sences due to sickness and absences due to other reasons. At the bottom of the
table, we report in brackets the p-value of a F-test that the two coefﬁcients of in-
terest are equal to each other. Comparing the effect of sickness absence with non-
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Table 3.8: Heterogeneity in the long-term effects by subgroup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
> Folk- Empl. Empl. Income Pensions Passed
skola 1960 1970 1970 2002 away≤70
Gender
Absence −0.0023 −0.0004 −0.0021 −8.9994 −28.2702 0.0011
(0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0020) (56.4558) (327.9810) (0.0016)
Abs.×female 0.0016 −0.0020 0.0002 −10.0480 −277.5613 0.0001
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018) (64.3459) (287.1122) (0.0017)
Father’s occupation
Absence −0.0008 −0.0021∗∗ −0.0022 70.2782 −315.6315 0.0015
(0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0016) (60.2351) (280.5521) (0.0012)
Abs.×agri. −0.0011 0.0011 0.0005 −192.8888∗∗∗ 328.3218 −0.0010
(0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0033) (54.5382) (357.2552) (0.0019)
Notes: Each panel states the coefﬁcient of total days of absence (average over grades 1 and 4) as well as of an interaction
between total days of absence and the subgroup indicator. Number of observations: More than Folkskola 3,087 (in 1,396
families), employment 1960 3,904 (1,751), employment 1970 4,471 (1,989), income 1970 2,139 (986), pensions 2002 2,365
(1,081), passed away before age 70 4,471 (1,989). Dependent variables deﬁned as in the baseline long-term results. Parish-
clustered standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
sickness absence across the different speciﬁcations (including school and teacher
FE) reveals an interesting pattern. In the OLS model and the individual FE model
(columns 1 and 5 in Table 3.9), the estimated effects of both types of absence are
similar in magnitude and statistically undistinguishable from each other. If we
only compare students who have the same teacher (and, thereby, are in the same
school and generally in the same class) to each other in column 3, the association
between non-sickness absence and performance is more than twice as strong as
the association between sickness absence and performance (the coefﬁcients differ
at the 10 percent level). This pattern suggests that the association between non-
sickness absence and performance is driven by family-level or individual factors.
A candidate for such a factor may be behavioral issues that cause truancy (which
is reported as non-sickness absence). Accounting for unobserved behavioral prob-
lems either through within-family or within-individual comparison yields rather
similar results – at least when compared to the effect in the teacher FE speciﬁca-
tion. If there are no time-varying behavioral problems (or other time-varying un-
observable confounders of non-sickness absence), the coefﬁcient of days of non-
sickness absence in column 5 may as well be a reasonable approximation for the
effect absence days w while holding the number of days in illness s constant. Tak-
ing up the discussion of what an ideal experiment may look like in Section 3.4.1,
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Table 3.9: Short-term effects – total absence vs. sickness absence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS
School Teacher Sibl. Indi.
FE FE FE FE
Average grade points in units of SD
Days of sickness absence −0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0042∗∗∗ −0.0036∗∗∗ −0.0044∗∗∗ −0.0034∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Days of non-sickness ab-
sence
−0.0027 −0.0039∗∗ −0.0075∗∗∗ −0.0017 −0.0031
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0025)
[0.5789] [0.8444] [0.0793] [0.2651] [0.9319]
# observations 8,938 8,938 8,938 8,938 8,938
# individuals/families 749 1,259 1,988 4,469
Notes: See note to the baseline results table. The brackets at the bottom of the table give the p-value of a F-test of equality
of the coefﬁcients of sickness and non-sickness absence. Parish-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance:
∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
the similar coefﬁcients of sickness and non-sickness absence in column 5 (the p-
value is close to 1) thus lends support to the notion that the reduced performance
associated with absence is driven by the absence in itself, and not by the student’s
health. The fact that only the impact of sickness absence is signiﬁcantly different
from zero might be driven by the fact that there is a lot more variation in this
variable than there is in days of non-sickness absence.32
A similar exercise for our long-term outcomes reveals very comparable patterns.
Table 3.10 reports the OLS (ﬁrst panel) and siblings FE (second panel) coefﬁcients
of sickness absence and non-sickness absence for grades 1 and 4. Interestingly,
the negative association between total absence and having more than Folkskola
education seems driven by non-sickness absence – even though sickness is the
main cause for overall absence. This supports the view that non-sickness absence
is driven by behavioral problems, which teachers account for when recommend-
ing students for Realskola enrollment. Once behavioral problems on family level
are partialled out (through the inclusion of siblings FE), the negative association
between absences with education vanishes.
Both the OLS and siblings FE speciﬁcations point to the fact that both types of
absences signiﬁcantly decrease early employment. Although the effect of non-
sickness absences is more negative than that of sickness absences, we cannot dis-
tinguish the two from each other at conventional levels of signiﬁcance. Regarding
32Aucejo and Romano (2016) distinguish between excused and unexcused absence. They do
not compare the effect size across different FE models, but in line with our ﬁndings, their esti-
mated effect of unexcused absence exceeds the effect of excused absence.
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Table 3.10: Long-term effects – total absence vs. sickness absence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
> Folk- Empl. Empl. Income Pensions Passed
skola 1960 1970 1970 2002 away≤70
OLS estimation
Sick. abs. gr. 1 0.0002 −0.0011∗ −0.0005 −16.0216 −24.3926 −0.0000
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (17.1981) (139.5187) (0.0005)
Non-sick. abs. gr. 1 −0.0025∗∗ −0.0028∗ −0.0013 −33.0191 158.5347 0.0014
(0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0015) (78.3599) (380.7130) (0.0013)
[0.0289] [0.3363] [0.6589] [0.8195] [0.6619] [0.3175]
Sick. abs. gr. 4 −0.0003 0.0002 −0.0005 −36.6376 −88.3797 0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005) (27.8351) (91.9464) (0.0006)
Non-sick. abs. gr. 4 −0.0035∗∗∗−0.0020 −0.0002 −32.5383 −255.0109 −0.0031∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0015) (50.2889) (238.1689) (0.0009)
[0.0253] [0.1076] [0.8157] [0.9462] [0.5525] [0.0004]
{0.0280} {0.1316} {0.9465} {0.8493} {0.8239} {0.0012}
Siblings FE
Sick. abs. gr. 1 −0.0013 −0.0022∗∗∗−0.0008 −25.7318 −15.8283 0.0004
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (42.5099) (198.1435) (0.0006)
Non-sick. abs. gr. 1 −0.0004 −0.0055∗∗ −0.0009 138.0634 443.4685 0.0032∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0024) (101.3751) (397.9748) (0.0016)
[0.5476] [0.2390] [0.9675] [0.1317] [0.3465] [0.0775]
Sick. abs. gr. 4 −0.0006 0.0011 −0.0011 −39.8570 −272.8657 0.0008
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (25.4238) (174.1033) (0.0007)
Non-sick. abs. gr. 4 0.0016∗ −0.0009 −0.0017 81.6146 56.3521 −0.0018
(0.0010) (0.0027) (0.0027) (65.2114) (249.8072) (0.0015)
[0.1149] [0.4702] [0.8370] [0.0692] [0.3066] [0.1160]
{0.1381} {0.0003} {0.9703} {0.1736} {0.2434} {0.2317}
Notes: Number of observations: More than Folkskola 3,087 (in 1,396 families), employment 1960 3,904 (1,751), employment
1970 4,471 (1,989), income 1970 2,139 (986), pensions 2002 2,365 (1,081), passed away before age 70 4,471 (1,989). The
brackets give the p-value of a F-test of equality of the coefﬁcients of sickness and non-sickness absence in the respective
grade. The braces state the p-value of a F-test of equality of all four coefﬁcients. Parish-clustered standard errors in
parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
employment in 1970, the absence coefﬁcients are negative but neither statistically
different from each other nor from zero. The income measures are only nega-
tively associated with non-sickness absence in the OLS estimates. To the extent
that non-sickness absence reﬂects a bolder behavior, these results that suggest
there might be a wage premium for being “pushy.”
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Figure 3.7: Non-linearities in the short-term effect of absence for different
threshold values
Notes: This graph plots the coefﬁcient of a regression of performance in school on a binary in-
dicator for total days of absence. In the left plot performance is measured in units of standard
deviations and in the right plot in year-2002 SEK. The indicator threshold is given on the x-axis.
The size of the coefﬁcient markers depicted through orange dots is proportional to the number of
observations for that the indicator is 1. Out of the 8,942 student-grade observations 95 per cent
have at least one day of absence (leftmost orange dot in the plots) and 2 per cent missed 50 or
more days in one school year (rightmost orange dot in the plots). The gray area indicates the 95
per cent signiﬁcance band of the coefﬁcient estimates. The red line depicts the linear effect of an
additional day of absence taken from the baseline model.
3.5.5 Non-linearities
While a student may be able to compensate a few days of absence, this may not be
possible for a longer period of absence. This would result in a non-linear relation-
ship between absence and educational performance. To investigate the presence
of non-linearities we run the individual FE speciﬁcation (similar to column 3 in
Table 3.5) where we deﬁne the treatment as an indicator for whether the number
of days of absence exceeds a certain threshold, where we vary this threshold be-
tween 1 and 50. The dots in Figure 3.7 give the coefﬁcients associated with such
indicator along the different threshold values on the x-axis.33 The size of the dots
indicates the relative number of observations for which the indicator is 1. While
95 percent out of the c.a. 9,000 student-grade observations exhibit at least one day
of absence, less than 2 percent of the student-grade observations have 50 or more
days. Naturally, the 95 percent conﬁdence interval of the point estimators – de-
picted in gray – increases with the threshold value. The red reference line depicts
33Because the number of students that miss a large number of days in one school year is often
rather low (e.g., only 12 students miss exactly 45 days), it is not meaningful to regress performance
on a full set of binary indicators for each number of days in a single regression. The Online
Appendix gives the results of a regression using indicator variables that bin days of absence. The
coefﬁcients of the indicator variables lie around the linear effect reference line.
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Figure 3.8: Non-linearities in the effect of average days of absence in both grades
on long-term outcomes using individual ﬁxed effects
Notes: This graph plots the coefﬁcient of a regression of the long-term on a binary indicator for
average days of total absence over grades 1 and 4. The indicator threshold is given on the x-axis.
The size of the orange coefﬁcient plot is proportional to the number of observations for that the
indicator is 1. The gray area indicates the signiﬁcance band of the coefﬁcient estimates. The red
line depicts the linear effect of an additional day of absence in the baseline speciﬁcation.
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the linear effect of the baseline model as of Table 3.5 multiplied by the number of
absent days.
A comparison of the orange and red lines indicates that the per-day effect in SD
(left plot) of the non-linear estimations using the binary indicators does not sub-
stantially differ from the linear effect. If short-term performance in school is mea-
sured in SEK in the year 2002, the non-linearly estimated effect exceeds the linear
effect for more than 30 days of sickness absence. That is, only if an individual
is absent more than 30 days in one school year, the effect of absence increases
disproportionately. Regardless of how we measure the outcome variable, the de-
viation from the linear trend is never signiﬁcantly different. Given that less than
6 percent of all student-grade observations have 30 or more days of absence, non-
linearities do not seem to play an important role. This ﬁnding is in line with
Aucejo and Romano (2016) who neither ﬁnd evidence of non-linearities.
Figure 3.8 reports the results of a similar exercise for our long-term outcomes.34
Overall, there is no strong evidence that absence has non-linear impacts on ﬁnal
educational achievement, adult employment, income or mortality.
3.6 Sensitivity analysis
The estimates in Tables 3.5 and 3.9 are remarkably stable across speciﬁcations,
suggesting that selection on unobservables into absence may not be a salient fea-
ture. However, the FE estimates could still be biased if there are unobservable
factors that correlate with individual absence and student outcomes and that vary
over time or across siblings. To address this caveat and show the robustness of
our results, we implement a bounding approach where we bound the inﬂuence
of omitted variables. We also present results from an instrumental variables ap-
proach using local weather shocks as instrument for absences.
3.6.1 Bounds
We employ the bounding approach suggested by Oster (forthcoming), building
on the idea of Altonji et al. (2005). Our goal is to bound the effect of absence as-
suming that the selection on unobservables is as strong as the selection on observ-
ables. We consider the case where the selection on unobservables is in the same
or the opposite direction as the selection on observables, thus allowing the true
34Because of the fewer observations for the long-term outcomes, we only run the absence indi-
cator up to the threshold of 30 or more days of absence.
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effect to be overestimated or underestimated. The exercise is only helpful if the
observables are informative with respect to the selection, so we control for a large
array of control variables and the full set of siblings ﬁxed effects. This removes
factors such as constant family resources, parental preferences, and genetic en-
dowment that are likely negatively correlated with absence and positively corre-
lated with performance. As omitting these factors would likely cause an upward
bias that challenges our implications, the bounding approach seems particularly
useful in the application at hand.
The starting point is to compare the coefﬁcient of absence in the baseline model
(β˜), with the coefﬁcient of absence in a simple linear regression of the dependent
variable on absence and an intercept (β˙). Formally, the bound around the coefﬁ-
cient of absence β∗ is:35
β∗ ≈ β˜ − δ(β˙ − β˜)Rmax − R˜
R˜− R˙ ,
where the degree of proportionality of selection on observables to selection on
unobservables, δ, is either set to 1 (unobservable selection goes into the same di-
rection) or -1 (unobservable selection is into the adverse direction). In a second
step, the movement in the coefﬁcient of absence, β˙ − β˜, is re-scaled by the move-
ment in the R2 relative to the potential change in the R2 (where R˜ and R˙ denote
the R2 of the baseline model and the simple regression, respectively, and Rmax
denotes the highest possible value of the R2).36
Table 3.11 shows the bound estimates for the short- and long-term effects of days
of absence. For the baseline model estimate β˜ we take the siblings FE speciﬁcation
in order to be able to calculate the bounds separately for each grade.37
For the short-term effect on performance in grade 1 the estimated β∗ for δ = 1 is
-0.0078. Thus, if unobservable selection is proportional to and goes in the same
direction as the observable selection an additional day of absence associates with
a decrease in performance by 0.78 percent of a SD. If instead assuming the same
amount of selection but in the opposite direction (δ = −1), the upper bound is
-0.0017. Even if our baseline model fails to account for selection on unobservables
that affect the outcome as strongly as family-level time-invariant characteristics,
35This expression is only an approximation, see Oster (forthcoming) for the exact calculation.
To calculate the bounds we use the Stata ado-ﬁle psacalc provided online by Emily Oster. All
errors are our own responsibility.
36Following Hener et al. (2016) we consider as Rmax = min(2.2× R˜, 1).
37To estimate β˜ we stratify the sample by grade and run separate regressions. For the short-
term estimates for grade heterogeneity in Table 3.7 we use instead an interaction term, for the
long-term estimates by grade in Table 3.6 we regress the outcome on absence in both grades in
the same regression. Thereby, the β˜ estimates used here are not exactly the same as in the analysis
before, but they are quite similar, see column 2 of Table 3.11.
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the effect of ten days of absence would be a decrease performance by 1.7 percent
of a SD. For the short-term effects for absence in the fourth grade the bounds have
the same sign for δ = 1 and δ = −1 and both bounds are barely distinguishable
from the baseline estimate. This strongly supports our interpretation that the
baseline results do not indicate an omitted variable bias.
For all long-term outcome variables all bounds for the adverse selection case
point towards the same direction as in the baseline model (absence in school is
harmful). For δ = 1, some of the bound estimates point to a positive effect of
absence. However, these are the cases when conditioning on the observables re-
duces the absence coefﬁcient in absolute terms and omitting the variables causes
an underestimation. The bounds, again, reinforce our belief that serious omitted
variable bias is unlikely.
Table 3.11: Coefﬁcient bounds for δ = 1 and δ = −1 selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent
Absence
Restricted Baseline Bound β∗ Bound β∗
variable model β˙ model β˜ for δ = 1 for δ = −1
Short-term outcome
Average performance Grade 1 −0.0032 −0.0028 −0.00777 −0.00191
(0.0007) (0.0015)
[0.0029] [0.3721]
Grade 4 −0.0032 −0.0046 −0.00496 −0.00456
(0.0019) (0.0018)
[0.0031] [0.3940]
Long-term outcomes
More than Folkskola Grade 1 −0.0004 −0.0012 −0.0012 −0.0011
(0.0005) (0.0007)
[0.0002] [0.1562]
Grade 4 −0.0010 −0.0003 −0.0000 −0.0004
(0.0006) (0.0006)
[0.0013] [0.1548]
Employment 1960 Grade 1 −0.0014 −0.0026 −0.0017 −0.0032
(0.0006) (0.0006)
[0.0012] [0.4712]
Grade 4 −0.0011 0.0007 0.0022 −0.0003
(0.0008) (0.0008)
[0.0007] [0.4688]
Employment 1970 Grade 1 −0.0008 −0.0008 −0.0004 −0.0011
(0.0006) (0.0010)
[0.0004] [0.2104]
Grade 4 −0.0007 −0.0012 −0.0010 −0.0014
(0.0007) (0.0009)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.11 – continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent
Absence
Restricted Baseline Bound β∗ Bound β∗
variable model β˙ model β˜ for δ = 1 for δ = −1
[0.0003] [0.2108]
Income 1970 Grade 1 −22.6056 −1.6248 55.9162 −28.4313
(16.4742) (39.6379)
[0.0004] [0.4697]
Grade 4 −48.0319 −12.3049 95.0982 −60.4634
(23.0625) (28.2772)
[0.0015] [0.4698]
Pensions 2002 Grade 1 −191.7764 35.9554 171.1624 −20.6282
(103.5173) (170.6840)
[0.0012] [0.3100]
Grade 4 −258.6889 −213.1113 171.4723 −401.7276
(79.8756) (148.5325)
[0.0022] [0.3111]
Passed away ≤ age 70 Grade 1 0.0004 0.0008 0.0002 0.0013
(0.0004) (0.0006)
[0.0001] [0.1456]
Grade 4 0.0001 0.0004 −0.0011 0.0014
(0.0006) (0.0006)
[0.0000] [0.1453]
Notes: Column 1 gives the coefﬁcient of absence in the restricted model where the outcome variable is regressed on absence
and an intercept. The unrestricted model in column 2 is similar to the baseline results for the short- and long-term effects.
Column 3 states the bound for proportional unobservable selection that goes in the same direction as observable selection.
In column 4 the unobserved selection is proportional but in an adverse direction. Parish-clustered standard errors for the
regression coefﬁcients in parentheses. The resulting R2s are given in brackets.
3.6.2 Instrumental variables estimates
Short-term IV estimates Next, we follow Goodman (2014) and Aucejo and Ro-
mano (2016) and employ an instrumental variables strategy. In line with Good-
man (2014), Marcotte (2007) and Marcotte and Hemelt (2008), we exploit changes
in weather conditions using local meteorological time series data on the temper-
ature collected from Matsuura and Willmott (2012).38 In the simplest feasible
speciﬁcation we instrument yearly absence using a count variable that gives the
number of “benign” months in the school year. Following Bruckner et al. (2014),
38The data includes monthly temperature information interpolated to a 0.5 degree by 0.5 de-
gree latitude/longitude grid and we assign each school parish to the closest grid node using
latitude and longitude information on the parish center as well as the grid node centroid.
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we deﬁne a month in a certain parish as benign if the average temperature in this
parish is within the upper quartile of the temperatures measured in all parishes
and all years for this month. The Online Appendix Figure O4 shows the average
temperature for the school years 1936/37–1947/48 across regions and the spatial
variation in the average number of benign months.39
The exclusion restriction of the instrument is that the number of benign months
only affects an individual’s performance in school through days of absence. As
pointed out by Goodman (2014) weather may affect both individual absence and
school closures. If the number of benign months correlates with weather-related
school closures, this would violate the exclusion restriction. While we have no
school-level information on closures, the context of our analysis makes weather-
related school closures unlikely. The northern part of Sweden is often covered
with snow from October to April, and it seems fair to assume that schools, parents
and students were well-adapted to the situation. Moreover, schools were usually
at walking distance from a student’s home and historical sources do not mention
snow-related school closures. Another concern is that weather-related teacher
and classmate absence affects performance. There is no direct information on
teacher absence, but teachers generally lived in one part of the school building,
and students were provided with a substitute teacher if the teacher was sick.
We consider the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator. To identify the impact
of weather on days of absence, we run a ﬁrst-stage regression of days of absence
Wig on the number of benign months experienced by student i when he or she is
in grade g. In the second stage, we regress the short-term outcome measure on
ﬁtted days of absence:
Wig = b0 + b1 #benign monthsig + b2X1i + b3X2ig + Pig + vig and
yig = α + τŴig + β1X1i + β2X2ig + Pig + εig for g = 1, 4,
where b1 is the effect of the number of benign months on days of absence.40
The instrument needs to satisfy the independence assumption that Yi (w, s) ⊥⊥
#benign monthsig | X1i, X2ig, Pig. Given the inclusion of parish ﬁxed effects that
39Naturally the parishes in the north with very low average temperatures are also the ones
that barely experience months with benign temperatures. This has limited consequences for our
analysis. Even in the north there is variation in the number of benign months and most parishes
in our sample are located in the more populated southern part, where the variation in benign
months is higher.
40In order to keep as much variation as possible in the ﬁrst stage we only rely on parish ﬁxed
effects. Moreover, we do not restrict our sample to siblings observed in both grades as neither
individual nor siblings FE seem necessary for the exclusion restriction to hold. This allows us to
use all individuals for that we have grade-1 and/or grade-4 information.
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account for more educated families living into certain regions (e.g., warmer, more
industrial regions), we believe this assumption is likely to hold.
Additionallywe consider a two-sample two-stage least square (TS2SLS) approach.41
The universe of the weather and absence information across grades constitute the
ﬁrst-stage sample that allows a pooled estimation of the ﬁrst-stage effect. We use
this ﬁrst-stage sample to estimate the effect of the number of benign months on
days of absence in either grade. In the reduced-form sample, we then predict
the days of absence based on the effect of benign months in the ﬁrst-stage sam-
ple. Instead of using the effect of weather in grade 1 or grade 4 on absence in
the same grade to predict absence in this grade, we thus use the coefﬁcient of the
pooled estimation to ﬁt absence in either grade.42 To get standard errors of the
second-stage TS2SLS estimates we apply the Delta method.
Regardless of the IV estimator, two remarks should be kept in mind. First, our
weather instrument is more plausibly providing exogenous variation in absences
due to sickness than to other reasons such as truancy. To the extent that the effect
of absence is heterogeneous across individuals missing school due to sickness
or non-sickness reasons, the IV estimates of τ will be the LATE for individuals
whose absence is affected by weather. Second, as remarked by Goodman: “es-
timates of the impact of weather on student achievement can be quite sensitive
to the chosen deﬁnition of the instrument” (see Goodman, 2014, p.15). The effect
of temperature on days of absence seems to be non-linear, and mapping monthly
information on weather conditions in days of absence per school year without
losing the variation that triggers absence is not trivial. For this reason, we think
our IV estimates provide complementary (rather than superior) evidence to our
individual ﬁxed effects estimates.
Table 3.12 shows the IV results for performance. Columns 1 and 2 give the 2SLS
effects for grade 1 and 4, and columns 3 and 4 state the corresponding TS2SLS
effects when the ﬁrst stage is estimated jointly. Regardless how the ﬁrst stage is
estimated, an additional month with benign temperatures reduces, on average,
the number of days of absence by about 0.35. The assumption that the ﬁrst-stage
41When implementing 2SLS, we can pool grade-1 and grade-4 information to receive average
ﬁrst- and second-stage effects or conduct the analysis separately by grade. Pooling has the ad-
vantage that we use more information at once and receive more precise estimates. Yet, a separate
estimation allows the ﬁrst- and second-stage effects to differ across grades. To circumvent this
trade-off we consider the TS2SLS approach.
42The underlying assumption is that the ﬁrst-stage effect does not differ across grades. Com-
paring the separate 2SLS ﬁrst-stage estimates with the jointly estimated TS2SLS ﬁrst-stage esti-
mate allows us to investigate the plausibility of this assumption.
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Table 3.12: Short-term IV results for total days of absence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Speciﬁcation
2SLS TS2SLS
grade 1 grade 4 grade 1 grade 4
First-stage effect of weather on absence
# benign months −0.3610∗∗∗ −0.3553∗∗∗ −0.3494∗∗∗ −0.3494∗∗∗
(0.0080) (0.1632) (0.0701) (0.0701)
Second-stage effect of ﬁtted absence on performance
Absence −0.0038 −0.0220 −0.0039 −0.0252
(0.0222) (0.0252) (0.0653) (0.0654)
# observations ﬁrst stage 13,884 14,152 28,036 28,036
# observations second stage 13,884 14,152 13,884 14,152
F-statistic instrument 7.91 4.74 24.86 24.86
Notes: Each cell (but the ﬁrst stage in column 3 and 4) states a separate regression. In the two-sample two-stage least
square (TS2SLS) speciﬁcation the ﬁrst stage is estimated jointly over both grades. All standard errors in parentheses. The
standard errors of the second stage in columns 1 and 2 are Stata’s default standard errors clustered on parish level. In
columns 3 and 4 the standard errors of the second stage are calculated using the Delta method and clustered on parish
level. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
relationship is the same across grade 1 and grade 4 seems justiﬁed. Noteworthily,
only the F-statistic of the pooled speciﬁcation exceeds the Staiger and Stock (1997)
rule-of-thumb value of 10. Turning to the structural estimates, all coefﬁcients in-
dicate a negative relationship between absence and performance in school. While
the second-stage coefﬁcients exhibit a large difference across grades, the deci-
sion of the IV estimator (2SLS vs. TS2SLS) makes no noteworthy difference. All
second-stage estimates have rather large standard errors and we cannot reject that
the coefﬁcient is zero. Still, the point estimates are negative and lower than the
baseline result. In fourth grade, an additional day of absence decreases perfor-
mance by 2 percent of a SD.43 Using a similar strategy, the IV results of Goodman
(2014) are also up to 2 percent of a SD.
All in all, we interpret the short-term IV results as conﬁrmation of the baseline
estimates. Given the limited external validity of the LATE estimates and the as-
signment mechanism, the IV approach is not a silver bullet to address identiﬁ-
cation. Still, an additional day of absence seems negatively related to academic
performance.
43A reason for the big effect sizemay be that the IV strategy yields LATE and not the population
average treatment effect.
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Long-term IV estimates For the long-term outcomes we extend the TS2SLS ap-
proach to all seven grades of compulsory education.44 As before, we estimate the
ﬁrst-stage effect of benign months on absence in grades 1 and 4:
Wig = b0 + b1 #benign monthsig + b2X1i + Pi + vig for g = 1, 4,
but we calculate the ﬁtted days of absence for all seven grades. This is possi-
ble due to two features of the data. First, weather information is available for
all years. Second, knowing when students were supposed to visit a certain grade
based on the year of birth allows us to assign the instrument value. The ﬁrst-stage
sample of the TS2SLS approach is the same as before (weather and absence infor-
mation for grades 1 and 4). The reduced-form sample is now the universe of the
weather information for all grades and long-term outcomes. In the second stage
we regress the long-term outcome variable ylong-termi on the predicted number of
days of absence for all seven grades:
ylong-termi = α +
7
∑
g=1
τgŴig + β1X1i + Pi + εi.
Socio-economic controls X1 come from the church records while the information
on the parish of residence during childhood Pi comes from the exam catalog. We
restrict the analysis to individuals that did not move between grades 1 and 4 and
assume that the school parish was the same in all grades.
This strategy relies on the assumption that weather conditions affect absence in
the same way in all seven grades. As indicated in Table 3.12, at least for the
observed grades 1 and 4, this assumption seems justiﬁed. We estimate the ﬁrst
stage using all absence information wherefore the ﬁrst-stage estimates for the
long-term TS2SLS approach are (nearly) those stated in Table 3.12.45 Table 3.13
presents the second-stage estimates for long-term outcomes. The point estimates
have the expected sign, but despite the strong ﬁrst stage, the estimated structural
effects of absence in school fail to reach statistical signiﬁcance. For employment
44It is not possible to employ the 2SLS implementation of the IV approach to the long-term
outcomes. The following example illustrates the problem: individual A is hit by a weather shock
in grade 4 in 1938, individual B is in grade 4 in 1939 and his or her absence in grade 4 is not
affected by the weather shock in 1938. However, individual B’s absence in grade 3 in 1938 is
affected by the weather shock. This is problematic as absences in grades 3 and 4 probably affect
the long-term outcomes similarly, but we do not observe absence in grade 3 (or any other grade
but grades 1 and 4).
45Because we limit the ﬁrst stage to individuals that did not move between grade 1 and 4, we
lose about 100 observations for the ﬁrst stage. The point estimates barely change compared to
Table 3.12. The Online Appendix reports the ﬁrst-stage estimates for the ﬁnal long-term sample.
Moreover, we present ﬁrst-stage estimates by grade when the ﬁrst-stage sample is restricted to in-
dividuals with available second-stage information. This does not affect our results and underlines
similar ﬁrst-stage effect across both grades.
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Table 3.13: Long-term IV using the TS2SLS approach – Second-stage results for
total days of absence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
> Folk- Empl. Empl. Income Pensions Passed
skola 1960 1970 1970 2002 away≤70
Fitted days of sickness absence in
grade 1 −0.0033 −0.0096 −0.0217 −39.36 −248.18 0.0091
(0.0238) (0.0254) (0.0256) (623.10) (4127.05) (0.0201)
grade 4 −0.0054 −0.0055 0.0006 154.13 −379.79 0.0039
(0.0269) (0.0149) (0.0213) (941.11) (4325.53) (0.0158)
# observations 22231 25657 27913 18459 19009 27913
# individuals 13814 15980 15980 11483 11848 17422
F-statistic instr. 19.72 19.22 25.59 18.38 13.54 25.59
Notes: Each cell states a separate regression. Parish-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1,
∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
in 1960 the point estimates clearly exceed the baseline estimates and the grade-
1 effect is, again, bigger than the one in grade 4. A similar pattern holds for
employment in 1970 but the grade-4 effect is close to zero with a positive sign. All
in all, as for the short-term effects, the long-term IV estimates exceed the baseline
FE estimates but do not indicate that omitted variables cause an overestimation
in the baseline model.
To overcome the assumption that weather conditions have the same effect on
absence in all grades, we additionally consider a model where days of absence
in grades 1 and 4 are treated as two endogenous variables and weather condi-
tions in grades 1 and 4 as two instruments. Controlling for the number of benign
months in the other ﬁve grades, solves the problem of weather shocks in unob-
served grades while, at the same time, does not rely on assuming equal ﬁrst-stage
effects. The Online Appendix shows the ﬁrst- and second-stage estimations us-
ing sickness absences as endogenous variables. The ﬁrst-stage F-statistics are
well-above zero, but below 10. The reason for this is that we use two variables
containing of number of benign months in grade 1 and in grade 4, respectively,
in each ﬁrst-stage regression. Given the high serial correlation of weather con-
ditions in both grades and that we would only expect contemporary weather to
affect absence, we may not overstate the importance of the F-statistics here. In
fact, the results indicate, that weather conditions in the same grade have an effect
on days of sickness absence (as also indicated by the short-term IV and long-term
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TS2SLS results). The second-stage results do not exhibit a different pattern than
for the TS2SLS estimates.
3.7 Conclusions
Student absence from school is an important but often overlooked determinant of
instructional time. To date, little is known about the long-run impact of students
missing school, and the only studies providing causal evidence of the impact of
student absence on academic performance focus on the US. The major contri-
bution of this paper is to estimate the impact of student absence in elementary
school on short- and long-term outcomes for a non-US context by using a unique
combination of historical records and administrative datasets from Sweden.
Our analysis shows that absence in elementary school has a signiﬁcant impact on
student performance: ten days of absence over a school year leads to a reduction
in grade point average of 3.3 percent of a standard deviation. The estimated ef-
fect is very robust across empirical strategies and comparable in magnitude to re-
sults found for the US. This immediate impact on school performance spills over
into secondary school admissions, which are based on elementary school perfor-
mance. Our estimated effect of absence on secondary schooling admissions is at
least as large as one would expect based on the effect of absence on performance –
even though we are unable to attribute it to a certain school grade. For the other
long-term outcomes, the effect of student absence in elementary school is only
pronounced for early-career employment. For employment and income at age
35–40, pension income, and mortality, our sibling ﬁxed effect estimates indicate
that the negative effect of absence is undistinguishable from zero.
Our ﬁndings for the short-term effects of absence on school performance deliver
very robust results and consistently suggest that the existence of an omitted vari-
able bias is rather unlikely. Nevertheless, we are careful in interpreting the causal-
ity of our long-term effects. When considering long-term outcomes, it becomes
more difﬁcult to deﬁne what the alternative to the ‘treatment’ is. A large majority
of absence days are due to illness, and we cannot rule out a priori that a persistent
health shock from elementary school has an independent effect on long-term out-
comes. As a result, we exploit the fact that our data has information on reasons
for absence to compare the long-term effects of absence due to sickness with those
of absence due to other reasons. We ﬁnd that there are no important differences
between the two, which we interpret as evidence that our long-term effects most
likely capture the impact of reduced instructional time.
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Our ﬁndings are obviously speciﬁc to a particular context, but as the ﬁrst study
providing evidence of the long-term effects of student absence, we believe that it
is highly relevant to both academics and policy-makers concerned with high rates
of absence around the world. Our results suggest that although student absence
leads to worse performance at the end of the school year, the associated penalty
on the labor market eventually fades out. Thus, the reduction in instructional
time resulting from individual absence does not prevent those missing school
from acquiring the skills that determine their long-run productivity. The fact that
absence only affects employment at age 25–30, but no outcome later on is con-
sistent with the labor market using educational performance as a signal of ability
early on and progressively learning about workers’ true productivity (Altonji and
Pierret, 2001).
Our ﬁndings are strikingly in the same vein as those of a small but growing num-
ber of studies interested in the long-run consequences of variation in instructional
time through changes in the school year length (Pischke, 2007) or in number of
years of compulsory schooling (Stephens and Yang, 2014 and Pischke and von
Wachter, 2008). One possible explanation for the patterns we ﬁnd is that students
are able to compensate for the educational content they miss over the next few
years in school and/or that teachers are effective at helping students catch up
the skills that have the most return in the labor market (though not being able to
help them catch up on the whole curriculum, as reﬂected by the negative effect of
absence on grade point average and secondary schooling enrollment). At a time
when policy-makers around the world are paying increasing attention to school
absence, our ﬁndings indicate that policies aimed at reducing student absence
may not be particularly effective at increasing productivity in the economy. At
least in the context that we study, students – perhaps with the support of their
teachers and/or parents – seem able to compensate for any shortfall in learning
associated with their absence in a way that does not affect their long-run produc-
tivity.
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Appendix
Appendix ﬁgures
Figure A3.1: Example of an exam catalog
Notes: Pictures of an exam catalog taken in an archive in Sweden.
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Appendix tables
Table A3.1: Summary statistics for control variables
Time-invariant variables Mean
Female (in %) 50.06
Number of siblings 1.56
Year of birth (in %)
1930 18.37
1931 16.74
1932 18.30
1933 17.39
1934 16.51
1935 12.69
(we additionally control for the month of birth and interaction terms between the year and
the month of birth)
Occupation of the parents at the time of birth (in %)
Father: farmer, ﬁsherman, hunter 42.13
Father: agricultural worker 34.59
Father: service and sales worker 7.21
Father: production workers 49.18
Mother: employed (binary) 2.39
Living at the time of time and birth conditions (in %)
Born out of wedlock (in %) 4.36
Born in hospital (in %) 7.97
Twin birth (in %) 4.16
Mother’s year of birth 1902
Father’s year of birth 1897
(mother’s and father’s year is controlled for by using 10-year dummies)
Mean grade
Time-variant variables 1 4
Age (in years) 8.13 11.27
(included through age-in-months ﬁxed effects)
Class characteristics
All classmates in same grade (in %) 34.93 29.38
Some classmates in lower grade (in %) 0.00 64.85
Some classmates in higher grade (in %) 65.07 30.81
Class size (number of students) 13.84 15.64
(measured through 5-day splines from 0 to 25)
Notes: Own calculation based on church records and exam catalog information. Sample restricted to individuals with
available sibling information when all siblings are observed in grade 1 and grade 4. Observations: 8,938. Mutually exclu-
sive indicators may not add up to 100 per cent because of missing information. For the estimations, missing information
are coded as separate category taken into account that the reason for the missing information might be meaningful in its
own right (e.g., the father’s occupation is missing because the father is unknown).
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Table A3.2: Full estimation output for all ﬁxed effects speciﬁcations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS
School Teacher Sibl. Indi.
FE FE FE FE
Total days of absence −0.0035∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0041∗∗∗ −0.0035∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Female 0.2761∗∗∗ 0.2794∗∗∗ 0.2863∗∗∗ 0.3256∗∗∗
(0.0318) (0.0313) (0.0328) (0.0397)
Birth year: 1931 −0.6899∗∗∗ −0.9647∗∗∗ −0.7462∗∗∗ −0.2439
(0.2360) (0.1333) (0.2010) (0.1929)
Birth year: 1932 −0.8483∗∗∗ −0.5598∗∗∗ −0.6575∗∗∗ −0.7286
(0.1765) (0.1308) (0.1894) (0.4565)
Birth year: 1933 2.4848∗∗∗ −0.0635 −0.0588 0.0116
(0.4723) (0.1455) (0.1706) (0.2730)
Birth year: 1934 −0.6706∗∗ −0.9025∗∗∗ −0.6238∗∗∗ −0.4792
(0.2738) (0.1762) (0.2176) (0.6530)
Birth year: 1935 2.4016∗∗∗ 2.6556∗∗∗ 3.4850∗∗∗ −0.0263
(0.3734) (0.3098) (0.6624) (0.3861)
Occup. father: agri-
culture
0.0616 0.0051 0.0053 0.0491
(0.0622) (0.0609) (0.0638) (0.0994)
Occup. father: ser-
vices
0.1276∗ 0.1637∗∗ 0.1675∗∗ 0.0057
(0.0723) (0.0802) (0.0818) (0.0911)
Occup. father: farmer 0.0071 0.0533 0.0554 −0.0920
(0.0595) (0.0607) (0.0586) (0.1011)
Occup. father: un-
known
0.0411 0.1140∗∗ 0.1393∗∗ 0.1571∗∗
(0.0576) (0.0573) (0.0578) (0.0664)
Mother employed −0.1685 −0.1324 −0.1503 −0.0723
(0.1094) (0.1021) (0.1026) (0.0902)
Wedlock 0.1362 0.1202 0.0684 0.0647
(0.0946) (0.0848) (0.0757) (0.0980)
Born in hospital 0.1455∗∗ 0.1322∗∗ 0.1134∗ 0.1111∗
(0.0648) (0.0662) (0.0641) (0.0646)
Twin −0.2138∗∗∗ −0.2091∗∗∗ −0.2080∗∗ −0.1821
(0.0721) (0.0742) (0.0831) (0.1362)
Grade 4 1.2066∗∗∗ 0.9332∗∗∗ 1.0493∗∗∗ 0.7943∗∗∗ 0.5899∗∗∗
Notes: See note to the baseline results table. Fixed effects are suppressed. Parish-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table A3.2 – continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS
School Teacher Sibl. Indi.
FE FE
(0.2107) (0.1712) (0.2313) (0.2286) (0.0344)
Classmates in lower
grade
0.0451 0.0757 0.1033∗ 0.1355∗∗∗ 0.1445∗∗
(0.0505) (0.0461) (0.0552) (0.0440) (0.0621)
Classmates in higher
grade
0.0556 −0.0411 −0.0792 −0.0588 −0.0574
(0.0378) (0.0480) (0.0702) (0.0664) (0.0553)
Class size 1–5 −0.0546∗∗ −0.0176 −0.0015 −0.0151 0.0258
(0.0259) (0.0297) (0.0351) (0.0371) (0.0414)
Class size 6–10 0.0169 0.0148 0.0142 0.0030 0.0024
(0.0129) (0.0157) (0.0164) (0.0118) (0.0233)
Class size 11–15 −0.0062 −0.0043 0.0032 0.0123 0.0204
(0.0092) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0119) (0.0177)
Class size 16–20 −0.0009 0.0132 −0.0052 −0.0018 0.0051
(0.0086) (0.0097) (0.0192) (0.0154) (0.0172)
Class size 21–25 0.0083 −0.0024 0.0137 0.0100 0.0149
(0.0122) (0.0137) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0233)
Class size >25 0.0008 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0142∗∗∗ 0.0121∗∗ 0.0118∗
(0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0047) (0.0054) (0.0068)
Class size (missing) 0.0029 0.4751∗∗∗ 0.5963∗∗∗ 0.5285∗∗∗ 0.7646∗∗∗
(0.1297) (0.1591) (0.1686) (0.1791) (0.1854)
# observations 8,942 8,942 8,942 8,942 8,942
# units 748 1,259 1,989 4,471
Notes: See note to the baseline results table. Fixed effects are suppressed. Parish-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Figure O3.1: Distribution of the within-family and within-individual variation
in (sickness) absence
Notes: Own calculations based on exam catalog information. 8,938 observations.
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Figure O3.2: Distribution of grades by subject
Notes: Own calculations based on exam catalog information.
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Figure O3.3: Nonlinearities in the short-term effect of grouped sickness absence
Notes: To detect nonlinearities in the effect of sickness absence we regress performance on indicator variables giving the
number of days of sickness absence in groups of 3. This graph plots the coefﬁcients of the indicator variables. The size of
the marker given the relative number of observations for which the group indicator is 1. In total grade 1 and 4 information
on 10,682 individuals is used. The spikes around the markers state the 95 per cent conﬁdence interval. The orange line
depicts the linear effect of an additional day of absence in the baseline results.
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Figure O3.4: Spatial temperature distribution
Notes: Own illustration. Data on monthly temperatures are taken from Matsuura and Willmott (2012).
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Tables
Table O3.1: Estimation of earnings potential
(1) (2)
Earnings potential in
pensions 2002
Grade 1 Grade 4
Math points 1 −96266.3∗∗∗ 19367.1∗∗∗
(32873.0) (6668.3)
Math points 2 −21115.4∗∗ −27084.9∗∗∗
(9183.3) (5701.6)
Math points 3 −25267.2∗∗∗ −24420.8∗∗∗
(7611.9) (5470.9)
Math points 4 −21651.7∗∗∗ −16571.9∗∗∗
(4400.2) (3985.3)
Math points 5 −13210.3∗∗∗ −5952.7
(4608.6) (4489.5)
Math points 6 −28367.5∗∗ −10389.4∗∗
(13940.7) (5242.2)
Math points 8 −15765.1 3756.6
(10779.7) (4195.3)
Math points 9 omitted 11150.2∗
(6752.2)
Math points 10 −5489.0 21965.2∗∗∗
(13303.2) (4368.4)
Math points 13 26109.9 38576.6∗∗∗
(65184.5) (8914.4)
Reading points 1 21166.6 −6229.5
(26801.0) (12175.4)
Reading points 2 −14140.2 12179.3
(8862.1) (9248.4)
Reading points 3 −10991.7 6074.4
(7257.6) (7185.5)
Reading points 4 −7235.8∗ 4654.9
(4331.4) (3980.4)
Reading points 5 −304.0 4637.7
(4683.1) (4363.7)
Reading points 6 −11745.8 9996.8∗
(12893.1) (5364.9)
Reading points 8 −6410.5 −334.9
(13150.2) (4167.6)
Reading points 9 19499.8 −4478.6
(37223.7) (7066.7)
Reading points 10 6939.5 5217.8
(14187.8) (4251.6)
Reading points 13 −64483.0 10075.0
(47935.8) (15234.3)
Writing points 1 91143.2∗∗∗ −7982.3
Continued on next page
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Table O3.1 – continued
(1) (2)
Earnings potential in
pensions 2002
Grade 1 Grade 4
(29263.6) (9019.7)
Writing points 2 15566.0∗ 620.5
(9243.1) (6484.4)
Writing points 3 17213.0∗∗ 8285.3
(7209.3) (5955.1)
Writing points 4 13766.5∗∗∗ 7793.7∗
(4945.8) (4049.7)
Writing points 5 8260.5 8874.8∗∗
(5427.1) (4209.8)
Writing points 6 6036.5 −1645.7
(16110.9) (5563.9)
Writing points 8 13814.6 −2000.9
(14438.2) (4343.8)
Writing points 9 74533.5 −12542.6
(48343.4) (7671.2)
Writing points 10 −35879.9∗ −7030.0
(21749.1) (4852.7)
Writing points 13 −14917.4 8006.3
(102333.7) (13230.3)
Constant 158638.4∗∗∗ 148308.6∗∗∗
(3915.1) (3075.5)
Notes: Dependent variable: pensions taken from tax registers 2002. Explanatory variables: binary in-
dicators of the points in math, reading and speaking and writing (15-point scale, reference category is
7 points). Grade points of 14 and 15 are not considered as such grades are barely awarded. Standard
errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table O3.2: Baseline results using the full sample
(1) (2)
OLS
Indi.
FE
Average grade points in units of SD
Days of absence −0.0035∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0007)
Average grade points in units of pension 2002
Days of absence −46.9136∗∗∗ −74.0147∗∗∗
(6.9904) (9.3396)
# observations 28946 28946
# individuals 10682
Notes: See note to the baseline results table. Parish-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
Table O3.3: Short-term effects measuring performance on a 7-point grading scale
(1) (2) (3)
OLS
Sibl. Indi.
FE FE
Average grade points (7-point scale) in units of SD
Days of absence −0.0035∗∗∗ −0.0049∗∗∗ −0.0045∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Notes: See note to the baseline results table. Parish-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁ-
cance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table O3.4: Long-term effect of absence in school – alternative outcome
measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled effect Separate effects
OLS Sibl. OLS Sibl.FE FE
Years of schooling
Total absence (avg. both
grades)
−0.0040 −0.0010
(0.0038) (0.0035)
Total absence in grade 1 0.0004 −0.0010
(0.0025) (0.0027)
Total absence in grade 4 −0.0043∗∗ −0.0000
(0.0021) (0.0020)
Gymnasium-track education (1=yes)
Total abs. (avg. both grades) −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0005)
Total absence in grade 1 0.0003 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Total absence in grade 4 −0.0004 −0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0004)
Labor market income 1970 (incl. zero incomes)
Total abs. (avg. both grades) −54.4394∗∗ −59.2415
(25.7378) (49.9878)
Total absence in grade 1 −29.8358∗∗ −25.4044
(14.1129) (24.7863)
Total absence in grade 4 −24.6486 −33.2657
(16.7865) (31.0227)
Pensions 2002 (incl. zero pensions)
Total abs. (avg. both grades) −235.8604∗ −229.8668
(119.0779) (234.4330)
Total absence in grade 1 −63.5785 5.0779
(123.0447) (170.3856)
Total absence in grade 4 −167.9506∗∗ −216.4590∗
(75.2518) (124.7150)
Pensions 2002 (incl. non-labor market income)
Total abs. (avg. both grades) −305.5247 −265.5650
(184.8329) (254.3537)
Total absence in grade 1 −143.9064 −19.9836
(171.0246) (184.6732)
Total absence in grade 4 −160.9356 −228.0035
(110.7283) (161.8834)
Notes: Number of observations: education measures 3,019 (in 1,373 families), income 1970 3,092 (1,398), income 1970
2,137 (985), pensions 2002 measures 2,468 (1,129). Parish-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1,
∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table O3.5: Short-term IV results for days of sickness absence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Speciﬁcation
2SLS TS2SLS
grade 1 grade 4 grade 1 grade 4
First-stage effect of weather on absence
# benign months −0.4033∗∗∗ −0.3231∗∗ −0.3744∗∗∗ −0.3744∗∗∗
(0.1238) (0.1285) (0.0617) (0.0617)
Second-stage effect of ﬁtted absence on performance
Absence −0.0034 −0.0242 −0.0036 −0.0209
(0.0199) (0.0284) (0.0568) (0.0566)
# observations ﬁrst stage 13,884 14,152 28,036 28,036
# observations second stage 13,884 14,152 13,884 14,152
F-statistic instrument 10.61 6.32 36.83 36.83
Notes: Each cell (but the ﬁrst stage in column 3 and 4) states a separate regression. In the two-sample two-stage least
square (TS2SLS) speciﬁcation the ﬁrst stage is estimated jointly over both grades. All standard errors in parentheses. The
standard errors of the second stage in columns 1 and 2 are Stata’s default standard errors clustered on parish level. In
columns 3 and 4 the standard errors of the second stage are calculated using the Delta method and clustered on parish
level. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table O3.6: Long-term IV using the TS2SLS approach – First-stage results for
total days of absence by grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample for
> Folk- Empl. Empl. Income Pensions Passed
skola 1960 1970 1970 2002 away≤70
Grade 1 only (and only complete information)
# benign
months
−0.3206∗∗ −0.3215∗∗ −0.3431∗∗∗−0.2797∗∗ −0.2780∗ −0.3431∗∗∗
(0.1303) (0.1342) (0.1257) (0.1127) (0.1424) (0.1257)
# observations 10,978 12,664 13,821 9,121 9,380 13,821
F-statistic instr. 6.05 5.74 7.46 6.16 3.81 7.46
Grade 4 only (and only complete information)
# benign
months
−0.2922∗ −0.2951∗ −0.3435∗∗ −0.2904∗ −0.3324∗∗ −0.3435∗∗
(0.1491) (0.1562) (0.1581) (0.1521) (0.1554) (0.1581)
# observations 11,253 12,993 14,092 9,338 9,629 14,092
F-statistic instr. 3.84 3.57 4.72 3.65 4.58 4.72
T2SSLS ﬁrst-stage results (all ﬁrst-stage information used)
# benign
months
−0.3527∗∗∗−0.3527∗∗∗−0.3527∗∗∗−0.3527∗∗∗−0.3527∗∗∗ −0.3527∗∗∗
(0.0749) (0.0749) (0.0749) (0.0749) (0.0749) (0.0749)
# observations 27,913 27,913 27,913 27,913 27,913 27,913
F-statistic instr. 22.19 22.19 22.19 22.19 22.19 22.19
Notes: Each cell states a separate regression. In rows 1 and 2 only observations with complete second-stage infor-
mation were used to estimate the ﬁrst stage. Parish-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1,
∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table O3.7: Long-term IV strategy treating sickness absences in grades 1 and 4 as
two endogenous variables – First-stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample for
> Folk- Empl. Empl. Income Pensions Passed
skola 1960 1970 1970 2002 away≤70
Endogenous variable: ﬁrst-grade sickness absence
# benign mon. gr. 1 −0.2834∗∗ −0.3592∗∗ −0.3706∗∗∗−0.2983∗∗∗−0.3872∗∗ −0.3706∗∗∗
(0.1317) (0.1451) (0.1403) (0.1059) (0.1769) (0.1403)
# benign mon. gr. 4 −0.1958 −0.1959 −0.2282 −0.2019 −0.2306 −0.2282
(0.1833) (0.1848) (0.1811) (0.1745) (0.2229) (0.1811)
# observations 10,978 12,664 13,821 9,121 9,380 13,821
F-statistic instr. 1.49 3.08 4.99 2.39 2.87 4.99
Endogenous variable: fourth-grade sickness absence
# benign mon. gr. 1 0.1471 0.1533 0.1258 0.1503 0.1856 0.1258
(0.1391) (0.1338) (0.1250) (0.1355) (0.1484) (0.1250)
# benign mon. gr. 4 −0.1794 −0.1877∗ −0.2074∗ −0.1515 −0.1919∗ −0.2074∗
(0.1118) (0.1111) (0.1090) (0.1038) (0.1150) (0.1090)
# observations 11,253 12,993 14,092 9,338 9,629 14,092
F-statistic instr. 3.63 5.19 5.15 2.86 4.13 5.15
Notes: Each cell states a separate regression. The ﬁrst-stage F-statistic of the instrument is calculated using the method
suggested by Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016). Parish-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1,
∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
Table O3.8: Long-term IV strategy treating sickness absences in grades 1 and 4 as
two endogenous variables – Second-stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
> Folk- Empl. Empl. Income Pensions Passed
skola 1960 1970 1970 2002 away≤70
Sickness abs. gr. 1 0.0051 −0.0100 −0.0137 185.65 −695.65 0.0097
(0.0243) (0.0162) (0.0143) (570.65) (2759.25) (0.0105)
Sickness abs. gr. 4 −0.0152 −0.0003 0.0090 73.05 −2104.72 0.0042
(0.0151) (0.0084) (0.0129) (554.44) (2826.38) (0.0126)
# observations 8,417 9,677 10,491 6,976 7,161 10,491
Notes: Each cell states a separate regression. Parish-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1,
∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Sample selection
The socio-economic characteristics assessed in the church books used to gather
the base dataset are available for all 30,150 individuals born in the sampled parishes.
If exam catalog information are missing at random, the mean value of those char-
acteristics between individuals we are able to trace down in school should equal
the mean of the full sample of all 30,150 individuals. Table O3.9 shows the results.
The ﬁrst two columns show the means and standard deviations over all individ-
uals, while the second two columns give the means and SD of the subsample of
individuals for that we have exam catalog information. The right-most column
indicates whether the difference of the means is statistically signiﬁcant at any of
the conventional levels. Only the share of individuals born in certain years differs
occasionally at the 5 percent level. Individuals we are able to trace down are more
likely to be born in 1935. However, the absolute difference is quite small and we
do not think that this is somehow correlated with the relationship between ab-
sence and performance. A likely reason of the difference is that exam catalogs are
often missing for entire schools and school years so that the data are missing for
a larger number of individuals. All in all, Table O3.9 does not indicate systematic
sample selection.
Still, to investigate this further Table O3.10 gives the baseline short-term effects
separately for individuals who did not move parishes between birth and grade 4
and individuals who have moved. If moving is selective with respect to absence
and performance in school, the effects would differ between the samples. This
does not seem to be the case. In fact, for the siblings FE model, the point estimates
are the same, even thus the association is only statistically different from zero for
same-parish matches due to the fewer movers observations.
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Table O3.9: Balancing check for church and school data samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Background variable in
exam
full catalog
sample sample Difference
Variable mean SD mean SD signiﬁcant
Female 0.49 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50)
Year of birth: 1930 0.18 (0.38) 0.17 (0.38) *
Year of birth: 1931 0.17 (0.38) 0.16 (0.37) **
Year of birth: 1932 0.17 (0.38) 0.16 (0.37) **
Year of birth: 1933 0.16 (0.36) 0.16 (0.37)
Year of birth: 1934 0.16 (0.37) 0.15 (0.36) **
Year of birth: 1935 0.15 (0.36) 0.19 (0.39)
Father: farmer, ﬁsherman, hunter 0.32 (0.47) 0.26 (0.44)
Father: agricultural worker 0.27 (0.44) 0.22 (0.42)
Father: service and sales worker 0.09 (0.29) 0.12 (0.32)
Father: production worker 0.57 (0.50) 0.60 (0.49)
Father: occupation unknown 0.23 (0.42) 0.31 (0.46)
Mother employed 0.04 (0.19) 0.08 (0.27)
Born out of wedlock 0.08 (0.28) 0.15 (0.36)
Born in hospital 0.11 (0.32) 0.13 (0.34)
Twin birth 0.02 (0.15) 0.04 (0.19)
Observations 30,150 17,771
Notes: Own calculations on church records. Columns 1 and 2 gives the mean value and the standard deviation (SD),
respectively, for the full sample. Columns 3 and 4 state the corresponding values for the sample restricted to individuals
for that we are able to ﬁnd exam catalog information. Column 5 indicates whether the difference in the means is
statistically signiﬁcant based on the p-value of a t-test of equal means. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table O3.10: Short-term effects for same-parish matches and movers
(1) (2) (3)
OLS
Sibl. Indi.
FE FE
Same-parish matches
Average grade points in units of SD
Days of absence −0.0038∗∗∗ −0.0039∗∗∗ −0.0031∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0013)
Average grade points in units of income 1970
Days of absence −8.5387∗∗∗ −6.8373∗∗ −6.6752
(2.9067) (3.2566) (4.1866)
Average grade points in units of pension 2002
Days of absence −55.7055∗∗∗ −37.7550∗ −44.8117∗∗
(15.1663) (21.7071) (20.6301)
# observations 8173 8173 8173
# individuals/families 4110 1851 4110
Movers
Average grade points in units of SD
Days of absence −0.0025 −0.0039 −0.0119∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0059)
Average grade points in units of income 1970
Days of absence −9.4861 −2.1847 5.1823
(10.4066) (6.9127) (6.4421)
Average grade points in units of pension 2002
Days of absence −43.2471 −34.0697 −85.7676
(43.2815) (62.9909) (105.1412)
# observations 769 769 769
# individuals/families 408 202 408
Notes: See note to the baseline results table. Parish-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗p ≤ 0.1,
∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Chapter 4
Reanalyzing Zero Returns to
Education in Germany
Joint work with Hendrik Schmitz
4.1 Introduction
A recent study by Pischke and von Wachter (2008) (PW henceforth) ﬁnds zero
earnings returns to (additional compulsory) schooling in Germany. This result is
in contrast to standard ﬁndings from the UK, the US, and Canada, where causal
returns to schooling are often estimated to be in the range of 10–15 percent per
year (e.g. Oreopoulos, 2006), and also to much of the work focussing on Conti-
nental Europe.1 PW can rule out wage rigidities and the prominent role of ap-
prenticeships in Germany as explanations for the zero returns. They hypothesize
(but get only indirect evidence) that the extra year of schooling did not enhance
labor market relevant skills which are formed earlier in the school life in Germany
than in the US.
This study contributes to the literature in three ways: (1) We replicate PW’s ﬁnd-
ing using a different data set (the German Socio-Economic Panel, SOEP) and a
slightly different sample selection. (2) We, then, extend their analysis by us-
ing different instruments in order to get a broader picture of returns to school-
ing. This allows us to widen the picture of returns to schooling by evaluating
whether different groups react heterogeneously. Effects for basic track students
1For the Netherland and France, Oosterbeek and Webbink (2007) and Grenet (2013) ﬁnd ef-
fects close to zero. Meghir and Palme (2005) ﬁnd heterogeneous effects in Sweden, where the
highest returns are 6.7 percent. For Norway, the estimate is 9.4 percent (Aakvik et al., 2010).
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(the compliers in PW) do not necessarily translate to other groups. Intermedi-
ate and academic schools differ by the curriculum, the degrees awarded, and the
career paths suggesting different returns. On the other hand, there is some ev-
idence for approximately linear returns to years of schooling in Germany (e.g.
Pischke and Krueger, 1995) which might suggest transferability of the PW results
to other groups. Ultimately, it is an empirical question what the effects are for
other groups of students. (3) Finally, we directly test PW’s conjecture that a lack
of skill formation could be a reason for zero returns in Germany by estimating
the causal effect of education on cognitive abilities.
Using the SOEP and exogenous variation in education, our results reinforce the
PW ﬁndings. Applying compulsory years of schooling and, additionally, the sup-
ply of schools in different tracks to instrument education, we do not ﬁnd any
signiﬁcant causal effect on wages in Germany – neither for basic nor for higher
tracks. In a second step, we ﬁnd that years of education, regardless of the track,
do not signiﬁcantly affect a word ﬂuency score used as ability measure. This sup-
ports the hypothesis that wage relevant skills are learned at an earlier stage in
Germany.
4.2 The effect of education on wages
4.2.1 Data and variables
Starting in 1984, the SOEP is the most important representative German longitu-
dinal survey containing yearly information on about 22,000 individuals in over
11,000 households (Wagner et al., 2007). We use the 2006 wave because, apart
from information on educational background and wages, it is the only wave that
also includes cognitive skills measures employed later in Section 4.3.
As a measure of earnings we use the log of hourly gross wage in 2006, calculated
as in PW. Years of education, are also computed as in PW by using the regular
length of the track, taking the compulsory reform in the case of basic schools into
account.
For the wage regression sample, we start with SOEP information on over 12,000
individuals who participate in the labor market in 2006. We restrict our sample
to West-German non-city states due to the different school system in the former
GDR (also see Footnote 6). Moreover, we consider the birth cohorts 1940–1970.
After also dropping individuals with missing values in covariates, the estimation
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sample includes 5,500 people.2 Control variables in the baseline regressions are
gender and birth cohort as well as state ﬁxed effects.
4.2.2 Identiﬁcation
The ﬁrst instrument (and the one used by PW) is the increase in compulsory years
of education in the basic track schools (Hauptschulen).3 Basic track schools cov-
ered grades 5 to 8 before the compulsory schooling reform in Germany and in-
cluded a ninth grade afterwards. While some states introduced a compulsory
ninth grade at an early stage, the majority of the states only introduced an ad-
ditional year of schooling due to the Hamburg Accord (Hamburger Abkommen) in
1964; see Table A4.1 of the Online Appendix A for regional variation in years of
implementation.
Since the results of instrumental variables estimations depend on the instrument
and the external validity of one local average treatment effect (LATE, see Imbens
and Angrist, 1994) may be considered limited (see e.g. Heckman, 2010), we use –
in an extension to PW – two more instruments which capture the effect for more
kinds of students in the German educational system. While the compliers of the
compulsory schooling reform are only basic track students, we use the supply of
schools in the two other tracks (academic schools and intermediate schools4) to
get LATEs for students of these schools.
Wemeasure the supply as the number of both intermediate and academic schools,
respectively, per 1,000 square km in the state of residence at the student’s age of
10. An increased supply of intermediate (or academic) schools enables more stu-
dents to visit such a school due to increased capacities and reduced average travel
time.5 The compliers with the school supply instruments are most likely individ-
uals at the margin of visiting a higher track. The construction of new schools
2A table of descriptive statistics is available in the Online Appendix. Even though we use
another data source than PW, the characteristics of the samples are similar. PW use information
on individuals born 1930–1960 and consider all West-German states.
3Enrollment into elementary school is at the child’s age of six in all states. After grade four,
students visit a secondary school of one out of three possible tracks. Which track a student is
assigned to, basically depends on the performance in elementary school.
4In academic schools (Gymnasien) students receive a degree qualifying for university entrance
(Abitur) after grade 13. Afterwards, many students decide to have university studies (in our sam-
ple 78 percent, see Table A4.2). In intermediate schools (Realschulen), students reach the leaving
degree after grade 10. Even if the degree is different from the basic track degree, students usually
enter vocational training afterwards (nearly 89 percent do so). Additional to Realschulen some
states offer a comprehensive school track (Gesamtschule). Since comprehensive schools play only
a minor role and most students leave after grade 10, we count comprehensive schools as interme-
diate schools, too. Even when leaving comprehensive schools out, the results remain unchanged.
5Academic school supply was used by Ju¨rges et al. (2011) as an instrument in the context of
health and health behaviors. The idea of instrumenting education by the availability of educa-
tional institutions goes back to Card (1995).
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reduces the distance and, thus, the costs of attending a higher track school. This
should be most relevant in rural areas. Certainly, the share of compliers to all
students within a school track is substantially lower than for the compulsory re-
form.6
Information on the supply of schools is taken from several issues of the Ger-
man Statistical Yearbook (German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 1992). Figure A4.1
shows that there is a lot of variation among and across states in schools per 1,000
square km. This generates exogenous variation in school supply that can be used
to identify effects of schooling on wages and skills. Since we use a full set of
year of birth and federal state dummies we basically exploit state level deviations
from the national trend in increased school supply. With the educational expan-
sion in the 60s and 70s, all states increased the number of schools but starting
points and intensity varied across states.7 E.g., the number of academic schools
per square km increased in the state of Rhineland-Palatinate by 5 percent and in
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg by nearly 50 percent.
The identifying assumption regarding school supply is that the variation in the
timing of the educational expansion is independent from wage (and skill) expec-
tations. This assumption would be violated if individuals with lower income
expectations (or worse skills) demand more schools to improve their (or their
children’s) chances on the labor market relative to individuals from other states.
This is unlikely to be the case and, if so, should largely be taken into account by
the state ﬁxed effects. More likely reasons for the different timing are electoral
cycles and political preferences (see Hadjar and Becker, 2006 and Ju¨rges et al.,
2011).
Another concern might be the weighting of the number of schools with the state’s
area instead of, e.g., the state’s cohort size.8 Herewe argue that three reasons chal-
lenge the use of schools per students as instrument (see Ju¨rges et al., 2011). First,
the cohort size is more volatile and would thus mainly drive the instrument’s
variation instead of the number of schools. Second, the cohort size probably af-
fects earnings directly (see e.g. Freeman, 1979 and Welch, 1979), which threatens
6This argument does not hold for the three German city states which have a substantially
higher school density than the other states. Unsurprisingly, including these reduced the ﬁrst-
stage F statistics of the instruments and, moreover, led to very unstable results. We, thus, dropped
these states from the analysis.
7Moreover, the educational expansion did not affect intermediate and academic schools in the
same way in each state.
8Since even a partial correlation with state-speciﬁc cohort sizes may bias the IV results to-
wards zero, Figure A4.2 depicts the variation in school supply adjusted by the cohort sizes. The
ﬁgure still shows a fair amount of variation in the construction of intermediate and academic
school over time and across states. We would interpret this as a hint that the cohort size does not
drive the variation of the school supply instruments.
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the validity. Third, the schools per students instrument would no longer take the
average distance to school into account.
We apply all instruments one by one. Doing so, this paper adds to knowledge
on heterogeneity of the effects. Note, however, that, since the years of schooling
measure is based on degrees the main effect of the school supply instrument is to
shift individuals between tracks.
4.2.3 Results: the effect of education on wages
Table 4.1 reports the coefﬁcients of the regressions of log hourly gross wages on
years of education and control variables. Each of the seven cells is the result of
one different regression. For the sake of clarity, we only report the coefﬁcients
of the instruments in the ﬁrst stage regressions and of years of education in the
second stage regressions. The ﬁrst column shows results from simple OLS regres-
sions, thereby neglecting any endogeneity problems. Column 2 shows results of
IV regressions with compulsory schooling as an instrument, as used in PW. This
instrument refers to the basic track. Column 3 uses the number of intermediate
track schools per 1,000 square km in the state and column 4 the number of aca-
demic track schools per state as instrument. Formal regression equations of each
speciﬁcation are shown in Online Appendix B.
The ﬁrst-stage results are presented in the ﬁrst line of Table 4.1. Students affected
by the compulsory schooling reform attend school on average 0.91 years longer
due to the reform. When the availability of intermediate schools increases by one
school per 1,000 square km, the average length of education increases by 0.09
years. In case of academic schools, the effect is 0.17 years. The average number of
intermediate schools per 1,000 square km is 3.1 in 1950 and 11.2 in 1980 over all
states under review. For academic schools the mean is 6.3 in 1950 and 9.6 in 1980,
see Table A4.2. Thus, a one unit increase is large in relative terms and together
with the small coefﬁcients this hints at the amount of compliers with the school
extensions being much smaller than with the compulsory schooling reform.
Regarding the structural equation and wages as dependent variable, the OLS co-
efﬁcient is statistically different from zero. An increase by one year of education
goes along with about 6.9 percent higher wages on average. The magnitude is in
line with the one in PW, Table 2, although they use different data sources. Con-
trary to the OLS case, the IV coefﬁcients of education are not only statistically but
also economically insigniﬁcant (again in line with PW for the compulsory school-
ing instrument). Using the instruments for intermediate and academic schooling
one by one, the effect of additional education is practically zero. This result goes
137
Table 4.1: Estimation results: Wages
Dependent variable OLS
IV
Instrument referring to
Basic Inter. Acad.
First stage results
Years of education
– –
0.9079∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗ 0.1672∗∗∗
(0.1894) (0.0246) (0.0426)
Second stage results
Log hourly gross wage 0.0686∗∗∗ −0.0004 −0.0002 0.0010
(0.0020) (0.0276) (0.0373) (0.0360)
First-stage F-statistic instruments – – 22.99 13.94 15.40
Notes: Own calculations based on SOEP data. Numbers of observations: 5,499. Control variables: female, as well as state
and birth cohort ﬁxed effects. State of schooling × year aged 10-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefﬁcients in
the ﬁrst stage refer to the respective instruments. Coefﬁcients in the second stage refer to years of schooling. Coefﬁcients
of other control variables not reported here but available upon request. Signiﬁcance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
beyond PW’s ﬁnding of zero returns to compulsory schooling. While compliers
to their reform are basic track students, these results suggest that schooling also
does not pay off for higher track students in Germany. The ﬁnding that the effect
of an additional year of education is the same for all levels of schooling in Ger-
many is in line with Pischke and Krueger (1995). They ﬁnd a linear wage increase
by years of education using OLS.
The Online Appendix provides results of several robustness checks where we, (1)
use net instead of gross wages as outcome variable, (2), limit years of education to
primary and secondary schooling (no post-secondary education), (3), add more
control variables that were left out in the preferred speciﬁcation due to potential
“bad control” problems,9 (4), also control for the average number of students per
school by track, (5), add interaction terms for gender and the cohort and state
ﬁxed effects, and, (6) estimate the reduced-form coefﬁcients. In no speciﬁcation
do we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect of education on wages for either instrument. All in
all, the robustness checks underline the baseline ﬁnding of zero returns.
9The added controls are dummy variables for mother’s/father’s education (at least interme-
diate school degree), number of siblings, dummies for at least good self-assessed health status,
obesity (Body Mass Index ¿ 30), migrational background, university degree, completed appren-
ticeship training, and an ISCO scale-based measure of the skill level demanded by the respon-
dent’s job.
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Table 4.2: Estimation results: Cognitive abilities
Dependent variable OLS
IV
Instrument referring to
Basic Inter. Acad.
First stage results
Years of education
– –
1.0211∗∗∗ 0.0618∗ 0.1650∗∗∗
(0.2701) (0.0341) (0.0597)
Second stage results
Log crystallized intelligence test score 0.0456∗∗∗ −0.0290 0.0078 −0.0197
(0.0039) (0.0541) (0.0966) (0.0661)
Notes: Own calculations based on SOEP data. Numbers of observations: 2,464. Control variables: female, as well as state
and birth cohort ﬁxed effects. State of schooling × year aged 10-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefﬁcients in
the ﬁrst stage refer to the respective instruments. Coefﬁcients in the second stage refer to years of schooling. Coefﬁcients
of other control variables not reported here but available upon request. Signiﬁcance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
4.3 Explanations: effects of education on cognitive
skills
PW conjecture – but cannot directly test – that the potential reason for zero returns
to (additional compulsory) schooling is that German students have learned the
important skills already before the ninth grade. To measure skills we use the
word ﬂuency test score included in the SOEP. While overall cognitive abilities –
also referred to as intelligence – incorporates many components, word ﬂuency, or
“crystallized intelligence”, is the component attributed to environmental factors
like education (Anderson, 2007). In the SOEP, word ﬂuency is assessed by an
ultra-short intelligence test where respondents have to name as many animals as
possible in 90 seconds.
The test score is the number of correct unique answers. Lang et al. (2007a) show
that the ultra-short intelligence test applied in the SOEP is comparable to more
extensive ones used in psychology. In order to simplify the interpretation of the
crystallized intelligence test score, we use its log value. For a documentation see
Schupp et al. (2008). For the ultra-short intelligence test, a computer assisted per-
sonal interview (CAPI) was needed and only one third of all SOEP respondents
were randomly asked to participate in the tests. Therefore, our cognitive test
sample includes only about 2,500 observations.
The same identiﬁcation issues as with wages appear to be relevant in this case
(see Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001), hence, we again prefer IV results with the same
instruments as before over benchmark OLS results in Table 4.2. The same picture
as with wages emerges. Individuals with more years of schooling have higher
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intelligence test scores – about 4.8 percent with one more year of schooling in the
OLS regressions. However, once accounting for the endogeneity of school length,
the coefﬁcients clearly approach zero and become insigniﬁcant (with larger con-
ﬁdence bands, however).
If one compares the ﬁrst-stage results of the wage and skills regressions, the rel-
evance of the supply of intermediate schools decreases for skills. The instrument
is only signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, probably due the lower sample size in
the skills regression. The other instruments remain highly signiﬁcant. Even if
one would lose faith in the IV results for intermediate tracks, there is no reason to
believe that the effect should drastically differ from those in the other two tracks.
Like for the wage regression, we carry out a series of robustness checks in the
Online Appendix. The speciﬁcations are the same as those for wages as outcome
variable (excluding gross/net comparison). The results are basically in line with
the baseline results. In a handful of estimations in the robustness checks, we ﬁnd
somewhat higher coefﬁcients than before (both in positive and negative direc-
tion). They are never signiﬁcant and, if any, do not systematically point into one
direction. We conclude that it is fair to say that “zero is not a bad number” to
describe the effect of schooling on cognitive skills in Germany.10
To conclude, we ﬁnd no systematic and signiﬁcant effect of education on cogni-
tive abilities. Hence, a lack of skills learned in school is an explanation for the
zero wage returns to additional education that is consistent with the evidence
shown in this paper.
4.4 Conclusions
This paper replicates Pischke and von Wachter’s (2008) study on returns to com-
pulsory schooling in Germany using a different data set. After reinforcing their
results we extend their analysis in two dimensions. First, we also use other instru-
ments and, thus, estimate the effect of schooling on earnings for different groups
of compliers. The group of compliers for the new instruments is much smaller,
however.
Second, we test a hypothesis by PW for their ﬁnding of zero returns to compul-
sory schooling, namely that basic skill formation – relevant for the labor market at
10This is a classic statement of James Heckman on the effect of training programs for unem-
ployed, published on p.23 of the 6 April 1996 edition of The Economist, also cited by, e.g., Lechner
et al. (2011).
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least – takes places before the ninth grade in Germany. This is done by estimating
the causal effect of education on cognitive skills.
We do ﬁnd no causal effect of schooling on earnings for any group of compli-
ers. Moreover, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of education on cognitive abilities
which is consistent with the mentioned explanation for no effects of schooling
on wages. Of course, this does not prove that basic skill formation does indeed
take place before the ninth grade in Germany. It is, however, some evidence that it
might not take place after the eighth grade. Both positive correlations of education
with earnings and skills seem to be mainly driven by selection of higher skilled
individuals into more years of schooling.
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Online Appendix
Figure and tables
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Figure A4.1: Number of intermediate and academic schools per 1,000 square km
Notes: Own calculations, data taken from the German Statistical Yearbook (German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 1992). Since
birth cohorts 1940–1970 are used and school supply is measured at the respondent’s age of 10, we use information on
school supply from 1950–1980.
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Figure A4.2: Number of intermediate and academic schools per 1,000 square km
adjusted by cohort size
Notes: Own calculations, data taken from the German Statistical Yearbook (German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 1992). Since
birth cohorts 1940–1970 are used and school supply is measured at the respondent’s age of 10, we use information on
school supply from 1950–1980. We create this ﬁgure using a two-step procedure. In the ﬁrst step, we regress the number
of intermediate and academic schools, respectively, on state and year indicators and the state and year-speciﬁc cohort size.
In the second step, we use the coefﬁcients of the ﬁrst step to predict the cohort size-adjusted number of schools.
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Table A4.1: Summary statistics for the instruments
Panel A: Size of the states and introduction of compulsory schooling
Area
Mandatory ninth grade for basic track schools
(in 1,000 Year of First cohort Share of stud-
square km) introduction affected ents affected
Schleswig-Holstein 15.799 1956 1941 76.0%
Lower Saxony 47.635 1962 1947 80.5%
North Rhine-Westphalia 34.088 1967 1953 74.6%
Hesse 21.115 1967 1953 71.4%
Rhineland-Palatinate 18.854 1967 1953 78.3%
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 35.751 1967 1953 72.6%
Bavaria 70.550 1969 1955 78.5%
Average 76.0%
Panel B: Number of intermediate schools per 1,000 square km by selected years
1950 1960 1970 1980
Schleswig-Holstein 3.988 6.266 7.595 11.583
Lower Saxony 3.590 4.492 5.353 8.670
North Rhine-Westphalia 5.192 8.155 15.225 17.748
Hesse 6.157 7.151 12.456 16.339
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.636 1.909 4.455 5.781
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 1.063 1.790 9.986 12.811
Bavaria 1.247 2.764 4.068 5.755
Average 3.125 4.647 8.448 11.241
Panel C: Number of academic schools per 1,000 square km by selected years
1950 1960 1970 1980
Schleswig-Holstein 3.418 4.114 5.000 6.203
Lower Saxony 3.149 3.863 4.891 5.416
North Rhine-Westphalia 12.409 13.641 18.394 18.922
Hesse 7.388 7.720 8.762 12.361
Rhineland-Palatinate 5.675 6.471 6.789 7.372
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 8.559 8.811 13.119 11.552
Bavaria 3.558 4.394 4.947 5.599
Average 6.308 7.002 8.843 9.632
Notes: Years and birth cohorts affected by the compulsory schooling reform are taken from Pischke and von Wachter
(2005), all other information are form the German Statistical Yearbook (German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 1992). The nature
of the variation in compulsory schooling and school supply is distinct. In general, the German Constitution guarantees
the autonomy of the Federal States in educational policy. After the WWII, basic track schools offered 8 years of education
in total. For reasons described in the text, some states decided to introduce a mandatory ninth grade at an early stage (see
panel A of this table). In 1964 the prime ministers of the states agreed on the Hamburg Accord (Hamburger Abkommen)
in order to unify some key characteristics of the educational systems in the German states. Besides the introduction of a
mandatory ninth grade in all states by 1967, the Hamburg Accord mainly regulated the start of the school year, see Pischke
(2007). The number of schools per track remained unaffected by the Hamburg Accord or any other agreement. In other
words, while changes in compulsory schooling are the consequence of a small degree of uniﬁcation, the variation in the
school construction reﬂects the states’ autonomy in educational issues.
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Table A4.2: Means of selected variables by track
Basic Inter. Acad. Total
Income
Gross hourly wage (in e ) 14.64 17.65 23.10 17.84
Gross monthly wage (in e ) 2,474 3,053 4,269 3,132
Education
Years of education 10.26 12.17 16.73 12.57
University degree (in %) 5.00 15.84 78.15 27.42
Apprenticeship (in %) 79.00 88.97 34.23 70.99
Cognitive skills
Raw crystallized intelligence test score 23.21 28.69 31.64 26.56
Socio-demographic characteristics
Female (in%) 39.50 47.31 40.36 42.41
Age (in years) 48.32 46.54 47.54 47.51
Mother has intermediate school degree (in %) 6.07 15.91 42.08 19.07
Father has intermediate school degree (in %) 7.64 22.14 51.48 24.36
Number of siblings 2.35 1.67 1.47 1.89
Self-assessed health stats at least good (in %) 46.18 55.60 60.61 53.11
Obesity: Body Mass Index ¿ 30 (in %) 22.00 14.52 11.60 16.77
Migratinal background (in %) 29.09 7.39 7.40 16.08
Measure of skills needed for joba 2.19 2.73 3.50 2.74
Observationsb 2,200 1,894 1,405 5,499
Share (in %) 40.01 34.44 25.55 100
Notes: Own calculations based on SOEP data. For cognitive skills the number of observations varies from the
number given at the bottom of the table.
aISCO scale-based measured of the skill level demanded by the respondents job, scale ranges from 1 (low skills needed)
to 4 (high skills needed), see International Labour Organization (2012).
bBased on wage information.
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Table A4.3: Robustness for wage as outcome variable
Speciﬁcation OLS
IV
Instruments referring to
Basic Inter. Acad.
First stage results
Log net hourly wage
– –
0.908∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(0.189) (0.025) (0.043)
Only school years
– –
0.373∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.015) (0.026)
Socio-economic controls
– –
0.902∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.014) (0.024)
Institutional controls
– –
0.864∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.033) (0.055)
Female speciﬁcation
– –
0.924∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.024) (0.041)
Second stage results
Log net hourly wage 0.067∗∗∗ 0.008 0.019 0.000
(0.002) (0.028) (0.035) (0.038)
Only school years 0.102∗∗∗ −0.031 −0.020 −0.012
(0.004) (0.068) (0.075) (0.063)
Socio-economic controls 0.029∗∗∗ 0.017 −0.018 −0.043
(0.004) (0.026) (0.039) (0.053)
Institutional controls 0.069∗∗∗ 0.015 0.039 0.033
(0.002) (0.030) (0.042) (0.035)
Female speciﬁcation 0.068∗∗∗ 0.000 0.008 0.005
(0.002) (0.027) (0.035) (0.035)
Reduced form
– –
0.000 −0.000 0.001
(0.025) (0.017) (0.030)
Notes: Own calculations based on SOEP data. Control variables: female, as well as state and birth cohort ﬁxed effects. State
of schooling × year aged 10-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Explanations: Log net hourly wage: dependent variable is the net instead of the gross hourly wage in logs. Observations:
5,499. Only school years: endogenous explanatory variable is limited to primary and secondary education. Observations:
5,268. Socio-economic controls: additional control variables: dummy variables for mother’s/father’s education (at least
intermediate school degree), number of siblings, dummy variables for at least good self-assessed health status, obesity
(Body Mass Index ¿ 30), migrational background, university degree, completed apprenticeship training, and an ISCO
scale-based measure of the skill level demanded by the respondent’s job. Leaving the potentially endogenous variables
university degree and completed apprenticeship training out, does not change the pattern. Observations: 4,666. Institu-
tional controls: additional control variables (starting with the baseline model) for the average size of the schools per track
by year and federal state. Observations: 5,499. Female interaction terms: additional interaction terms between female and
the state and birth cohort ﬁxed effects are included. Observations: 5,499. Reduced form: instrument directly plugged into
the the wage equation instead of instrumented years of education. Observations: 5,499.
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Table A4.4: Robustness for crystallized intelligence as outcome variable
Speciﬁcation OLS
IV
Instruments referring to
Basic Inter. Acad.
First stage results
Only school years
– –
0.600∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.022) (0.039)
Socio-economic controls
– –
1.129∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.025) (0.043)
Institutional controls
– –
1.118∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.046) (0.072)
Female speciﬁcation
– –
0.991∗∗∗ 0.062∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.255) (0.034) (0.060)
Second stage results
Only school years 0.067∗∗∗ −0.072 −0.023 −0.033
(0.007) (0.096) (0.099) (0.082)
Socio-economic controls 0.023∗ −0.018 0.038 −0.044
(0.012) (0.051) (0.073) (0.103)
Institutional controls 0.046∗∗∗ −0.024 −0.024 0.009
(0.004) (0.054) (0.079) (0.054)
Female speciﬁcation 0.045∗∗∗ −0.035 0.007 −0.014
(0.004) (0.054) (0.095) (0.069)
Reduced form
– –
−0.030 0.002 −0.016
(0.051) (0.031) (0.053)
Notes: Own calculations based on SOEP data. Control variables: female, as well as state and birth cohort ﬁxed effects. State
of schooling × year aged 10-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Explanations: Only school years: endogenous explanatory variable is limited to primary and secondary education. Obser-
vations: 2,355. Socio-economic controls: additional control variables: dummy variables for mother’s/father’s education
(at least intermediate school degree), number of siblings, dummy variables for at least good self-assessed health status,
obesity (Body Mass Index ¿ 30), migrational background, university degree, completed apprenticeship training, and an
ISCO scale-based measure of the skill level demanded by the respondent’s job. Leaving the potentially endogenous vari-
ables university degree and completed apprenticeship training out, does not change the pattern. Observations: 1,259.
Institutional controls: additional control variables (starting with the baseline model) for the average size of the schools
per track by year and federal state. Observations: 2,464. Female interaction terms: additional interaction terms between
female and the state and birth cohort ﬁxed effects are included. Observations: 2,464. Reduced form: instrument directly
plugged into the the wage equation instead of instrumented years of education. Observations: 2,464.
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Formal Description of the Model
The conventional OLS estimation of the relationship between education and the
log of hourly gross wages is the following:
yi = β0 + β1educi + β2Xi + ui. (A4.2)
yi is the log hourly gross wage of person i (with i = 1, 2, ..., N observations). educ
denotes the years of education measured as years in school determined by cho-
sen track plus years of further education due to an apprenticeship or university
studies. Xi is a matrix of control variables. In the baseline speciﬁcation these
variables are gender as well as state of schooling and year of birth ﬁxed effects.11
Further variables – which might depend on education and are therefore left out
in the preferred speciﬁcation – are added later on to check the robustness. ui is
the error term. If there is a selection of individuals with higher skills into more
education and better paid jobs, β1 would be biasedly estimated by OLS.
To overcome this problem we instrument years of education using different in-
struments. The ﬁrst-stage equation is
educi = δ Instrumenti + γXi + εi (A4.2)
where εi denotes the error term. The instrument is one of the following three
variables: a dummy variable which is 1 if person i was affect by the compulsory
schooling reform, and 0 otherwise; and the number of either intermediate or aca-
demic schools per 1,000 square km in the state of residence at the respondent’s
age of 10. Thus, we run three regressions with one instrument at a time.
The formal model depicted here is the same when the outcome variable is the log
value of the cognitive skills test score as in Section 4.3 of the text. In this case,
however, y in Eq. (A4.2) states the log crystallized intelligence test score of the
SOEP.
Cognitive skill measures and previous ﬁndings
In the psychological literature the commonly used test procedure to measure in-
telligence is the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). It covers seven distinct
11As Ju¨rges et al. (2011) we do not include state-speciﬁc trends. Regarding our IV estimations,
this would discard variation and reduce the explanatory power of the school supply instruments
considerably. The second-stage results would, however, not change qualitatively. I.e., the second-
stage coefﬁcients are not large and signiﬁcant after including state-speciﬁc trends, thus not lead-
ing to different conclusions.
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skill components. For two of those components the SOEP includes a short test
especially designed for the conduction in the survey. According to psychological
insights (see e.g. ?), the measure we use, crystallized intelligence, is determined
by environmental factors, e.g., education. The other intelligence measure in the
SOEP refers to ﬂuid intelligence – a component of the overall intelligence that is
attributed to inherited genes.
We are only aware of four studies on cognitive skill returns to secondary educa-
tion. These studies based on samples for which a positive earning returns to ed-
ucation were established. The ﬁndings of the studies are ambiguous but indicate
positive skill returns if any. Moreover, the choice of the intelligence component
seems to matter.
Glymour et al. (2008) and Banks and Mazzonna (2012) instrument education us-
ing changes in compulsory schooling in the US and the UK, respectively. Using
similar law changes in Continental European countries, Schneeweis et al. (2014)
provide pooled evidence on the schooling-skills relationship in the Survey of
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Mazzonna (2012) uses com-
pulsory schooling and the birth order to instrument years of education in the
SHARE data. While the sets of countries analysed by Schneeweis et al. (2014)
and Mazzonna (2012) include Germany, they pool the observations affected by
the German compulsory schooling reform with observations from other countries
(for which there is evidence on positive wage returns to education). Therefore,
our study provides the ﬁrst separate analysis of the effect of years of secondary
education on cognitive skills.
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Chapter 5
Heterogeneity in Marginal
Non-monetary Returns to Higher
Education
Joint work with Hendrik Schmitz and Matthias Westphal
5.1 Introduction
“The whole world is going to university – Is it worth it?” The Economist’s head-
line read in March 2015.1 While convincing causal evidence on positive labor
market returns to higher education is still rare and nearly exclusively available
for the US, even less is known about the non-monetary returns to college edu-
cation (see Barrow and Malamud, 2015 and Oreopoulos and Petronijevic, 2013).
Although non-monetary factors are acknowledged to be important outcomes of
education (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011), evidence on the effect of college ed-
ucation is so far limited to health behaviors (see below). We estimate the long-
lasting marginal returns to college education in Germany decades after leaving
college. As a benchmark, we start by looking at wage returns to higher educa-
tion but the paper’s focus is on the non-monetary returns which might also be
seen as mediators of the more often studied effect of education on wages. These
non-monetary returns are cognitive abilities and health.
Cognitive abilities and health belong to the most important non-monetary deter-
minants of individual well-being. Moreover, the stock of both factors also inﬂu-
ences the economy as a whole (see, among many others, Heckman et al., 1999,
1The Economist, edition March 28th to April 3rd 2015.
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and Cawley et al., 2001, for cognitive abilities and Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007,
Cervellati and Sunde, 2005, and Costa, 2015, for health). Yet, non-monetary re-
turns to college education are not fully understood (Oreopoulos and Salvanes,
2011). Psychological research broadly distinguishes between effects of education
on the long-term cognitive ability differential that are either due to a change in
the cognitive reserve (i.e., the cognitive capacity) or due to an altered age-related
decline (see, e.g., Stern, 2012). Still, even the compound manifestation of the over-
all effect has rarely been studied for college education over a short-term horizon2
and – as far as we are aware – it has never been assessed for the long run. Few
studies analyze the returns to college education on health behaviors (Currie and
Moretti, 2003, Grimard and Parent, 2007, de Walque, 2007).
We use a slightly modiﬁed version of the marginal treatment effect approach in-
troduced and forwarded by Bjo¨rklund and Mofﬁtt (1987) and Heckman and Vyt-
lacil (2005). The main feature of this approach is to explicitly model the choice
for education, thus turning back from a mere statistical view of exploiting ex-
ogenous variation in education to identify casual effects towards a description
of the behavior of economic agents. Translated into our research question, the
MTE is the effect of education on different outcomes for individuals at the mar-
gin of taking higher education. The MTE can be used to generate all conventional
treatment parameters, such as the average treatment effect (ATE). On top of this,
comparing the marginal effects along the probability of taking higher education
is also informative in its own right: different marginal effects do not just reveal
effect heterogeneity but also some of its underlying structure (for instance, selec-
tion into gains). This is be an important property that the local average treatment
effect – LATE, as identiﬁed by conventional two stage least squares methods –
would miss.
The individuals in our sample made their college decision between 1958 and 1990
and graduated in the case of college education between 1963 and 1995. Our out-
come variables (wages, standardized measures of cognitive abilities3 and mental
and physical health) are assessed between 2010 and 2012, thus, 20 to 54 years af-
ter the college decision. Our instrument is a measure of the relative availability of
college spots (operationalized by the number of enrolled students divided by the
number of inhabitants) in the area of residence at the time of the secondary school
graduation. Using detailed information on the arguably exogenous expansions
2Hansen et al. (2004) use a control function approach to adjust for education in the short-term
development of cognitive abilities. Carneiro et al. (2001, 2003) analyze the short-term effects of
college education. Glymour et al. (2008), Banks and Mazzonna (2012), Schneeweis et al. (2014),
and Kamho¨fer and Schmitz (2016) analyze the effects of secondary schooling on long-term cogni-
tive skills.
3See Section 5.4 for a detailed deﬁnition of cognitive abilities. We use the terms “cognitive
abilities”, “cognitive skills”, and “skills” interchangeably.
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of college capacities in all 326 West German districts (cities or rural areas) dur-
ing the so-called “educational expansion” between the 1960s and 1980s generates
variation in the availability of higher education.
By deriving treatment effects over the entire support of the probability of college
attendance, this paper contributes to the literature mainly in two important ways.
First, this is the ﬁrst study that analyzes the long-term effect of college education
on cognitive abilities and general health measures (instead of speciﬁc health be-
haviors). Long-run effects on skills are crucial in showing the sustainability of
human capital investments after the age of 19. Along this line, this outcome can
complement existing evidence in identifying the fundamental value of college ed-
ucation since – unlike studies on monetary returns – effects on cognitive skills do
neither directly exhibit signaling (see the debate on discrepancy between private
and social returns as in Clark and Martorell, 2014) nor adverse general equilib-
rium effects (as skills are not determined by both, forces of demand and supply).
Second, by going beyond the point estimate of the LATE, we provide a more
comprehensive picture in an environment of essential heterogeneity.
The results suggest positive average returns to college education for wages, cog-
nitive abilities, and physical health. Yet, the returns are heterogeneous – thus, we
ﬁnd evidence for selection into gains – and even close to zero for the around 30
percent of individuals with the lowest desire to study. Mental health effects are
zero throughout the population. Thus, or ﬁndings can be interpreted as evidence
for remarkable positive average returns for those who took college education in
the past. Yet, a further expansion in college education, as sometimes called for,
is likely not to pay off as this would mostly affect individuals in the part of the
distribution that are not found to be positively affected by education. We also
try to substantiate our results by looking at potential mechanisms of the average
effects. Although we cannot causally differentiate all channels and the data allow
us to provide suggestive evidence only, our ﬁndings may be interpreted as fol-
lows. Mentally more demanding jobs, jobs with a less health deteriorating effects
and better health behaviors probably add to the explanation of skill and health
returns to education.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 brieﬂy introduces the German ed-
ucational system and describes the exogenous variation we exploit. Section 5.3
outlines the empirical approach. Section 5.4 presents the data. The main results
are reported in Section 5.5 while Section 5.6 addresses some of its potential un-
derlying pathways. Section 5.7 concludes.
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5.2 Institutional background and exogenous variation
5.2.1 The German higher educational system
After graduating from secondary school, adolescents in Germany either enroll
into higher education or start an apprenticeship. The latter is part-time training-
on-the-job and part-time schooling. This vocational training usually takes three
years and individuals often enter the ﬁrm (or another ﬁrm in the sector) as a
full-time employee afterwards. To be eligible for higher education in Germany,
individuals need a university entrance degree. In the years under review, only
academic secondary schools (Gymnasien) with 13 years of schooling in total award
this degree (Abitur). Although the tracking from elementary schools to secondary
schools takes place rather early at the age of 10, students can switch secondary
school tracks in every grade. It is also possible to enroll into academic schools af-
ter graduating from basic or intermediate schools in order to receive a university
entrance degree.
In Germany, mainly two institutions offer higher education: universities/colleges4
and universities of applied science (Fachhochschulen). The regular time to receive
the formerly common Diplom degree (master’s equivalent) was 4.5 years at both
institutions. Colleges are usually large institutions that offer degrees in various
subjects. The other type of higher educational institutions, universities of ap-
plied science, are usually smaller than colleges and often specialized in one ﬁeld
of study (e.g., business schools). Moreover, universities of applied science have
a less theoretical curriculum and a teaching structure that is similar to schools.
Nearly all institutions of higher education in Germany do not charge any tuition
fees. However, students have to cover their own costs of living. On the other
hand, their peers in apprenticeship training earn a small salary. Possible budget
constraints (e.g., transaction costs arising through the need to move to another
city in order to go to college) are likely determinants of the decision to enroll into
higher education.
5.2.2 Exogenous variation in college education over time
While the higher educational system as described in Section 5.2.1 did not change
in the years under review, the accessibility (in terms of mere quantity but also dis-
4We use the words university and college as synonyms to refer to German Universita¨ten
and closely-related institutions like technical universities (Technische Universita¨ten/Technische
Hochschulen), an institutional type that combines features of colleges and universities ap-
plied science (Gesamthochschulen) and universities of the armed forces (Bundeswehruniver-
sita¨ten/Bundeswehrhochschulen).
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tribution within Germany) of tertiary education changed signiﬁcantly, providing
us with a source of exogenous variation. This so called “educational expansion”
falls well into the period of study (1958–1990). Within this period, the shrinking
transaction costs of studying may have changed incentives and the mere presence
of new or growing colleges could also have nudged individuals towards higher
education that otherwise would not have studied. In this paper, we consider two
processes in order to quantify the educational expansion. The ﬁrst is the openings
of new colleges, the second is the extension in capacity of all colleges (we refer to
both as college availability).5 College availability as an instrument for higher ed-
ucation was introduced to the literature by Card (1995) and has frequently been
employed since then (e.g., Currie and Moretti, 2003), also to estimate the MTE
(e.g., Carneiro et al., 2011, and Nybom, 2017). We exploit the rapid increase in the
number of new colleges and in the number of available spots to study as exoge-
nous variation in the college decision.
Between 1958 (the earliest secondary school graduation year in our sample) and
1990 the number of colleges in Germany doubled from 33 to 66.6 In particular, the
opening of new colleges introduced discrete discontinuities in choice sets. As an
example, students had to travel 50 kilometers, on average, to the closest college
before a college was opened in their district (measured from district centroid to
centroid), see Figure 5.1. Figure A4.1 in the Appendix gives an impression of the
spatial variation in college availability over time.
There was an increase in the size of existing colleges and, therefore, in the number
of available spots to study as well. The average number of students per college
was 5,013 in 1958 and 15,438 in 1990. Of the 33 colleges in 1958, 30 still existed
in 1990 and had an average size of 23,099 students. The total number of students
increased from 155,000 in 1958 to 1 million in 1990. Figure 5.2 shows the trends
in college openings and enrolled students (normalized by the number of inhabi-
tants) for the ﬁve most-populated German states. While the actual numbers used
in the regressions vary on the much smaller district level, the state level ﬁgures
simplify the visualization of the pattern.
Factors that have driven the increase in the number of colleges and their size can
brieﬂy be summarized into four groups: (i) The large majority of the population
5The working paper version Kamho¨fer et al. (2015) also uses the introduction of a student
loan program as further source exogenous variation. Using this instrument does not affect the
ﬁndings at all but is not considered here for the sake of legibility of the paper.
6All data are taken from the German Statistical Yearbooks, 1959-1991, see German Federal Sta-
tistical Ofﬁce (1991). We only use colleges and no other higher educational institutes described in
Section 5.2 (e.g., universities of applied science). Administrative data on openings and the num-
ber of students are not available for other institutions than colleges. However, since other higher
educational institutions are small in size and highly specialized, they should be less relevant for
the higher education decision and, thus, neglecting them should not affect the results.
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Figure 5.1: Average distance to the closest college over time for districts with a
college opening
Notes: Own illustration. Information on colleges are taken from the German Statistical Yearbooks 1959–1991 (German
Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 1991). The distances (in km) between the districts are calculated using district centroids. These
distances are weighted by the number of individuals observed in the particular district-year cells in our estimation sample
of the NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data. The resulting average distances are depicted by green circles. Note that prior to time
period 0, the average distance changes over time either due to sample composition or a college opening in a neighboring
district. Only districts with a college opening are taken into account.
had a low level of education. This did not only result from WWII but also from
the “anti-intellectualism” (Picht, 1964, p.66) in the Third Reich, and the notion of
education in imperial Germany before, beﬁtting the social status of certain indi-
viduals only (ii) An increase in the number of academic secondary schools at the
same time (as analyzed in Kamho¨fer and Schmitz, 2016, and Ju¨rges et al., 2011,
for instance) qualiﬁed a larger share of school graduates to enroll into higher ed-
ucation (Bartz, 2007). (iii) A change in production technologies led to an increase
in ﬁrm’s demand for high-skilled workers – especially, given the low level of ed-
ucational participation (Weisser, 2005). (iv) Political decision makers were afraid
that “without an increase in the number of skilled graduates the West German
economy would not be able to compete with communist rivals” (Ju¨rges et al.,
2011, p.846, in reference to Picht, 1964).
Although these reasons (maybe except for the ﬁrm’s demand for more educated
workers) affected the 10 West German federal states – that are in charge of edu-
cational policy – in the same way, the measures taken and the timing of actions
differed widely between states. Because of local politics (e.g., the balancing of re-
gional interests and avoiding clusters of colleges) there was also a large amount
of variation in college openings within the federal state. See the Supplementary
Materials A to the paper for a much more detailed description of the political
process involved.
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Figure 5.2: Number of colleges and students over the time in selected states
Notes: Own illustration. College opening and size information are taken from the German Statistical Yearbooks 1959–1991
(German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 1991). Yearly information on the district-speciﬁc population size is based on personal
correspondence with the statistical ofﬁces of the federal states. For sake of lucidity the trends are only plotted for the ﬁve
most-populated states.
A major concern for instrument validity is that, even though the political process
did not follow a uniﬁed structure and included some randomness in the ﬁnal
choice of locations and timing of openings, regions where colleges were opened
differed from those that already had colleges before (or that never established
any). Table 5.1 reports some numbers on the regional level as of the year 1962
(the earliest possible year available to us with representative data).7 Regions that
already had colleges before did not differ in terms of socio-demographics (ex-
cept for population densities, as mostly large cities had colleges before) but were
somewhat stronger in terms of socio-economic indices. The differences were not
large however. Given that we include district ﬁxed-effects and a large set of socio-
economic controls (including the socioeconomic environment before the college
decision, see Section 5.4), this should not be a problematic issue.
Yet, changes in district characteristics that are potentially related to the outcome
variables might be a more important problem. There could, for instance, be
changes in the population structure that both induce a higher demand for col-
lege education and go along with improved cognitive abilities and health. This
could be the case if the regions with college openings were more “dynamic” with
a younger and potentially increasing population. Table 5.1 shows a decline in the
population density by 6 percent between 1962 and 1990 in the areas that opened
colleges while there were no average changes in the areas with preexisting col-
leges and a 10 percent increase in the areas that never opened any. This reﬂects
different regional trends in population ageing. As one example, the Ruhr Area
in the west, where three colleges were opened, experienced a population decline
7Table 5.1 uses a different data source than the main analysis and the local level is slightly
broader than districts, see the notes to the table.
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Table 5.1: Comparison of regions with and without college openings before
college opens using administrative data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
College opening...
before between later than
1958 1958-1990 1990 or never
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Observations
Number of regions 27 30 190
Sociodemographic characteristics
Female (in %) 53.0 (2.0) 53.0 (1.4) 52.9 (4.3)
Average age (in years) 37.2 ( 1.1) 37.0 ( 1.1) 36.6 ( 1.9)
Singles (in %) 38.8 (2.5) 37.7 (2.3) 38.9 (4.6)
Population density per
km2 in 1962
1381.9 (1076.7) 1170.1 (1047.3) 327.1 (479.7)
Change in population
density 1962 to 1990
1.6 (186.3) −71.0 (202.8) 31.5 (98.5)
Migrational background
(in %)
2.7 (3.0) 1.6 (1.5) 2.1 (2.3)
Socioeconomic characteristics
Share of employees to all
individuals (in %)
47.0 (3.6) 45.3 (4.2) 46.2 (5.2)
Employees with an
income>600 DM (in %)
27.3 (3.8) 24.8 (5.3) 25.9 (6.4)
Employees by industry (in %)
– primary 2.1 (5.2) 5.2 (5.2) 2.8 (5.5)
– secondary 52.9 (8.4) 54.7 (6.2) 54.3 (8.9)
– tertiary 45.0 (9.3) 40.1 (8.3) 42.9 (9.6)
Employees in blue collar
occup. (in %)
53.6 (9.4) 59.0 (7.9) 56.5 (9.3)
Employees in academic
occup. (in %)
22.0 (4.4) 17.5 (4.3) 20.3 (5.9)
Notes: Own calculations based on Micro Census 1962, see Lengerer et al. (2008). Regions are deﬁned through admin-
istrative Regierungsbezirk entries and the degree urbanization (Gemeindegro¨ßenklasse) and may cover more than one
district. College information is aggregated at regional level and a region is considered to have a college if at least one
of its districts has a college. Calculations for population density and change in population density based on district-
level data acquired through personal correspondence with the statistical ofﬁces of the federal states. Data are available
on request. The variables “employees in blue collar occup.” and “employees in academic occup.” state the shares
of employees in the region in an occupation that is usually conducted by a blue collar worker/a college graduate,
respectively. Standard deviations (s.d.) are given in italics in parentheses.
and comparably stronger population ageing over time. Again, these differences
are not dramatically large, but we might be worried of different trends in health
and cognitive abilities that are correlated with college expansion. If this was the
case – more expansion in areas that have a more ageing population with deterio-
rating health and cognitive abilities – we might underestimate the effect of college
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eduction on these outcomes. We include a district-speciﬁc time trend to account
for this in the analysis.
The expansion in secondary schooling noted above was unrelated to the college
expansion. While college expansion naturally took place in a small number of
districts, expansion in secondary schooling was across all regions. In addition,
Kamho¨fer and Schmitz (2016) do not ﬁnd any local average treatment effects of
school expansion on cognitive abilities and wages. Thus, it seems unlikely that
selective increases in cognitive abilities due to secondary school expansion in-
validate the instrument. Nevertheless, again, district-speciﬁc time trends should
capture large parts if this was a problem.
So essentially, what we do is the following: we look within each district and
attribute changes in the college (graduation/enrollment) rate from the general
trend (by controlling for cohort FE) and the district speciﬁc trend (which might
be due to continually increased access to higher secondary education) to either
changes in the college spots or a new opening of a college nearby. We use dis-
continuities in college access over time that cannot be exploited using data on
individuals that make the college decision at the same point in time (for instance
cohort studies) as some of the previous literature that used college availability as
an instrument did. Details on how we exploit the variation in college availability
in the empirical speciﬁcation are discussed in Section 5.4.4 after presenting the
data.
5.3 Empirical Strategy
Our estimation framework widely builds on Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and
Carneiro et al. (2011). Derivations and in-depth discussion of most issues can
be found there. We start with the potential outcome model, where Y1 and Y0
are the potential outcomes with and without treatment. The observed outcome
Y either equals Y1 in case an individual received a treatment – which is college
education here – or Y0 in the absence of treatment (the individual identifer i is
implied). Obviously, treatment participation is voluntary, rendering a treatment
dummy D in a simple linear regression endogenous. In the marginal treatment
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effect framework, this is explicitly modeled by using a choice equation, that is,
we specify the following latent index model:
Y1 = X′β1 +U1 (5.1)
Y0 = X′β0 +U0 (5.2)
D∗ = Z′δ −V where D = 1[D∗ ≥ 0] = 1[Z′δ ≥ V] (5.3)
The vector X contains observable, and U1,U0 unobservable factors that affect the
potential outcomes.8 D∗ is the latent desire to take up college education which
depends on observed variables Z and unobservables V. Z includes all variables
in X plus the instruments. Whenever D∗ exceeds a threshold (set to zero without
loss of generality), the individual opts for college education, otherwise she does
not. U1,U0,V are potentially correlated, inducing the endogeneity problem (as
well as heterogenous returns) as we observe Y(= DY1 + (1− D)Y0), D, X, Z, but
not U1,U0,V.
Following this model, individuals are indifferent between between higher edu-
cation and directly entering the labor market (e.g., through an apprenticeship)
whenever the index of observables Z′δ is equal to the unobservables V. Thus, if
we knew the switching point (point of indifference) and its corresponding value
of the observables, we could make sharp restriction on the value of the unob-
servables. This property is exploited in the estimation. Since for every value
of the index Z′δ one needs individuals with and without higher education, it is
important to meaningfully aggregate the index by a monotonous transformation
that for example returns the quantiles of Z′δ and V. One such rank-preserving
transformation is done by the cumulative distribution function that returns the
propensity score P(Z) (quantiles of Z) and UD (quantiles of V).9
If we vary the excluded instruments in Z′δ from the lowest to the highest value
while holding the covariates X constant, more and more individuals will select
into higher education. Those who react to this shift also reveal their rank in the
unobservable distribution. Thus, the unobservables are ﬁxed given the propen-
sity score and it is feasible to evaluate any outcome for those who select into
treatment at any quantile UD that is identiﬁed by the instrument-induced change
of the higher education choice. In general, estimating marginal effects by UD does
not require stronger assumptions than those required by the LATE since Vytlacil
8Note that the general derivation does not require linear indices. However, it is standard to
assume linearity when it comes to estimation.
9By applying, for instance, the standard normal distribution to the left and the right of the
equation: Z′δ ≥ V ⇔ Φ(Z′δ) ≥ Φ(V) ⇔ P(Z) ≥ UD where P(Z) ≡ P(D = 1|Z) = Φ(Z′δ).
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(2002) showed its equivalence.10 Yet, strong instruments are beneﬁcial for ro-
bustly identifying effects over the support of P(Z). This, however, is testable.
The marginal treatment effect (MTE), then, is the marginal (gross) beneﬁt of tak-
ing the treatment for those who are just indifferent between taking and not-taking
it and can be expressed as
MTE(x, uD) =
∂E(Y|x, p)
∂p
.
This is the effect of an incremental increase in the propensity score on the ob-
served outcome. The MTE varies along the line of UD in case of heterogeneous
treatment effects which arise if individuals self-select into the treatment based on
their expected idiosyncratic gains. This is a situation Heckman et al. (2006) call
“essential heterogeneity”. This is an important structural property that the MTE
can recover: If individuals already react at low values of the instrument, where
the observed part of the latent desire of selecting into higher education (P(Z)) is
still very low, a prerequisite for yet going to college is that V is marginally lower.
These individuals could choose college against all (observed) odds because they
are more intrinsically talented or motivated as indicated by a low V. If this is
translated into higher future gains (U1 −U0), the MTE would exhibit a signiﬁcant
negative slope: As P(Z) rises, marginal individuals need less and less compen-
sation in terms of unobserved and expected returns to yet choose college – this
is called selection into gains. As Basu (2011, 2014) notes, essential heterogeneity
is not restricted to active sorting into gains but is always an issue if selection is
based on factors that are not completely independent of the gains. Thus, in health
economic applications, where gains are arguably harder to predict for the indi-
vidual than, say, monetary returns, essential heterogeneity is also an important
phenomenon.
In this case the common treatment parameters ATE, ATT, and LATE do not co-
incide. The MTE can be interpreted as a more fundamental parameter than the
usual ones as it unfolds all local switching effects by intrinsic ‘willingness’ to
study and not only some weighted average of those.11
The main component for estimating the MTE is the conditional expectation E(Y|
X, p). Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) show that if we plug in the counterfactuals
10In this model the exclusion restriction is implicit since Z has an effect on D∗ but not on
Y1,Y0. Monotonicity is implied by the choice equation since D∗ monotonously either increases
are decreases the higher the values of Z.
11To make this explicit, all treatment parameters (TEj(x)) can be decomposed into a weight
(hj(x, uD)) and the MTE: TEj(x) =
∫ 1
0 MTE(x, uD)hj(x, uD)duD. See, e.g. Heckman and Vytlacil
(2007) for the exact expressions of the weights for common parameters.
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in (5.1) and (5.2) in the potential outcome equation, rearrange and apply the ex-
pectation E(.|X, p) to all expressions and impose an exclusion restriction of p on
Y (exposed below), we get an expression that can be estimated:
E(Y|X, p) = X′β0 + X′(β1 − β0) · p+ E(U1 −U0|D = 1, X) · p
= X′β0 + X′(β1 − β0) · p+ K(p) (5.4)
where K(p) is some not further speciﬁed function of the propensity score if one
wants to avoid distributional assumptions of the error terms. Thus, the estima-
tion of the MTE involves estimating the propensity score in order to estimate
Equation (5.4) and, ﬁnally, taking its derivative with respect to p. Note that this
derivative – and hence the effect of college education – depends on heterogene-
ity due to observed components X and unobserved components K(p), since this
structure was imposed by Equations (5.1) and (5.2):
∂E(Y|X, p)
∂p
= X′(β1 − β0) + ∂K(p)
∂p
(5.5)
To achieve non-parametric identiﬁcation of the terms in Equation (5.5), the Con-
ditional Independence Assumption has to be imposed on the instrument.
(U1,U0,V)⊥⊥ Z|X
meaning that the error terms are independent of Z given X. That is, after condi-
tioning on X a shift in the instruments Z (or the single index P(Z)) has no effect
on the potential outcome distributions.
Non-parametrically estimating separate MTEs for every data cell determined by
X is hardly ever feasible due to a lack of observations and powerful instruments
within each such cell. Yet, in case of parametric or semiparametric speciﬁcations
a conditional independence assumption is not sufﬁcient to decompose the effect
into observed and unobserved sources of heterogeneity. To separately identify
the right hand side of Equation (5.5) unconditional independence is required:
(U1,U0,V)⊥⊥ Z, X (Carneiro et al., 2011, for more details consult the Supplemen-
tary Materials).12
In a pragmatic approach, one can now either follow Brinch et al. (2017) or Cor-
nelissen et al. (2017) who do not aim at causally separating the causes of the effect
heterogeneity. In this case a conventional exclusion restriction on the instruments
sufﬁces for estimating the overall level and the curvature of the MTE. Our solu-
12Essentially, this is equivalent to a simple 2SLS case. If one wants to identify observable effect
heterogeneity (that is, interact the treatment indicator with control variables in the regression
model) the instrument needs to be independent unconditional of these controls.
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tion in bringing the empirical framework to the data without too strong assump-
tions, is to estimate marginal effects that only vary over the unobservables while
ﬁxing the X-effects at mean value. This means to deviate from (5.4) by restricting
β1 = β0 = β except for the intercepts α1, α0 in (5.1) and (5.2) such that E(Y|X, p)
becomes:
E(Y|X, p) = X′β + (α1 − α0) · p+ K(p) (5.6)
Thus, we allow for different levels of potential outcomes, while we keep con-
ditioning on X. This might look like a strong restriction at ﬁrst sight but is no
more different than the predominant approach in empirical economics of trying
to identify average treatment effects where the treatment indicator is typically not
interacted with other observables. Certainly, this does not rule out that the MTE
varies by observable characteristics.
Evenwith the true population effects that are varying over X, note that the deriva-
tive of Equation (5.4) w.r.t. the propensity score is constant in X. Hence, only the
level of the MTE changes for certain subpopulations determined by X, the cur-
vature remains unaffected. Thus, estimation of Equation (5.6) delivers an MTE
that has a level which is averaged over all subpopulations without changing the
curvature. In this way all crucial elements of the MTE are preserved, since we
are interested in the average effect and its heterogeneity with respect to the unob-
servables for the whole population. How this heterogeneity is varying for certain
subpopulations is of less importance and also the literature has focused on MTEs
where the X-part is averaged out. On the other hand we gain with this approach
by considerably relaxing our identifying assumption from an unconditional to a
conditional independence of the instrument. One advantage in not estimating
heterogeneity in the observables can arise if X contains many variables that each
take many different values. In this case, problems of weak instruments can inﬂate
the results.13
In estimating (5.6), we follow Carneiro et al. (2010, 2011) again and use semi-
parametric techniques as suggested by Robinson (1988).14 Standard errors are
13On the other hand, estimating with heterogeneity in the observables can lead to an efﬁciency
gain.
14Semi-parametrically, the MTE can only be identiﬁed over the support of P. The greater the
variation in Z (conditional on X) and, thus P(Z), the larger the range over which the MTE can be
identiﬁed. This may be considered a drawback of the MTE approach, in particular, because treat-
ment parameters that have weight unequal to zero outside the support of the propensity score
are not identiﬁed using semi-parameteric techniques. This is sometimes called the “identiﬁcation
at inﬁnity” requirement (see Heckman, 1990) of the MTE. However, we argue that the MTE over
the support of P is already very informative. We use semi-parametric estimates of the MTE and
restrict the results to the empirical ATE or ATT that are identiﬁed for those individuals who are
in the sample (see Basu et al., 2007). Alternatively one might use a ﬂexible approximation of K(p)
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clustered at the district level and were generated by bootstrapping the entire pro-
cedure using 200 replications.
5.4 Data
5.4.1 Sample selection and college education
Our main data source are individual level data from the German National Edu-
cational Panel Study (NEPS), see Blossfeld et al. (2011). The NEPS data map the
educational trajectories of more than 60,000 individuals in total. The data set con-
sists of a multi-cohort sequence design and covers six age groups, called “start-
ing cohorts”: newborns and their parents, pre-school children, children in school
grades 5 and 9, college freshmen students, and adults. Within each starting cohort
the data are organized in a longitudinal manner, i.e., individuals are interviewed
repeatedly. For each starting cohort, the interviews cover extensive information
on competence development, learning environments, educational decisions, mi-
grational background, and socioeconomic outcomes.
We aim at analyzing longer term effects of college education and, therefore, re-
strict the analysis to the “adults starting cohort”. For this age group six waves are
available with interviews conducted between 2007/2008 (wave 1) and 2013 (wave
6), see LIfBi (2015). Moreover, the NEPS includes detailed retrospective informa-
tion on the educational and occupational history as well as the living conditions
at the age of 15 – about three years before individuals decide for higher educa-
tion. From the originally 17,000 respondents in the adults starting cohort, born
between 1944 and 1989, we exclude observations for four reasons: First, we fo-
cus on individuals from West Germany due to the different educational system
in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), thereby dropping 3,500 indi-
viduals living in the GDR at the age of the college decision. Second, to allow for
long term effects we make a cut-off at college attendance before 1990 and drop
2,800 individuals who graduated from secondary school in 1990 or later. Third,
we drop 1,000 individuals with missing geographic information. An attractive
(and for our analysis necessary) feature of the NEPS data is that they include in-
formation on the district (German Kreis) of residence during secondary schooling
which is used in assigning the instrument in the selection equation. The fourth
reason for losing observations is that the dependent variables are not available for
based on a polynomial of the propensity score as done by Basu et al. (2007). This amounts to es-
timating E(Y|X, p) = X′β + (α1 − α0) · p+∑kj=1 φj pj by OLS and using the estimated coefﬁcients
to calculatêMTE(x, p) = (α̂1 − α̂0) +∑kj=1 φ̂j jpj−1.
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each respondent, see below. Our ﬁnal sample includes between 2,904 and 4,813
individuals, depending on the outcome variable.
The explanatory variable “college degree” takes on the value 1 if an individual
has any higher educational degree, and 0 otherwise. Dropouts are treated as all
other individuals without college education. More than one fourth of the sample
has a college degree, while three fourths do not.
5.4.2 Dependent variables
Wages
The data set covers a wide range of individual employment information such
as monthly income and weekly hours worked. We calculate the hourly gross
wage for 2013 (wave 6) by dividing the monthly gross labor market income by the
actual weekly working hours (including extra hours) times the average number
of weeks per month, 4.3. A similar strategy is, e.g., applied by Pischke and von
Wachter (2008) to calculate hourly wages using German data.
For this outcome variable, we restrict our sample to individuals in working age
up to 65 years and drop observations with hourly wages below 5 Euros and above
the 99th quantile (77.52 Euros) as this might result from misreporting. Table 5.2
reports descriptive statistics and reveals considerably higher hourly wages for
individuals with college degree. The full distribution of wages (and the other
outcomes) for both groups is shown in Figure ?? in the Appendix. In the regres-
sion analysis we use log gross hourly wages.
Health
Two variables from the health domain are used as outcome measures: the Physi-
cal Health Component Summary Score (PCS) and the Mental Health Component
Summary Score (MCS), both from 2011/2012 (wave 4).15 These summary scores
are based on the SF12 questionnaire, which is an internationally standardized
set of 12 items regarding eight dimensions of the individual health status. The
eight dimensions comprise physical functioning, physical role functioning, bod-
ily pain, general health perceptions, vitality, social role functioning, emotional
role functioning and mental health. A scale ranging from 0 to 100 is calculated
for each of these eight dimensions. The eight dimensions or subscales are then
aggregated to the two main dimensions mental and physical health, using ex-
plorative factor analysis (Andersen et al., 2007). For our regression analysis, we
standardize the aggregated scales (MCS and PCS) to have mean 0 and standard
15The working paper version also considers health satisfaction with results very similar to PCS
(Kamho¨fer et al., 2015).
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics dependent variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gross
hourly
wage
Health measure Cognitive ability component
PCS MCS
Read. Read. Math
speed comp. liter.
Observations 3, 378 4, 813 4, 813 3, 995 4, 576 2, 904
with college degree (in %) 31.0 28.1 28.1 27.8 28.1 28.0
Raw values
Mean with degree 27.95 53.31 51.15 39.69 29.76 13.37
Mean without degree 19.35 50.39 50.53 35.99 22.75 9.36
Maximum possible value – –a 100 100 51 39 22
Transformed values
Mean with degree 3.25 0.23 0.04 0.32 0.63 0.61
Mean without degree 2.88 −0.09 −0.02 −0.12 −0.25 −0.24
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data. Gross hourly wage given in Euros. Gross hourly
wage is transformed to its log value, the other variables are transformed in units of standard deviation with mean 0
and standard deviation 1.
a The gross hourly wage is truncated below at 5 Euros and above at the highest quantile (77.52 Euros).
deviation 1, where higher values indicate better health. Columns (2) to (3) of Ta-
ble 5.2 report sample means of the health measures across individuals by college
graduation. Those with college degree have, on average, a better physical health
score. With respect to mental health, both groups differ only marginally.
Cognitive abilities
Cognitive abilities summarize the “ability to understand complex ideas, to adapt
effectively to the environment, to learn from experience, to engage in various
forms of reasoning, to overcome obstacles by taking thought” (American Psycho-
logical Association, 1995), where the sum of these abilities is referred to as intel-
ligence. Psychologists distinguish several concepts of intelligence with different
cognitive abilities. However, they all include measures of verbal comprehension,
memory and recall as well as processing speed.
Although comprehensive cognitive intelligence tests take hours, a growing num-
ber of socioeconomic surveys includes much shorter proxies that measure speciﬁc
skill components. The short ability tests are usually designed by psychologists
and the results are highly correlated with the results of more comprehensive in-
telligence tests (cf. Lang et al., 2007b, for a comparison of cognitive skill tests in
the German Socio-economic Panel with larger psychological test batteries). The
NEPS includes three kinds of competence tests which cover various domains
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of cognitive functioning: reading speed, reading competence, and mathemati-
cal competence.16 All competence tests were conducted once in 2010/2011 (wave
3) or 2012/2013 (wave 5), respectively, as paper and pencil tests under the super-
vision of a trained interviewer and the test language was German.
The ﬁrst test measures reading speed.17 The participants receive a booklet con-
sisting of 51 short true-or-false questions and the test duration is 2 minutes. Each
question has between 5 and 18 words. The participants have to answer as many
questions as possible in the given window. The test score is the number of cor-
rect answers. Since the test aims at the answering speed, the questions only deal
with general knowledge and use easy language. One question/statement, for
example, reads “There is a bath tub in every garage.” The mean number of cor-
rect answers in our estimation sample is 39.69 (out of 51) for college graduates
and 35.99 for others, see Table 5.2. For more information, see Zimmermann et al.
(2014).
The reading competence test measures understanding of texts. It lasts 28 minutes
and covers 32 items. The test consists of three different tasks. First, participants
have to answer multiple choice questions about the content of a text, where only
one out of four possible answers is right. In a decision-making task, the partici-
pants are asked whether statements are right or wrong according to the text. In
a third task, participants need to assign possible titles out of a list to sections of
the text. The test includes several types of texts, e.g., comments, instructions, and
advertising texts (LIfBi, 2011). Again, the test score reﬂects the number of correct
answers. Participants with college degree score on average 29.76 and without
22.75 (out of 39).18
Themathematical literacy test evaluates “recognizing and [...] applying [of] math-
ematics in realistic, mainly extra-mathematical situations” (LIfBi, 2011, p.8). The
test has 22 items and takes 28 minutes. It follows the principle of the OECD-PISA
tests and consists of the areas quantity, space and shape, change and relations, as
well as data and change, and measures the cognitive competencies in the areas
of application of skills, modelling, arguing, communicating, representing, as well
as problem solving; see LIfBi (2011). Individuals without college degree score on
average 9.36 (out of 22) and persons who graduated from college receive 4 points
more.
16For a general overview over test designs and applications in the NEPS, see Weinert et al.
(2011).
17The test measures the “assessment of automatized reading processes”, where a “low degree
of automation in decoding [...] will hinder the comprehension process”, i.e., understanding of
texts (Zimmermann et al., 2014, p.1). The test was newly designed for NEPS but based on the
well-established Salzburg reading screening test design principles (LIfBi, 2011).
18The total number of possible points exceeds 32 because some items were worth more than
one point.
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Due to the rather long test duration given the total interview time, not every re-
spondent had to do all three tests. Similarly to the OECD-PISA tests for high
school students, individuals were randomly assigned a booklet with either all
three or two out of the three tests. 3,995 individuals did the reading speed test,
4,576 the reading competence test, and 2,904 math. Since the tests measure dif-
ferent competencies that refer to distinct cognitive abilities, we may not combine
the different test scores into an overall score but give the results separately (see
Anderson, 2007).
5.4.3 Control variables
Individuals in our sample made their college decision between 1958 and 1990.
The NEPS allows us to consider important socioeconomic characteristics that
probably affect both the college education decision as well as the outcomes today
(variables denoted with X in Section 5.3). This is general demographic information
such gender, migrational background, and family structure, parental characteristics
like parent’s educational background. Moreover, we include two blocks of con-
trols that were determined before the educational decision was made. Pre-college
living conditions include family structure, parental job situation and household
income at the age of 15, while pre-college education includes educational achieve-
ments (number of repeated grades and secondary school graduation mark).
Table A4.1 in the Appendix provides more detailed descriptions of all variables
and reports the sample means by treatment status. Apart from higher wages,
abilities and a better physical health status (as seen in Table 5.2), individuals with
a college degree are more likely to be males from an urban district without a
migrational background. Moreover, they are more likely to have healthy parents
(in terms of mortality). Other variables seem to differ less between both groups.
We also account for cohort effects of mother and father, district ﬁxed effects as
well as district-speciﬁc time trends (see Mazumder, 2008, and Stephens and Yang,
2014, for the importance of the latter).
5.4.4 Instrument
The processes of college expansion discussed in Section 5.2.2 probably shifted in-
dividuals also with a lower desire to study into college education. Such powerful
exogenous variation is beneﬁcial for our approach as we try to identify the MTE
along the distribution of the desire to study. We assign each individual the col-
lege availability as instrument (that is, a variable in Z but not in X). In doing
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so, we use the information on the district of the secondary school graduation and
the year of the college decision, which is the year of secondary school graduation.
The district – there are 326 districts in West Germany – is either a city or a certain
rural area.
The question is how to exploit the regional variation in openings and spots most
efﬁciently as it is almost infeasible to control for all distances to all colleges simul-
taneously. Our approach to this question is to create an index that best reﬂects the
educational environment in Germany and combines the distance with the num-
ber of college spots:
Zit =
326
∑
j
K(distij)×
(
#studentsjt
#inhabitantsjt
)
. (5.7)
The college availability instrument Zit basically includes the total number of col-
lege spots (measured by the number of students) per inhabitant in district j (out
of the 326 districts in total) individual i faces in year t weighted by the distance
between i’s home district and district j. Weighting the number of students by the
population of the district takes into account that districts with the same number
of inhabitants might have colleges of a different size. This local availability is
then weighted by the Gaussian kernel distance K(distj) between the centroid of
the home district and the centroid of district j. The kernel puts a lot of weight
to close colleges and a very small weight to distant ones. Since individuals can
choose between many districts with colleges, we calculate the sum of all district-
speciﬁc college availabilities within the kernel bandwidth. Using a bandwidth
of 250km, this basically amounts to K(distj) = φ(distj/250) where φ is the stan-
dard normal pdf. While 250km sounds like a large bandwidth, this implies that
colleges in the same district receive a weight of 0.4, while the weight for colleges
that are 100km away is 0.37, but it is reduced to 0.24 for 250km. Colleges that
are 500km away only get a very low weight of 0.05. A smaller bandwidth of, say,
100km would mean that already colleges that are 250km away receive a weight
of 0.02 which implies the assumption that individuals basically do not take them
into account at all. Most likely this does not reﬂect actual behavior. As a robust-
ness check, however, we carry out all estimations with bandwidths between 100
and 250km and the results are remarkably stable, see Figure S.C1 in the Supple-
mentary Materials. Table 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics. We also provide
background information on certain descriptive measures on distance and student
density.
The instrument jointly uses college openings and increases in size. Size is mea-
sured in enrollment as there is no available information on actual college spots.
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics of instruments and background information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Instrument: College availability 0.459 0.262 0.046 1.131
Background information on college availability (implicitly included in the instrument)
Distance to nearest college 27.580 26.184 0 172.269
At least one college in district 0.130 0.337 0 1
Colleges within 100km 5.860 3.401 0 16
College spots per inhabitant within 100km 0.034 0.019 0 0.166
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data and German Statistical Yearbooks 1959–1991 (Ger-
man Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 1991). Distances are calculated as the Euclidean distance between two respective
district centroids.
This might be considered worrisome as enrollment might reﬂect demand factors
that are potentially endogenous. While we believe that this is not a major prob-
lem as most study programs in the colleges where used to capacity, we also, as
a robustness check, neglect information on enrollment and merely exploit infor-
mation on college openings by using
Zit =
326
∑
j
K(distij)×  [college avaiablejt] (5.8)
where  [·] is the indicator function. The results when using this instrument are
comparable, with minor differences, to those from the baseline speciﬁcation as
shown in Figure A4.3 in the Appendix. Certainly, the overall ﬁndings and con-
clusions are not affected by this choice. We prefer the combined instrument as
this uses information from both aspects of the educational expansion.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 OLS
Although we are primarily interested in analyzing the returns to college edu-
cation for the marginal individuals, we start with ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimations as a benchmark. Column (1) in Table 5.4, Panel A, reports results for
hourly wages, columns (2) and (3) for the two health measures, while columns (4)
to (6) do the same for the three measures of cognitive abilities. Each cell reports
the coefﬁcient of college education from a separate regression. After conditioning
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on observables, individuals with a college degree earn approximately 28 percent
higher wages, on average. While PCS is higher by around 0.3 of a standard de-
viation – recall that all outcomes but wages are standardized –, there is no signif-
icant relation with MCS. Individuals with a college degree read, on average, 0.4
SD faster than those without college education. Moreover, they approximately
have a by 0.7 SD better text understanding and mathematical literacy. All in all,
the results are pretty much in line with the differences in standardized means as
shown in Table 5.2, slightly attenuated, however, due to the inclusion of control
variables.
Table 5.4: Regression results for OLS and ﬁrst stage estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gross
hourly
wage
Health measure Cognitive ability component
PCS MCS
Read. Read. Math
speed comp. liter.
Panel A: OLS results
College degree 0.277∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.003 0.398∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.033) (0.036) (0.037) (0.032) (0.044)
Panel B: 2SLS ﬁrst-stage results
College availability 2.368∗∗∗ 2.576∗∗∗ 2.576∗∗∗ 2.521∗∗∗ 2.327∗∗∗ 2.454∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.122) (0.122) (0.132) (0.119) (0.159)
Observations 3,378 4,813 4,813 3,995 4,576 2,904
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data. Regressions also include a full set of control vari-
ables as well as year-of-birth and district ﬁxed effects, and district-speciﬁc linear trends. District clustered standard
errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Panel B of Table 5.4 reports the ﬁrst stage results of the 2SLS estimations. The co-
efﬁcients of the instrument point into the expected direction and are individually
signiﬁcant. As to be expected, they barely change across the outcome variables
(as the ﬁrst-stage speciﬁcations only differ in the number of observations across
the columns).
In order to get a feeling for the effect size of college availability in the ﬁrst-stage,
we consider, as an example, the college opening in the city of Essen in 1972. In
1978, about 11,000 students studied there. To illustrate the effect of the opening,
we assume a constant population size of 700,000 inhabitants. The kernel weight
of new spots in the same district is 0.4 (= K(0)). According to Equation (5.7), the
instrument value increases by 0.006 (rounded). Given the coefﬁcient of college
availability of 2.4, an individual who made the college decision in Essen in 1978
had a 1.44 percentage points higher probability to go to college due to the opening
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of the college in Essen (compared to an individual who made the college decision
in 1971). This seems to be a plausible effect. The effect of the college opening in
Essen on individuals who live in districts other than Essen is smaller, depending
on the distance to Essen.
5.5.2 Marginal treatment effects
Figure 5.3a shows the distribution of the propensity scores used in estimating the
MTE by treatment and control group. They are obtained by logit regressions of
the college degree on all Z and X variables. Full regression results of the ﬁrst and
the second stage of the 2SLS estimations are reported in the Supplementary Ma-
terials. For both groups, the propensity score varies from 0 to about 1. Moreover,
there is a common support of the propensity score almost on the unit interval.
Variation in the propensity score where the effects of the X variables are inte-
grated out is used to identify local effects.
This variation is presented in Figure 5.3b. It shows the conditional support of P
when the inﬂuence of the linear X-index of observables on the propensity score
is integrated out (
∫
fP(Z,X)dX). Here, the support ranges nearly from 0 to 0.8 only
caused by variation in the instrument – the identifying variation. This is impor-
tant in the semiparametric estimation since it shows the regions in which we can
credibly identify (conditional on our assumptions) marginal effects without hav-
ing to rely on inter- or extrapolations to regions where we do not have identifying
variation.
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of propensity scores
Notes: Own illustration based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data. The left panel shows the propensity score (PS) density by
treatment status. The right panel illustrates the joint PS density (dashed line). The solid line shows the PS variation solely
caused by variation in Z, since the X-effects have been integrated out. Further note that in the right panel the densities
were both normalized such that they sum up to one over the 250 points where we evaluate the density.
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We calculate the MTE using a local linear regression with a bandwidth that ranges
from 0.10 to 0.16 depending on the outcome variable.19 We calculate the marginal
effects along the quantiles UD by evaluating the derivative of the treatment effect
with respect to the propensity score (see Equation (5.6) in Section 5.3).
Figure 5.4 shows the MTE for all outcome variables. The upper left panel presents
the MTE for wages. We ﬁnd that individuals with low values of UD have the
highest monetary returns to college education. Low values of UD mean that these
are the individuals who are very likely to study as already small values of P(z)
exceed UD, see the transformed choice equation in Section 5.3. The returns are
close to 80 percent for the smallest values of UD and then approach 0 at UD ≈
0.7. Thus, we tend to interpret these ﬁndings as clear and strong positive returns
for the 70 percent of individuals with the highest desire to study, while there
is no clear evidence for any returns for the remaining 30 percent. Hence, there
is obviously selection into gains with respect to wages, where individuals with
higher (realized) returns self-select into more education. This reﬂects the notion
that individuals make choices based on their expected gains.
The curve of marginal treatment effects resembles the one found by Carneiro et al.
(2011) for the US with the main difference that we do not ﬁnd negative effects
(but just zero) for a part of the distribution. The effect sizes are also comparable
although ours are somewhat smaller. For instance, Carneiro et al. (2011) ﬁnd
highest returns of 28 percent per year of college, while we ﬁnd 80 percent for the
college degree which, on average, takes 4.5 years to be earned.
What could explain these wage returns? Two potential channels of higher earn-
ings could be better cognitive skills and/or better health due to increased edu-
cation. The ﬁndings on skills and health that we discuss in the following could,
thus, be read as investigations into mechanisms for the positive wage returns.
However, at least for health, this would only be one potential interpretation as
health might also be directly affected by income.
The right column of Figure 5.4 plots the results for cognitive skills. The distri-
bution of marginal treatment effects is remarkably similar to the one for wages.
We see that, also in terms of cognitive skills, not everybody beneﬁts from more
education. Some individuals, again those with high desire to study, strongly ben-
eﬁt, while the effects approach zero for individuals with UD > 0.6. This holds for
reading speed, reading competence, as well as mathematical literacy. The largest
returns are as high as 2 to 3 standard deviations, again, for the small group with
19We assess the optimal bandwidth in the local linear regression using Stata’s lpoly rule of
thumb. Our results are also robust to the inclusion of higher order polynomials in the local (poly-
nomial) regression. The optimal, exact bandwidths are: wage 0.10, PCS 0.13, MCS 0.16, reading
competence 0.10, for reading speed 0.11, math score 0.12.
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Figure 5.4: Marginal Treatment Effects for cognitive abilities and health
Notes: Own illustration based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data. For gross hourly wage, the log value is taken. Health and
cognitive skill outcomes are standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The MTE (vertical axis) is measured in
logs for wage and in units of standard deviations of the health and cognitive skill outcomes. The dashed lines give the 95
percent conﬁdence intervals based on clustered bootstrapped standard errors with 200 replications. Calculations based
on a local linear regression where the inﬂuence of the control variables was isolated using a semiparametric Robinson
estimator (Robinson, 1988) for each outcome variable. The optimal, exact bandwidths for the local linear regressions are:
for wage 0.10, PCS 0.13, MCS 0.16, reading competence 0.10, for reading speed 0.11, math score 0.12.
highest college readiness only. Thus, we observe the same selection into gains as
with wages and the ﬁndings could be interpreted as returns to cognitive abilities
from education being a potential pathway for positive earnings returns.
174
The ﬁndings are somewhat different for health, as seen in the lower left part of
Figure 5.4. First of all, the returns are much more homogeneous then those for
wages and skills. While there is still some heterogeneity in returns to physical
health (though to a smaller degree than before) returns are completely homoge-
neous for mental health. Moreover, the returns are zero throughout for mental
health. Physical health effects are positive (although not always statistically sig-
niﬁcant) for around 75 percent of the individuals while they are close zero for the
25 percent with the lowest desire to study.
The main ﬁndings of this paper can be summarized as follows:
- Education leads to higher wages and cognitive abilities for the same approx.
60 percent of individuals. This can also be read as suggestive evidence for
cognitive abilities being a channel for the effect of education on wages.
- Education does not pay off for everybody. However, in no case are the
effects negative. Thus, education does never harm in terms of gross wages,
skills and health. (Obviously, this view only considers potential beneﬁts
and disregards costs - thus, net beneﬁts might well be negative for some
individuals.)
- There are clear signs of selection into gains. Those individuals who realize
the highest returns to education are those who are most ready to take it.
With policy initiatives such as the “Higher Education Pact 2020” Germany con-
tinuously increases participation in higher education in order to meet OECD
standards (see OECD, 2015b,a). Our results imply that this might not pay off,
at least in terms of productivity (measured by wages), cognitive abilities, and
health. Without fully simulating the results of further increased numbers of stu-
dents in Germany, it is save to assume that additional students would be those
with higher values of UD as those with the high desire to study are in large parts
already enrolled. But these additional students are the ones that do not seem to
beneﬁt from college education. However, this projection needs to be taken with
a grain of salt as our ﬁndings are based on education in the 1960s to 1980s and
current education might yield different effects.
We carry out two kinds of robustness checks with respect to the deﬁnition of the
instrument (see Section 5.4.4). Figure A4.3 in the Appendix reports the ﬁndings
when the instrument deﬁnition does not consider the increases in college size.
The MTE curves do not exactly stay the same as before but the main conclusions
are unchanged. Wage returns are slightly more homogeneous. The results for
reading competence and mathematical literacy are virtually the same while for
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reading speed homogeneously positive effects are found. However, the conﬁ-
dence bands of the curves for both deﬁnitions of the instrument widely over-
lap. This also holds for the health measures. The MTE curve for MCS is slightly
shifted upwards and the one for PCS is more homogeneous but the difference in
the curves across both kinds of instruments are not signiﬁcant. While the likeli-
hood that two valid instruments exactly deliver the same results is fairly low in
any application (and basically zero when so many points are evaluated as is the
case here), the broad picture that leads to the conclusions above is invariant to
the change in the instrument deﬁnition.
In the SupplementaryMaterials C, we report the results of robustness checkwhere
we use different kernel bandwidths to weight the college distance (bandwidths
between 100km and 250km). Here the differences are indeed widely absent. Al-
though the condensation of college availability in Equation (5.7) seems somewhat
arbitrary, these robustness checks show that the speciﬁcation of the instrument
does not affect our conclusions.
5.5.3 Treatment parameters
Table 5.5 reports the conventional treatment parameters estimated using the MTE
and the respective weights as described above and more formally derived and
explained in, for example, Heckman et al. (2006). In particular, we calculate the
average treatment effect (ATE), the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT),
the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) and the local average treat-
ment effect (LATE). The estimated weights applied to the returns for each UD on
the MTE curve are shown in Figure 5.5. Whereas the local average treatment ef-
fect is an average effect weighted by the conditional density of the instrument, the
ATT (vice versa for the ATU) for example gives more weight to those individuals
that select already into higher education at low UD values (indicating low intrin-
sic reluctance for higher education). The reason is that their likelihood of being
in any ‘treatment group’ is higher compared to individuals with higher values of
UD. The ATE places equal weight over the whole support.
In all cases but mental health and reading speed, the LATE parameters in col-
umn (4) approximately double compared to the OLS estimates. Increasing local
average treatment effects (compared to OLS) seem to be counterintuitive as one
often expects OLS to overestimate the true effects. Yet, this is not an uncommon
ﬁnding and in a world with heterogeneous effects often explained by the group
of compliers that potentially has higher individual treatment effects than the av-
erage individual (Card, 2001). This is directly obvious by comparing the LATE
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Table 5.5: Estimated treatment parameters for main results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment parameter
ATE ATT ATU LATE
Main outcomes:
Log gross wage 0.43 0.59 0.36 0.49
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
PCS 0.45 0.86 0.29 0.55
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.09)
MCS 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.05
(0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.08)
Reading competence 1.10 1.88 0.78 1.18
(0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.08)
Reading speed 0.72 1.17 0.54 0.70
(0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.11)
Mathematical literacy 1.11 1.56 0.93 1.13
(0.17) (0.21) (0.19) (0.14)
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data. The MTE is estimated with a semiparametric
Robinson estimator. The LATE is estimated using the IV weights depicted in Figure 5.5. Therefore, the LATE in this
table deviates slightly from corresponding 2SLS estimates. Standard error estimated using a clustered bootstrap (at
district level) with 200 replications.
to column (1) which is another indication of selection into gains. Regarding the
other treatment parameters, the LATE lies within the range of the ATT and the
ATU.
Note that these are the “empirical”, conditional-on-the-sample parameters as cal-
culated in Basu et al. (2007), that is, the treatment parameters conditional on the
common support of the propensity score. The population ATE, however, would
require full support on the unity interval.20 As depicted in Figure 5.3, we do not
have full support in the data at hand. Although we observe individuals with and
without college degree for most probabilities to study, we cannot observe an in-
dividual with a probability arbitrarily close to 100 percent without college degree
(and arbitrarily close to 0 percent with a degree). Instead, the parameters in Table
5.5 were computed using the marginal treatment effects on the common support
only. However, as this reaches from 0.002 to 0.969 it seems fair to say that this
probably comes very close to the true parameters.
20The ATT would require for every college graduate in the population a non-graduate with
the same propensity score (including 0 percent). For the ATU one would need the opposite: a
graduate for every non-graduate with the same Propensity Score including 100 percent.
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Figure 5.5: Treatment parameter weights conditional on the propensity score
Notes: Own illustration based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data. Weights were calculated using the entire sample of 8,672
observations for that we have instrument and control variable information in spite of availability of the outcome variable.
Table 5.5 is informative in particular for two reasons. First, it boils down the
MTE to single numbers such that the average effect size immediately becomes
clear. And, second, differences between the parameters again emphasize the role
of effect heterogeneity. Together with the bootstrapped standard errors the table
reveals that the ATT and the ATU structurally differ from each other for all out-
comes but mental health. Hence, the treatment group of college graduates seems
to beneﬁt from higher education in terms of wages, skills, and physical health
compared to the non-graduates. One reason is that they might choose to study
because of their idiosyncratic skill returns. Yet, it is also likely to be windfall gains
that go along with monetary college premiums that the decision was more likely
to be based on. Nonetheless, this also is evidence for selection into gains.
The effect sizes for all (ATE), for the university degree subgroup (ATT), and for
those without higher education (ATU) in Table 5.5 capture the overall returns
to college education, not the per-year effects. On average, the per-year effect is
approximately the overall effect divided by 4.5 years (the regular time it takes to
receive a Diplom degree), if we assume linear additivity of the yearly effects. The
per-year effects for mathematical literacy and reading competence are about 25
percent of a standard deviation for all parameters. For reading speed the effects
are around 15 percent of an SD, while the wage effects are around 10 percent.
These effects are of considerable size, yet slightly smaller than those found in the
previous literature on different treatments and, importantly, different compliers.
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For instance, ability returns to an additional year of compulsory schooling were
found to be up to 0.5 SD (see, e.g., Banks and Mazzonna, 2012).
To get an idea of the total effect of college education on, say, math skills, the
following example might help. If you start at the median of the standardized
unconditional math score distribution (Φ(0) = 50) percent, the average effect of
1.11 of a standard deviation, all other things the same, will make you end up at
the 87 percent quantile of that distribution (Φ(0 + 1.11) = 87) percent – in the
thought experiment of being the only treated in the peer group.
As suggested by the pattern of the marginal treatment effects in Figure 5.4, the
health returns to higher education are smaller than the skill returns, still they are
around 10 percent of an SD per year (except for the zero effect on mental health).
Given the previous literature, the results seem reasonable.
Regarding statistical signiﬁcance of the effects, note that we use several outcome
variables and potentially run into multiple testing problems. Yet, we refrain from
taking this into account by a complex algorithm that also accounts for the correla-
tion of the six outcome variables and argue the following way: All ATEs and ATTs
are highly statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, our multiple testing procedure with six
outcomes should not be a major issue. Even with a most conservative Bonferroni
correction, critical values for statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level would
increase from 1.96 to 2.65 and would not change any conclusions regarding sig-
niﬁcance.21
5.6 Potentialmechanisms for health and cognitive abil-
ities
In this section, we investigate the role of potential mechanisms through which
college education may work. It is likely to affect the observed level of health
and cognitive abilities through the attained stock of health capital and the cogni-
tive reserve – the mind’s ability to tolerate brain damage (Stern, 2012; Meng and
D’Arcy, 2012).
There are probably three channels throughwhich education affects long-run health
and cognitive abilities:
- in college: a direct effect from education;
21Also taking into account the outcomes from Section 6 and assuming that we test 18 times
would increase the critical value to 2.98 in the (overly conservative) Bonferroni-correction.
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- post-college: a diminished age-related decline in health and skills due to the
higher health capital/cognitive reserve attained in college (e.g., the “cogni-
tive reserve hypothesis”, Stern et al., 1999);
- post-college: different health behavior or different jobs that are less detri-
mental to health and more cognitively demanding (Stern, 2012).
The post-college mechanisms that compensate for the decline also contain im-
plicit multiplying factors like complementarities and self-productivity, see Cunha
et al. (2006) and Cunha and Heckman (2007). The NEPS data include various
job characteristics and health behaviors that potentially reduce the age-related
skill/health decline. However, the data neither allow us to disentangle these
components empirically (i.e., observing changes in one channel that are exoge-
nous from other channels) nor to analyze how the effect on themechanism causally
maps into higher skills or better health (as for example in Heckman et al., 2013).
Thus, it should be noted that this sub-analysis is merely suggestive and by no
means a comprehensive analysis on the mechanisms of the effects found in the
previous section. Moreover, the following analysis focusses on the potential chan-
nel of different jobs and health behavior. It does the same as before (same con-
trols, same estimation strategy and instrument) but replaces the outcome vari-
ables by the indicators of potential mechanisms.
Cognitive abilities
The main driving force behind skill formation after college might lie in activities
on the job. When individuals with college education engage in more cognitively
demanding activities, e.g., more sophisticated jobs, this might mentally exercise
their minds (Rohwedder and Willis, 2010). This effect of mental training is some-
times referred to as use-it-or-lose-it hypothesis, see Rohwedder and Willis (2010)
or Salthouse (2006). If such an exercise effect leads to alternating brain networks
that “may compensate for the pathological disruption of preexisting networks”
(Meng and D’Arcy, 2012, p.2), a higher demand for cognitively demanding tasks
(as a result of college education) increases the individual’s cognitive capacity.
In order to investigate if a more cognitively demanding job might be a potential
mechanism (as, e.g., suggested by Fisher et al., 2014), we use information on the
individual’s activities on the job. All four outcome variables considered in this
subsection are binary, their deﬁnitions, sample means effects of college education
are given in Table 5.6. For the sake of brevity we focus on the most relevant
treatment parameters here and do not discuss the MTE curvatures.
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College education has strong effects on all four outcomes. It increases the likeli-
hood to be in a job that requires calculating with percentages and fractions, that
involves reading or writing and in which individuals often learn new things. The
effect sizes are very large which is not too surprising as many of the jobs that en-
tail these mentally demanding tasks require a college diploma as a quasi-formal
condition of employment.
Table 5.6: Potential mechanisms for cognitive skills
Deﬁnition
Sample Parameter
mean ATE ATT ATU
Math: percentages =1 if job requires calculat-
ing with percentages and
fractions
0.711 0.20 0.23 0.19
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Reading =1 if respondent often
spends more than 2 hours
reading
0.777 0.23 0.30 0.30
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Writing =1 if respondent often
writes more than 1 page
0.704 0.39 0.64 0.29
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
Learning new things =1 if respondent reports to
learn new things
0.671 0.22 0.31 0.18
often (0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data. Deﬁnitions are taken from the data manual. Standard
error estimated using a clustered bootstrap (district level) and reported in parentheses.
Moreover, as observed before, there seems to be effect heterogeneity here as well
and selection into gains as all average treatment effects on the treated are larger
than the treatment effects on the untreated (except for the case of reading more
than two hours). The differences are particularly strong for writing and for learn-
ing new things. All in all, the ﬁndings suggest that cognitively more demanding
jobs due to college education might play a role in explaining long-run cognitive
returns to education. Note again, however, that these ﬁndings are only sugges-
tive evidence for a causal mechanism. It might as well be that it is the other way
around and the cognitive abilities attained in college induce a selection into these
job types.
Health
Concerning the health mechanisms, we study job-related effects and effects on
health behavior. The NEPS data cover engagement in several physical activities
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on the job, e.g.,: working in a standing position, working in an uncomfortable po-
sition (like bending often), walking or cycling long distances, or carrying heavy
loads. Table 5.7 reports deﬁnitions, sample means and effects. The binary indi-
cators are coded as 1 if the respondent reports to engage in the activity (and 0
otherwise) in the upper panel of the table.
We ﬁnd that college education reduces the probability of engaging in all four
physically demanding activities. Again, the estimated effects are very large in
size, implying that it is the college diploma that qualiﬁes for a white-collar ofﬁce-
job position. These effects might explain why we ﬁnd physical health effects of
education and are in line with the absence of mental health effects. White-collar
jobs are usually less demanding with respect to physical health but not at all less
stressful.
Besides physical activities on the job, health behaviors may be considered as an
important dimension of the general formation of health over the life-cycle, see
Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010). To analyze this, we resort to the following vari-
ables in our data set: a binary indicator for obesity (body mass index exceeds
30) as a compound lifestyle measure and more direct behavioral variables like an
indicator for smoking, the amount of alcohol consumption (1 if at least three or
more drinks when consuming alcohol), as well as physical activity measured by
an indicator of having taken any sport exercise in the previous 3 months. The
lower panel in Table 5.7 reports the sample means and treatment effects.
College education leads to a decrease in the probability of being obese, but in-
creases the probability of smoking. This is in line with LATE estimates of the
effect of college education in the US of Grimard and Parent (2007) and de Walque
(2007). College education also seems to negatively affect alcohol consumption
and increases the likelihood to engage in sport exercise. Again, the effect sizes
are large, if not as large compared to the other potential mechanisms. Moreover,
some of them are only marginally statistically signiﬁcant. Taken together, college
education affects potential health mechanisms in the expected direction. Again,
there is effect heterogeneity, observable in different treatment parameters for the
same outcome variables. Since health is a high dimensional measure, the poten-
tial mechanisms at hand are of course not able to explain the health returns to
college education entirely. Nevertheless, the ﬁndings encourage us in our inter-
pretation of the effects of college education on physical health.
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Table 5.7: Potential mechanisms for health
Deﬁnition
Sample Parameter
mean ATE ATT ATU
Physically demanding activities on the job
Standing position =1 if often working in a
standing position for 2 or
more hours
0.302 -0.37 -0.56 -0.30
(0.07) (0.09) 0.08)
Uncomfortable pos. =1 if respondent needs to
bend, crawl, lie down,
keen or squat
0.190 -0.20 -0.37 -0.13
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Walking =1 if job often requires
walking, running or cy-
cling
0.242 -0.39 -0.56 -0.32
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Carrying =1 if often carrying a load
of at least 10 kg
0.182 -0.40 -0.50 -0.37
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Health behaviors
Obesity =1 if Body Mass Index
(=weight in kg/height in
m2) > 30
0.155 -0.08 -0.15 -0.05
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Smoking =1 if currently smoking 0.270 -0.18 -0.23 -0.16
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Alcohol amount =1 if three or more drinks
when consuming alcohol
0.187 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Sport =1 if any sporting exercise
in the previous 3 months
0.717 0.16 0.31 0.10
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data. Deﬁnitions are taken from the data manual. Standard
error estimated using a clustered bootstrap (at district level) and reported in parentheses.
5.7 Conclusion
This paper uses the Marginal Treatment Effect framework introduced and ad-
vanced by Bjo¨rklund and Mofﬁtt (1987) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005, 2007)
to estimate returns to college education under essential heterogeneity. We use
representative data from the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS).
Our outcome measures are wages, cognitive abilities, and health. Cognitive abil-
ities are assessed using state-of-the-art cognitive competence tests on individual
reading speed, text understanding, and mathematical literacy. As expected, all
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outcome variables are positively correlated with having a college degree in our
data set. Using an instrument that exploit exogenous variation in the supply of
colleges, we estimate marginal returns to college education.
The main ﬁndings of this paper are as follows: College education improves aver-
age wages, cognitive abilities and physical health (but not mental health). There
is heterogeneity in the effects and clear signs of selection into gains. Those in-
dividuals who realize the highest returns to education are those who are most
ready to take it. Moreover, education does not pay off for everybody. While it is
never harmful, we ﬁnd zero causal effects for around 30–40 percent of the popu-
lation. Thus, while college education is beneﬁcial on average, further increasing
the number of students – as sometimes called for – is less likely to pay off, as the
current marginal students are those who are mostly in the range of zero causal
effects. Potential mechanisms of skill returns are more demanding jobs that slow
down the cognitive decline in later ages. Regarding health we ﬁnd positive ef-
fects of higher education on BMI, non-smoking, sports participation and alcohol
consumption.
All in all, given that the average individual clearly seems to beneﬁt from educa-
tion and provided that the continuing technological progress has skills become
more and more valuable, education should still be an answer to the technological
change for the average individual.
One limitation of this paper is that we are not able to stratify the analysis by study
subject. This is left for future work.
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Appendix
Figures
1958 1970
1980 1990
Figure A4.1: Spatial variation of colleges across districts and over time
Notes: Own illustration based on the German Statistical Yearbooks 1959–1991 (German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 1991).
The maps show all 326 West German districts (Kreise, spatial units of 2009) but Berlin in the years 1958 (ﬁrst year in the
sample), 1970, 1980, and 1990 (last year in the sample). Districts usually cover a bigger city or some administratively
connected villages. If a district has at least one college, the district is depicted darker. Only few districts have more
than one college. For those districts the number of students is added up in the calculations but multiple colleges are not
depicted separately in the maps.
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Figure A4.2: Distribution of dependent variables by college graduation
Notes: Own illustration based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data.
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Figure A4.3: Sensitivity in Marginal Treatment Effects when using only the sum
of the kernel weighted college distances
Notes: Own illustration based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data. For gross hourly wage, the log value is taken. Health and
cognitive skill outcomes are standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The MTE (vertical axis) is measured in
logs for wage and in units of standard deviations of the health and cognitive skill outcomes. The dashed lines give the
95% conﬁdence intervals. Calculations based on a local linear regression where the inﬂuence of the control variables was
isolated using a semiparametric Robinson estimator (Robinson, 1988) for each outcome variable.
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Tables
Table A4.1: Control variables and means by college degree
Variable Deﬁnition Respondents
with w/o
college college
degree degree
General information
Female =1 if respondent is female 40.38 54.18
Year of birth (FE) Year of birth of the respondent 1959 1959
Migrational background =1 if respondent was born abroad 0.89 0.64
No native speaker =1 if mother tongue is not German 0.30 0.43
Rural district =1 if current district is rural 16.79 24.96
Mother still alive =1 if mother is still alive in 2009/10 65.38 63.83
Father still alive =1 if father is still alive in 2009/10 45.27 42.3
Pre-college living conditions
Married before college =1 if respondent got married before the year
of the college decision or in the same year
0.20 0.44
Parent before college =1 if respondent became a parent before the
year of the college decision or in the same
year
0.30 0.17
Siblings Number of siblings 1.56 1.87
First born =1 if respondent was the ﬁrst born in the
family
33.73 29.01
Age 15: lived by single par-
ent
=1 if respondent was raised by single parent 5.33 5.32
Age 15: lived in patchwork
family
=1 if respondent was raised in a patchwork
family
1.11 0.27
Age 15: orphan =1 if respondent was a orphan at the age of
15
0.10 0.20
Age 15: mother employed =1 if mother was employed at the respon-
dent’s age of 15
45.93 46.87
Age 15: mother never un-
employed
=1 if mother was never unemployed until
the respondent’s age of 15
61.24 62.29
Age 15: father employed =1 if father was employed at the respon-
dent’s age of 15
92.46 90.73
Age 15: father never unem-
ployed
=1 if father was never unemployed until the
respondent’s age of 15
98.45 97.14
Pre-college education
Final school grade: excel-
lence
=1 if the overall grade of the highest school
degree was excellent
4.59 1.79
Final school grade: good =1 if the overall grade of the highest school
degree was good
31.51 25.83
Continued on next page
188
Table A4.1 – continued
Variable Deﬁnition Respondents
with w/o
college college
degree degree
Final school grade: satisfac-
tory
=1 if the overall grade of the highest school
degree was satisfactory
17.97 28.03
Final school grade: sufﬁ-
cient or worse
=1 if the overall grade of the highest school
degree was sufﬁcient or worse
1.04 1.42
Repeated one grade =1 if student needed to repeat one grade in
elementary or secondary school
19.97 20.51
Repeated two or more
grades
=1 if student needed to repeat two or more
grades in elementary or secondary school
2.74 1.85
Military service =1 if respondent was drafted for compul-
sory military service
28.03 23.89
Parental characteristics (M: mother, F: father)
M: year of birth (FE) Year of birth of the respondent’s mother 1930 1932
M: migrational background =1 if mother was born abroad 5.47 4.85
M: at least inter. edu =1 if mother has at least an intermediate sec-
ondary school degree
17.97 5.95
M: vocational training =1 if mother’s highest degree is vocational
training
20.86 16.18
M: further job qualiﬁcation =1 if mother has further job qualiﬁcation
(e.g., Meister degree)
4.29 1.73
F: year of birth (FE) Year of birth of the respondent’s father 1927 1929
F: migrational background =1 if father was born abroad 6.36 5.54
F: at least inter. edu =1 if father has at least an intermediate sec-
ondary school degree
20.86 8.09
F: vocational training =1 if father’s highest degree is vocational
training
19.12 21.99
F: further job qualiﬁcation =1 if father has further job qualiﬁcation (e.g.,
Meister degree)
11.46 6.76
Number of observations (PCS and MCS sample) 1,352 3,461
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data. Deﬁnitions are taken from the data manual. Mean values
refer to the MCS and PCS sample. FE = variable values are included as ﬁxed effects in the analysis.
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Online Appendix
Additional information on the instrument
In the years immediately after WWII, neither political decision makers nor society
as a whole were concerned with higher educational affairs (Bartz, 2007). Weisser
(2005) argues that colleges have been enganged in reconstructing their facilities
(and curricula) as the rest of the country but almost unnoticed by society. This
changed at the beginning of the 1960s when politicians of all parties started to
doubt that the existing colleges were able cope with newly arising challenges of
an increasing demand for higher education. This increased demand was partly
driven by catch-up effect for large parts of the population. The number of stu-
dents in higher education in Germany decreased by 50% between 1928 and 1938
and at the beginning of the 1960s and educational participation in Germany was
much lower than in other industrialized countries (Picht, 1964). For other factors
that increased the pressure to political decision makers to be involved in higher
educational policies, consult the paper.
Various policy measures at the national level and in the 11 West German fed-
eral states have been taken in order to address these challenges and ﬁnally led
to expansion of higher education. After WWII, the existing colleges adopted
their former regulations from the time before the Third Reich. Because the Ger-
man Empire consisted of dozens of microstates each college had basically its own
rules (Bartz, 2007). To unify the regulations each of the federal state and the fed-
eral government passed so-called higher education acts (Hochschulrahmengesetze)
that allow them to intervene in university politics between 1966 and 1967. At
the same time, the states and the federal government also established the Ger-
man Council of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat), an advisory board for
higher educational policies (Bartz, 2007). In its landmark report in 1960, the coun-
cil suggested to increase the number of professors and lectures at the existing col-
leges by 40% (Wissenschaftsrat, 1960). In follow-up reports, it also proposed to
increase facilities of the existing colleges and to build new colleges (Wissenschaft-
srat, 1966, 1970). While the suggestions of the council have been rather broad and
not binding for the state’s governments, the states developed their own strate-
gies to cope with the expected increase in the number of students. Examples are
the (not entirely realized) Dahrendorf-Plan in the state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
and the introduction of Gesamthochschulen (a combination of colleges and univer-
sities of applied science) in North Rhine-Westphalia and some other states, see
Bartz (2007). The reform process went along with a public debate on higher ed-
ucation among academics and in the media (see, e.g., the newspaper articles in
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Der Spiegel, 1967, and Die Zeit, 1967). Moreover, the discussion was spurred
by the publication of the inﬂuential books “Education as Civil Right” (Bildung
als Bu¨rgerrecht, Dahrendorf, 1965) and “The German Educational Disaster” (Die
deutsche Bildungskatastrophe, Picht, 1964).
In order to learn more about the timing and the placement of the college construc-
tion within the states, we searched for records on the decision making process in
the most-populated state of North Rhine-Westphalia.22 While the Council of Sci-
ence and Humanities suggested to link college openings to the expected increase
in the population (NRW, 1971a), we ﬁnd evidence that the state’s authorities also
took criteria into account that were independent of the expected demand. In a re-
port on the founding of ﬁve new Gesamthochschule institutions, the Minister of Ed-
ucation and Research of North Rhine-Westphalia described the aim of the place-
ment decision as “improving the equality of educational opportunities for all po-
tential students by providing a sufﬁcient number of open spots” (NRW, 1971b,
section 3.1, own translation). The minister explicitly argued that the opening of
colleges in regions that had no college before would increase the participation in
(secondary and higher) education in those regions – the new colleges would serve
as “advertisement for education” (Bildungswerbung, NRW, 1971c, section II.2.11).
This reasoning is somewhat remarkable given that decision makers expected a
higher demand for college education in cities that already had a college (NRW,
1971c). Another piece of evidence is provided by a review of the history of the
University of Bochum by Weisser (2005). Originally, decision makers intended to
open the new college in the city of Dortmund; however, the construction site in
Dortmund was found to be not sufﬁcient. Thus, they decided to construct the col-
lege in the close-by city of Bochum. The decision to open a college in Dortmund
was made a couple of years later “in the run-up to the state’s parliament elec-
tions” (Weisser, 2005, own translation). We do not depict the decision marking
processes for all college openings in West-Germany, although we found evidence
that the processes went often similarly.
In our interpretation of the evidence, the decentralized decision making processes
between the federal states and within the states introduced variation in the higher
educational expansion that is likely to be independent from a demand for higher
education (that might be the result of low cognitive abilities or a worse health).
22For North Rhine-Westphalia, records (in German language) of parliament hearings and de-
bates are available online, see the references for links.
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Additional Tables and Figures
Table O4.1: Full results for logit estimation of the selection equation (mean
marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample for
Gross
hourly
wage
Health measure Cognitive ability component
PCS MCS
Read. Read. Math
speed comp. liter.
College availability 3.133∗∗∗ 3.527∗∗∗ 3.527∗∗∗ 3.711∗∗∗ 3.050∗∗∗ 3.815∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.233) (0.233) (0.206) (0.188) (0.286)
Female −0.079∗ −0.046 −0.046 0.012 −0.056 0.011
(0.045) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.038) (0.045)
Rural district −0.050∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗
(0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.025)
Migrational background −0.146 0.064 0.064 −0.004 −0.051 0.116
(0.116) (0.086) (0.086) (0.074) (0.065) (0.094)
No native speaker −0.347∗∗ −0.084 −0.084 −0.051 0.049 −0.046
(0.139) (0.153) (0.153) (0.104) (0.103) (0.123)
Military service −0.101∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.030)
First born 0.080∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018)
Age 15: lived by single
parent
−0.041 −0.010 −0.010 −0.008 −0.050 −0.009
(0.036) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.040)
Age 15: lived in patch-
work family
−0.155∗∗∗ −0.136∗∗∗ −0.136∗∗∗ −0.091∗ −0.037 −0.127∗
(0.059) (0.045) (0.045) (0.050) (0.042) (0.074)
Age 15: orphan −0.089 −0.051 −0.051 −0.082 −0.206∗∗∗ −0.103
(0.078) (0.059) (0.059) (0.067) (0.068) (0.072)
Number of siblings −0.027∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Married before college 0.277∗∗ 0.180∗ 0.180∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.256∗∗
(0.122) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.085) (0.112)
Parent before college −0.044∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.039∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.036∗
(0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019)
Mother: migrational
background
0.055 0.054∗ 0.054∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.042 0.015
(0.039) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.036)
Mother: at least inter.
edu
0.164∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.020) (0.035)
Continued on next page
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Table O4.1 – continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mother: college degree 0.081 0.098∗ 0.098∗ 0.072 0.097∗∗ 0.125
(0.061) (0.055) (0.055) (0.061) (0.049) (0.080)
Mother: vocational
training
0.005 0.053∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.042∗ 0.009 0.041
(0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.028)
Mother: further job
qualiﬁcation
−0.080∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.028 0.059
(0.046) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.032) (0.051)
Mother: still alive 0.027 0.026∗ 0.026∗ 0.027∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.021)
Age 15: mother unem-
ployed
−0.015 0.010 0.010 0.022 −0.004 0.020
(0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.024)
Age 15: mother never
employed
0.012 −0.008 −0.008 −0.009 0.008 −0.008
(0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.024)
Father has migrational
background
0.044 0.004 0.004 0.027 0.023 0.038
(0.032) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.037)
Father: at least inter.
edu
0.090∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗
(0.030) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.021) (0.036)
Father: college degree 0.208∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.034) (0.056)
Father: vocational train-
ing
0.071∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.054∗ 0.032 0.042
(0.040) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.024) (0.039)
Father: further job qual-
iﬁcation
0.200∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.027) (0.045)
Father: still alive 0.066∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020)
Age 15: father unem-
ployed
0.005 0.001 0.001 0.021 0.019 0.025
(0.043) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.039)
Age 15: father never em-
ployed
0.102 0.098∗ 0.098∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.110∗ 0.085
(0.090) (0.055) (0.055) (0.063) (0.061) (0.074)
Final school grade: ex-
cellent
0.468∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.064) (0.064) (0.068) (0.057) (0.080)
Final school grade: good 0.301∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.059) (0.041) (0.070)
Continued on next page
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Table O4.1 – continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Final school grade: satis-
factory
0.185∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.062) (0.042) (0.072)
Final school grade: suf-
ﬁcient or worse
0.163∗∗ 0.181∗∗ 0.181∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗
(0.082) (0.075) (0.075) (0.083) (0.086) (0.096)
Grade repetition: 1
grade
−0.034∗∗ −0.007 −0.007 −0.012 −0.027∗ −0.003
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020)
Grade repetition: 2+
grades
−0.030 −0.004 −0.004 0.028 0.015 0.078
(0.058) (0.042) (0.042) (0.049) (0.044) (0.058)
Observations 3,378 4,813 4,813 3,995 4,576 2,904
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data. The table gives the mean marginal effects of the logit
model. Regressions also include a full set of individual year-of-birth ﬁxed effects and district ﬁxed effects, and district-
speciﬁc linear trends. District-year-clustered standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table O4.2: Full results for 2SLS second-stage estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample for
Gross
hourly
wage
Health measure Cognitive ability component
PCS MCS
Read. Read. Math
speed comp. liter.
College degree 0.549∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.080 0.888∗∗∗ 1.529∗∗∗ 1.490∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.099) (0.099) (0.114) (0.098) (0.126)
Female −0.192∗∗∗ 0.081 −0.270∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ −0.384∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.089) (0.084) (0.097) (0.086) (0.098)
Rural district −0.055∗∗ −0.008 0.052 −0.039 −0.042 0.001
(0.024) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.044) (0.058)
Migrational background −0.034 0.010 −0.043 −0.381∗ −0.375∗∗ −0.654∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.214) (0.188) (0.205) (0.149) (0.224)
No native speaker 0.064 0.212 0.042 −0.070 −0.731∗∗∗ 0.251
(0.119) (0.189) (0.221) (0.279) (0.243) (0.277)
Military service 0.044 0.054 0.012 −0.030 −0.047 0.043
(0.028) (0.057) (0.061) (0.064) (0.055) (0.076)
First born −0.023 0.006 0.064∗ 0.011 0.037 0.039
Continued on next page
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Table O4.2 – continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.018) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.033) (0.041)
Age 15: lived by single
parent
0.011 0.008 −0.130∗ −0.121 −0.043 0.080
(0.038) (0.081) (0.072) (0.077) (0.064) (0.089)
Age 15: lived in patch-
work family
0.005 −0.038 −0.245∗∗ 0.013 0.008 0.201∗
(0.045) (0.093) (0.105) (0.106) (0.092) (0.110)
Age 15: orphan 0.043 −0.326∗∗∗ −0.023 −0.034 0.056 −0.042
(0.066) (0.125) (0.115) (0.115) (0.122) (0.129)
Number of siblings −0.020∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ 0.018∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Married before college 0.061 0.028 0.366∗∗ 0.314 0.162 0.367
(0.101) (0.290) (0.169) (0.200) (0.160) (0.276)
Parent before college 0.011 0.020 0.113∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.034) (0.045)
Mother: migrational
background
0.042 0.013 0.022 0.106 0.114 0.085
(0.039) (0.079) (0.079) (0.076) (0.074) (0.082)
Mother: at least inter.
edu
−0.014 0.064 −0.028 0.011 −0.047 −0.056
(0.032) (0.068) (0.066) (0.068) (0.056) (0.083)
Mother: college degree −0.009 0.088 0.129 −0.229 −0.149 0.016
(0.070) (0.151) (0.151) (0.172) (0.116) (0.206)
Mother: vocational
training
−0.024 0.022 0.047 0.061 −0.004 0.017
(0.024) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.039) (0.062)
Mother: further job
qualiﬁcation
−0.006 −0.133 −0.024 −0.064 −0.018 −0.105
(0.050) (0.105) (0.095) (0.116) (0.075) (0.125)
Mother: still alive 0.028 0.043 −0.049 −0.027 −0.004 0.023
(0.019) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.034) (0.045)
Age 15: mother unem-
ployed
0.041∗ 0.022 0.043 0.040 −0.010 0.003
(0.021) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.041) (0.050)
Age 15: mother never
employed
−0.052∗∗ −0.060 −0.074∗ −0.009 0.036 −0.004
(0.022) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.051)
Father has migrational
background
−0.012 0.073 −0.107 −0.155∗∗ −0.099 −0.015
(0.037) (0.067) (0.073) (0.071) (0.072) (0.083)
Father: at least inter.
edu
−0.017 −0.137∗∗ 0.098 0.112 0.027 −0.056
(0.033) (0.069) (0.064) (0.069) (0.056) (0.079)
Continued on next page
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Table O4.2 – continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Father: college degree 0.003 −0.236∗∗ −0.125 0.008 0.084 −0.016
(0.051) (0.119) (0.111) (0.113) (0.086) (0.135)
Father: vocational train-
ing
−0.020 −0.098 0.022 −0.013 0.101∗ 0.031
(0.030) (0.068) (0.069) (0.067) (0.052) (0.075)
Father: further job qual-
iﬁcation
−0.028 −0.134 −0.055 −0.024 0.107∗ 0.062
(0.037) (0.082) (0.082) (0.084) (0.063) (0.097)
Father: still alive −0.014 0.078∗∗ −0.067∗ 0.034 0.040 0.006
(0.017) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.035) (0.044)
Age 15: father unem-
ployed
0.009 0.114 0.106 0.002 −0.036 −0.002
(0.039) (0.070) (0.077) (0.080) (0.069) (0.086)
Age 15: father never em-
ployed
0.018 0.131 −0.113 0.058 0.113 0.087
(0.069) (0.158) (0.175) (0.153) (0.117) (0.160)
Final school grade: ex-
cellent
0.050 0.043 0.127 0.172 0.293∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.127) (0.132) (0.133) (0.138) (0.135)
Final school grade: good 0.034 0.064 0.200∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.169∗
(0.045) (0.089) (0.101) (0.097) (0.084) (0.097)
Final school grade: satis-
factory
0.033 0.066 0.164∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.044) (0.086) (0.100) (0.095) (0.083) (0.094)
Final school grade: suf-
ﬁcient or worse
−0.145∗ −0.112 −0.086 −0.064 −0.139 −0.388∗∗
(0.084) (0.164) (0.172) (0.160) (0.193) (0.158)
Grade repetition: 1
grade
−0.031∗ 0.057 −0.052 −0.058 −0.002 −0.073∗
(0.018) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.035) (0.044)
Grade repetition: 2+
grades
−0.022 0.002 −0.145 0.036 0.093 −0.101
(0.053) (0.095) (0.115) (0.116) (0.099) (0.134)
Observations 3,378 4,813 4,813 3,995 4,576 2,904
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data. Regressions also include a full set of individual year-of-
birth ﬁxed effects and district ﬁxed effects, and district-speciﬁc linear trends. District-year-clustered standard errors in
parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure O4.1: Sensitivity in Marginal Treatment Effects when using different
kernel bandwidths
Notes: Own illustration based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data. All outcomes are standardized to mean 0 and standard de-
viation 1. The MTE (vertical axis) is measured in units of standard deviations of the outcome variable. Calculations based
on a local linear regression where the inﬂuence of the control variables was isolated using a semiparametric Robinson
estimator (Robinson, 1988) for each outcome variable.
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Table O4.3: First-stage estimations when using different kernel bandwidths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample for
Gross
hourly
wage
Health measure Cognitive ability component
PCS MCS
Read. Read. Math
speed comp. liter.
Bandwidth 100km
College availability 5.545∗∗∗ 5.587∗∗∗ 5.587∗∗∗ 5.557∗∗∗ 5.271∗∗∗ 5.449∗∗∗
(0.332) (0.284) (0.284) (0.322) (0.282) (0.379)
Bandwidth 150km
College availability 3.558∗∗∗ 3.693∗∗∗ 3.693∗∗∗ 3.666∗∗∗ 3.449∗∗∗ 3.575∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.175) (0.175) (0.197) (0.171) (0.233)
Bandwidth 200km
College availability 2.763∗∗∗ 2.943∗∗∗ 2.943∗∗∗ 2.903∗∗∗ 2.703∗∗∗ 2.828∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.132) (0.132) (0.149) (0.128) (0.177)
Bandwidth 250km (baseline speciﬁcation)
College availability 2.368∗∗∗ 2.577∗∗∗ 2.577∗∗∗ 2.530∗∗∗ 2.333∗∗∗ 2.465∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.112) (0.112) (0.126) (0.107) (0.149)
Observations 3,378 4,813 4,813 3,995 4,576 2,904
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS-Starting Cohort 6 data. Regressions also include a full set of control vari-
ables as well as year-of-birth and district ﬁxed effects, and district-speciﬁc linear trends. District-year clustered
standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Marginal Treatment effect – why observed and unobserved het-
erogeneity cannot be separated under conditional independence
of the instrument
Modeling of counterfactual ountcomes:
Y1 = Xβ1 +U1
Y0 = Xβ0 +U0
Assumptions:
U1,U0 ⊥ Z|X
E(U1|X) = E(U0|X) = 0
Potential outcome equation:
Y = DY1 + (1− D)Y0
= Y0 + D(Y1 −Y0)
= [Xβ0 +U0] + [(Xβ1 +U1)− (Xβ0 +U0)]D
= [Xβ0 +U0] + [X (β1 − β0) + (U1 −U0)]D
Applying conditional expectation E(.|X, Z):
E(Y|X, Z) = E [Xβ0 +U0|X, Z]︸ ︷︷ ︸
CIA: Independent of Z
+ E [(X (β1 − β0) + (U1 −U0))D|X, Z]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Law of Iterated Expectations
= Xβ0 + E(U0|X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
CIA: independent of Z︷ ︸︸ ︷
E [X(β1 − β0) + (U1 −U0) |D = 1, X, Z] E(D|X, Z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=p
= Xβ0 + E [X(β1 − β0) + (U1 −U0) |D = 1, X, Z] p
= Xβ0 + X(β1 − β0)p+ E [(U1 −U0) |D = 1, X]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
p
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cannot be separated in estimation: one term
would need to be restricted by some assumption.
Under the CIA X(β1 − β0) and E [(U1 −U0) |D = 1, X] would be observationally
equivalent as long as U1,U0 ⊥ Z|X. If U1,U0 ⊥ X, Z the equivalence is dissolved
since only E [(U1 −U0) |D = 1] needs to be identiﬁed and E (X(β1 − β0)) can be
restricted to zero without loss of generality.
However, if one is solely interested in identifying the general heterogeneity in
E(Y1 − Y0|X, p) with regard to p without separating between the exact source
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(U1 −U0 or X(β1 − β0)), further restrictions regarding U1,U0 and β1, β0 are not
necessary and U1,U0 ⊥ Z|X is sufﬁcient.
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Chapter 6
Fertility Effects of College Education:
Evidence from the German
Educational Expansion
Joint work with Matthias Westphal
6.1 Introduction
Among the many changes that have affected developed societies in the past 60
years, two certainly belong to the most signiﬁcant ones: the educational expan-
sion – describing the substantial upsurge in higher education enrollment, espe-
cially that of females – and the fertility transition, characterized by declining fer-
tility rates that have fallen below replacement rates. The resulting consequences
of both these evolutions have affected many dimensions of social interaction such
as the demographic change – which today constitutes an urgent concern from a
policy perspective. While policies that aim at increasing education have been in-
troduced in all parts of the world, many developed countries have also set up
policies to boost fertility rates. Although both kinds of policies are often compar-
atively well-understood due to ample research, the link between these policies
– that is, how education affects fertility – is still mostly understudied. The neg-
ative correlation between education and fertility, sometimes referred to as the
“baby gap” between high- and low-educated individuals, may hint at the po-
tential side-effects education policies may have on fertility.1 By analyzing the
1The ambiguity that education policies may reduce fertility while family policies in developed
countries are targeted at increasing fertility becomes most visible in developing countries where
education policies are often implemented in order to reduce family size. Due to the context and
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upsurge in higher education in Germany triggered by a massive build-up of col-
leges, we contribute to the understanding of whether increased education causes
lower fertility or whether individuals merely choose to have more education and
smaller families simultaneously.
Researchers have been concerned with the consequences of education policies for
decades. While there are still some “unknowns” with respect to the optimal mar-
gin of education and potential effect heterogeneities, education is often found to
increase labor market performance (for the case of higher education see, e.g., the
literature reviews of Barrow and Malamud, 2015, and Oreopoulos and Petroni-
jevic, 2013). Although there is the reasonable suspicion that the non-pecuniary
returns to education are positive as well (see Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011), ev-
idence of the causal long-term effects on these outcomes is rather scarce. Most
studies that analyze the effect of education on fertility utilize variation in com-
pulsory schooling laws to address the selection problem.2 While such changes
to the law affect a large share of students in many countries, it seems a priori
unlikely that the effects for secondary schooling also hold true for other margins
of education, such as college education. The results of the literature on the effec-
tiveness of family policies that induce ﬁnancial incentives for bigger families in
general may be summarized as mixed (see Gauthier, 2007, for a review and Haan
and Wrohlich, 2011, and Riphahn and Wiynck, 2017, as well as Raute, 2016, for
evidence on Germany). The absence of such silver bullets to increase fertility us-
ing existing family policies emphasizes the need to gain a better understanding
of how education affects fertility decisions.
We are not aware of any study that explicitly investigates the causal link between
college education and fertility in a developed economy3 although the college
margin provides a presumably interesting addition to the more often considered
fertility effect of secondary schooling for four reasons: First, college education
is taught more extensively – in Germany the formal duration of college educa-
tion in the time under review was 4.5 years compared to changes in compulsory
schooling that, at most, account for one or two years. Second, while compulsory
schooling affects individuals at the lower end of the education (and presumably
the margin of education we focus on the situation in developed countries. See Duﬂo et al. (2015)
and the literature therein for the case in developing countries.
2See, for instance, Cygan-Rehm and Maeder (2013) for Germany, Black et al. (2008) for the US
and Norway, Geruso and Royer (2014) for the UK, Monstad et al. (2008) for Norway, Gro¨nqvist
and Hall (2013) for Sweden, and Fort et al. (2016) for the UK and pooled Continental European
countries. McCrary and Royer (2011) consider changes in the school entry age that cause variation
in education.
3Currie and Moretti (2003) analyze the effect of maternal education on the offspring’s health in
the US but consider the number of children merely as a potential channel. A recent working paper
by Tequamem and Tirivayi (2015) analyzes the fertility effects of higher education in Ethiopia and
ﬁnd a reduction in family size.
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skill) distribution, college affects individuals at the upper end who may react
differently. Third, college education falls well into the prime reproductive age
of women (and potential fathers) while the largest effects of additional years of
compulsory schooling have been found on in-school and teenage pregnancies.
Fourth, college education is presumably the most important margin that drives
the changes in the educational composition of developed societies in the future.
By launching the Higher Education Pact 2020, for instance, Germany has recently
made large public funds available in order to further increase access to college ed-
ucation. These points emphasize the complementary value of analyzing tertiary
education: investigating effects at the college margin may help to gain a better
and highly policy-relevant understanding of the previous ﬁndings.
This study examines the effect of college education on the number of biological
children a woman has throughout her fertile ages (so-called completed fertility)
as well as the extensive and intensive margins of fertility (probability of becom-
ing a mother versus number of children once a woman is a mother). Moreover,
we study two intriguing aspects of fertility decisions: the timing of births and
socioeconomic channels that may help to explain the observed fertility patterns.
By unfolding our main effects via the timing of their occurrence, we shed light on
potential postponement and catch-up and possibly even biological effects. While
the postponement of motherhood may emerge rather mechanically, e.g., through
an “incarceration” in college (see Black et al., 2008), the degree of the catch-up is
likely to reﬂect the preferences, for instance, for a family or a career. A biologi-
cal effect may unfold through age-related fertility problems if the catch-up effect
occurs too late to reach the desired family size. Whereas a social planner would
wish to prevent the biological effect from playing a role (as women may well
want, but cannot have, children), implications are less clear for catch-up effects
in general as they may evolve through a college-induced change in preferences.
To differentiate further whether catch-up effects – that may result in a decline in
completed fertility – are driven by decreased family preferences (relative to ca-
reer preferences), or by an incompatibility of work and family life, we investigate
the effect of college education on career opportunities (assessed through labor
supply and wages) and preferences and opportunities for family life (marriage,
assortative mating, and offspring’s education).
A pivotal prerequisite of these analyses is to separate correlative patterns from
the underlying causal relationship. Women with initial preferences for large fam-
ilies might be more reluctant to sort into college education, for instance, because
they expect the investment in their skills to have less time to pay off. Women with
initial preferences for a career, on the other hand, might be very prone to study,
since it fuels their labor market opportunities. These conﬂicting preferences ex-
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emplify the need to address selection into college education. To do so, we exploit
arguably exogenous variation in the college expansion in Germany by means of
an instrumental variables approach (see also Kamho¨fer et al., 2017, who rely on
the same instrument). Several higher education policies at the federal level and
within the states caused the number of colleges in Germany to double between
the 1960s and 1980s and led to an upsurge in the number of available college
spots. At the same time, the local bargaining of the districts with the state gov-
ernments and with each other plus the balancing of local interests caused regional
variation between and within states. This process changed the opportunity to ac-
cess college in a period of excess demand for college education. Quantitative
evidence from an explorative study of the local determinants of college openings
indeed indicates that differences in the opportunity to study are to a large degree
exogenous.
Our results suggest that college education reduces the probability of becoming
a mother by one-quarter, but college-educated women who do become mothers
have, on average, 0.27 more children (about 13 percent) compared to their peers
without college education. Looking at the timing of the effects (that is, the age
of childbearing) indicates that a biological effect does not trigger the negative
effect of college education on overall fertility: the increased (catch-up) fertility
of college-educated women fades out before an age-related decline in fertility
usually matters. The effects of college education on potential mediators suggest
that the increased probability of working full-time due to college (compared to
working half-time or not at all) and the college wage premium are higher for
non-mothers; they are also less likely to be married, but do equally well in terms
of positive assortative mating. From a policy perspective, these effects of college
education on quantitative fertility outcomes can have crucial implications that
are at least twofold. First, college education seems to trigger the demographic
transition solely through its effect on childlessness, but not through the number of
children per mother. If so, promising policies should aim at this margin. This is in
line with an increasing number of economists, among others, who call for policies
targeted at raising the compatibility between work and family life. Policies that,
for instance, enable more ﬂexible working hours and the opportunity of working
from home may decrease the labor market burden of becoming a mother (see,
e.g., Goldin, 2014). Moreover, family policies that are speciﬁcally aimed at higher
educated women, such as means-tested maternity leave beneﬁts (as analyzed by
Raute, 2016) seem to be a step forward toward closing the baby gap. A second
implication for further policies to consider arises through the positive effect at
the intensive margin and evidence of a positive educational transmission that
affects the socioeconomic composition of fertility. This has important long-term
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implications for societies (e.g., in terms of ﬁscal net effects), especially in societies
with a low social or educational mobility (Raute, 2016).
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 6.2 brieﬂy presents the gen-
eral trends in fertility and higher education in Germany. Section 6.3 provides an
overview of the college expansion and exploits both the qualitative and quan-
titative reasons that led to this expansion. The data and the empirical strategy
are presented in Section 6.4. The main results on quantitative fertility effects are
presented in Section 6.5. Subsequently, Section 6.6 sheds light on the timing and
socioeconomic factors that potentially shape the detected fertility patterns before
Section 6.7 concludes.
6.2 Trends in fertility and education in Germany
Using ofﬁcial statistics for the whole population, Figure 6.1 depicts the develop-
ment in female college education and fertility over time in Germany. The hori-
zontal axis states the birth cohort. The violet line gives the trend in the share of
women per birth cohort who were enrolled in college at the age of 20 (referring
to the vertical axis on the left-hand side). While only 5 percent of all women born
in 1943 were enrolled in higher education in 1963, the number increased tenfold
until the birth cohort 1972. After the baby-booming years succeeding World War
II, the average number of births per women dropped from 1.8 to 1.5. The average
number of children is assessed at the woman’s age of 40 for the birth cohort of
the horizontal axis and plotted by the orange line (referring to the vertical axis on
the right-hand side).
At ﬁrst sight, Figure 6.1 suggests that the initial reduction in fertility was a pre-
requisite for the boom in female college enrollment. While this may be true, a fur-
ther, substantial reduction in fertility occurred just after female college enrollment
rates soared the most. As preferences for smaller families grew and contraceptive
pills (whose commercial launch in Germany was in 1961, just after the cohort of
1940 decided whether to enroll in college) made it easier to meet the preferred
number of children and females could “more accurately anticipate their work
lives” (Goldin, 2006, p.8), which made human capital investments for women
more valuable. This emphasizes how close fertility and female education are in-
terrelated. Using variation in the availability of higher education, the empirical
analysis in the following sections addresses the underlying causal relationship.
Another piece of suggestive evidence on the college education-fertility nexus is
the relationship between the share of women in higher education and the average
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Figure 6.1: Trends in fertility and college enrollment by birth cohort in Germany
Notes: Own calculations using data from Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research and Vienna Institute of Demog-
raphy (2014) and German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce (2016b). The orange line refers to the axis on the right-hand side states
the average number of children per women at the age of 40 by birth cohort. The violet line illustrates the share of women
of the birth cohort that are enrolled in higher education at the age of 20 and corresponds to the vertical axis on the left-
hand site. To transform the number of female students in the enrollment year into the cohort share of female students, we
deduct 20 years from the enrollment year and take into account that only about one-ﬁfth of women studying in a certain
year are freshmen. We divide the resulting number of female students in total by the average study length of 4.5 years to
get the number per year. Finally, we divide the number of female students in a certain year by the female cohort size in
this year. Note that this is only a crude adjustment. However, as we are primarily interested in the change of this share
over time, we are conﬁdent of capturing most of the changes.
age at the time of the ﬁrst marriage as depicted in Figure 6.2. In the time under
review, marriage was an important gatekeeper for fertility and births out of wed-
lock were rare events. The violet line (referring to the left vertical axis) gives the
share of all women enrolled in higher education in a certain year. Unlike Figure
6.1, Figure 6.2 compares the share of females in higher education and the age at
ﬁrst marriage per calender year (and not by birth cohort). While the average age
at the time of the ﬁrst marriage decreased until the mid-1970s to 22.5 years, it
increased by 2.5 years in the following 15 years (orange line on the right vertical
axis). Based on the descriptive pattern in Figure 6.2, two things are important
to note for the empirical analysis: First, marriage may mediate the effect of col-
lege education on fertility as the college enrollment decision predates the mean
age at the ﬁrst marriage in the ﬁgure. Second, the trend in the age at ﬁrst mar-
riage changes only a few years after the boost in the share of women in higher
education, suggesting that college enrollment had an impact on fertility.
Moreover, Figure 6.2 also bears suggestive evidence of the empowerment of women.
The delay in marriage indicates that the share of women that transitioned di-
rectly from living at home (where the parents presumably took care of subsis-
tence) to living with the husband (and relying on his subsistence) decreased. In
other words, Figure 6.2 suggests that the share of women who took care of their
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Figure 6.2: Mean age at ﬁrst marriage and college enrollment by year in
Germany
Notes: Own calculations using data from Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research and Vienna Institute of Demog-
raphy (2014); German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce (2016b). The violet line gives the share of women aged 20 per year and is
shown in the vertical axis on the left-hand site. In 1970 this shows, for instance, the number of female students in higher
education divided by the number of women at this time. The orange line referring to the right-hand site axis gives the
average age of women at the time of the ﬁrst marriage per year.
own subsistence (through working for pay or student loans introduced in 1971)
increased over time.
6.3 The college expansion
6.3.1 Background and developments
Higher education in Germany
After graduating from secondary school, adolescents in Germany either enroll in
higher education or start an apprenticeship training.4 The latter consists of part-
time training-on-the-job in a ﬁrm and part-time schooling. This vocational edu-
cation usually takes three years and individuals often enter the ﬁrm (or another
ﬁrm in the sector) as a full-time employee afterwards. To be eligible for higher
education in Germany, individuals need a university entrance degree (Abitur). In
the years under review, only academic secondary schools (Gymnasien) with nine
years secondary schooling (and four years elementary schooling) could award
this degree. The tracking from elementary school to secondary school took (and
still takes) place rather early at the age of 10. However, it is generally possible
4The general description of education in Germany and the college expansion is closely related
to Kamho¨fer and Schmitz (2016) and has been adjusted for the purpose of the analysis conducted
here.
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to switch secondary school tracks after any term. Moreover, students could en-
roll into academic schools after graduating from the other tracks (with four to
ﬁve years basic track schooling or six years of intermediate track schooling) in
order to receive three additional years of schooling and be awarded a university
entrance degree.
In Germany, higher education is, in general, free of tuition fees and several in-
stitutions offer tertiary education – even though the distinction of the different
types is not always straightforward. We limit our analysis to the larger and most
established institutions: universities and technical universities. We refer to the
union of these institutions interchangeably as “universities” or “colleges.” We
neglect two groups of higher education institutions. First, small institutions that
specialize in teacher education, religious education and ﬁne arts with no more
than 1,000 students at the time under review. The second group are universities
of applied science (Fachhochschulen). They emerged in the 1980s (see Lundgreen
and Schwibbe, 2008) and are usually smaller than regular universities, special-
ize in one area of education, have a less theoretical curriculum, and the style of
teaching is more similar to secondary schools. In the time under review, the de-
gree awarded was also distinct.
Build-up of new colleges and the rise in higher education enrollment
While the educational system as described above did not change in the years
under review, the number of academic-track secondary schools and colleges sig-
niﬁcantly increased – providing us with an arguably powerful and exogenous
source variation in educational opportunities. In this subsection, we describe the
supply-sided expansion in the number of colleges and their capacities in terms of
student spots as this is a prerequirement for the trends in college enrollment out-
lined above. This so-called period of “educational expansion” (Bildungsexpansion)
started in the 1960s and peaked in the 1970s. In the years under review, 1958–1990
(determined by the birth cohorts in our survey data), the number of districts with
at least one college (only very few districts had more than one college) increased
from 27 to 54 (out of 325 districts) and the total number of students increased by
over 850,000 from 157,000 in 1958 to more than one million in 1990 (see Figure
6.3a). The number of female students in total in the colleges in the sample in
Figure 6.3b is similar to the corresponding number in Figure 6.1. This indicates
that our college panel captures the bulk of the higher education institutions in
Germany (although we do not have any data on smaller institutions, see above).
Figure A6.1 in the Appendix shows the spatial variation over time. Following the
reasoning of Card (1995) and many others since then (e.g., Currie and Moretti,
2003, Carneiro et al., 2011, and Nybom, 2017), we argue that availability of higher
educational opportunities in large parts of the country led to a decrease in the op-
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portunity costs of education due to the changed distances to college. While newly
opened academic schools enabled secondary school students in rural areas to re-
ceive a university entrance degree, college openings in smaller cities allowed a
broader group of secondary school graduates from both rural areas and cities to
take up higher education. That is, the opening of new colleges allowed individ-
uals to commute instead of moving to a city with a college (which causes higher
costs) or decreased the commuting time. As indicated in Figure 6.3b, women es-
pecially beneﬁted from this development as the share of women relative to men
doubled from 20 to 40 percent in the time under review.
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Figure 6.3: Colleges and students over time and by gender
Notes: Own illustration. College opening and size information are taken from the German Statistical Yearbooks 1959–1991
(German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 1991). The information on students refer to the college included in the left panel of the
ﬁgure. More specialized higher education institutes that are smaller in size are disregarded as information on them are
often missing.
6.3.2 Determinants of the college expansion
According to the analysis of Bartz (2007) of the history of higher education in
Germany, mainly four factors triggered the college expansion: (i) The two world
wars and the National Socialists’ “anti-intellectualism” led to a low educational
attainment for large parts of the population – as also argued in (Picht, 1964, p.66).5
Therefore, large parts of society may have had an urge to catch up in terms of
education. (ii) The industry demanded more qualiﬁed workers that were able to
cope with new production technologies (see the review of the history of the ﬁrst
post-war era colleges of Weisser, 2005). (iii) As argued in Ju¨rges et al. (2011) and
Picht (1964), political decision-makers saw education both as an outcome and a
5Even today, more than 70 years later, the share of college students in Germany still does not
meet OECD standards, see OECD (2015b) – even so this is at least in part due to the prominent role
of the apprenticeship training system in Germany. To close this gap and increase participation in
higher education the German federal government and the state governments launched the Higher
Education Pact 2020 (Hochschulpakt 2020) in 2007 and funded it with 38.5 billion Euros until 2023.
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means in the rivalries with the communist East Germany. (iv) All these reasons
also led to an increase in academic track secondary schools – as analyzed by,
e.g., Kamho¨fer and Schmitz (2016) and Ju¨rges et al. (2011) – which then led to an
increase in the number of individuals eligible for higher education.6
It was partly because of these reasons that the federal government introduced the
German Council of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat) in 1957, see Bartz
(2007). In its 1960, 1966, and 1970 reports the expert council advised that college
capacities should be largely increased (see Wissenschaftsrat, 1960, 1966, 1970).
However, the council’s authorities were (and still are) limited to making sugges-
tions. The governments of the federal states in Germany are in charge of edu-
cational policies. The coordination between the states (which are usually ruled
by several parties or coalitions of them and have elections at different points in
time) mainly focuses on a standardization and mutual recognition of degrees.
Figure A6.3 in the Appendix shows the number of colleges and shares of female
students over time across the states. The timing of the educational expansion ex-
hibits large differences between the states. In our analysis we use the variation in
the timing between the 325 German districts (smaller administrative units, e.g.,
cities, that are nested in the federal states). Combining administrative data on the
college expansion with survey data on individuals that face the college decision
spread over more than 30 years, yields a panel structure in college availability.
Eventually, this allows us to control for district ﬁxed effects (as well as district-
speciﬁc time-trends) and still observe a sufﬁcient amount of variation in college
availability.
In the following parts of this section we provide qualitative and quantitative ev-
idence that this variation is exogenous with respect to individual fertility and
marriage preferences.
Qualitative evidence
While the decentralized decision-making process makes it hard, if not impossible,
to trace back the exact political reasons that led to each college opening or expan-
sion in college size, we found evidence of the political reasoning behind some
college openings. The ﬁrst post-war college opening – the University of Bochum
in the most-populated state of North Rhine-Westphalia in 1966 – was based on a
6Figure A6.2 in the Appendix the trend in academic-track secondary schooling. Two facts
stand out: First, even in the expanding academic secondary schooling the share of female students
rose disproportionately until women outnumbered men at academic secondary schools in 1990.
Second, even in 1950 the share of women leveled at some 40 percent. The excess in the number
of women eligible to take higher education compared to the number of women actually enrolled
in colleges suggests that the academic school expansion might have been an important reason for
the surge in female college participation but that it was certainly not the only one.
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state’s parliament decision in 1961. According to Weisser (2005), the ﬁrst nego-
tiations between the city of Bochum and the state government were even partly
held in secret. This offended ofﬁcials of the city of Dortmund – that also hoped
to get the college – but was unable to provide a construction site that fulﬁlled the
requirements. Facing state elections, the decision to open a college in Dortmund
was made only one year after the announcement to open a college in Bochum.
The decision to open six new so-called comprehensive colleges (Gesamthochschulen)
in North Rhine-Westphalia at the beginning of the 1970s was accompanied by a
more intensive public debate. After several parliamentary hearings, the sugges-
tion of the state’s minister for educational affairs to construct new colleges in
areas without existing ones was agreed on, see NRW (1971a,b). Four of the six
colleges were opened in industrialized cities (Duisburg, Essen, Hagen, and Wup-
pertal) and two colleges were opened in more rural areas (Paderborn and Siegen).
The college openings in these districts were supposed to actively “promote” ed-
ucation (“Bildungswerbung”) and allow a larger range of secondary school gradu-
ates to enroll in higher education, see NRW (1971c).
All in all, we neither know of any law that relates college openings to potential
reasons (like population size) nor could we ﬁnd a pattern in the discussions to
open colleges. On the contrary, the length of the political process and time from
the opening decision to the start of the teaching exhibits a lot of variation. To in-
vestigate further which factors are associated with college openings, we conduct
an additional quantitative analysis.
Quantitative evidence
Our concern regarding the exogeneity of college expansion is that certain charac-
teristics, such as average fertility, age and living arrangements plus employment
structure, systematically differ between regions with a college opening through
the educational expansion and a region that had not experienced a college open-
ing. To investigate this, we combine the data on college openings presented above
with administrative data from the German Micro Census in 1962 (a 1 percent sam-
ple of the whole population, see Lengerer et al., 2008). Because the Micro Census
data is on a slightly broader level we observe 249 regions (in which the 325 dis-
tricts are nested). While 22 of these regions already had a college before 1962 and
206 regions had no college until 1990 or later, a college was opened in 21 regions
in the years under review.
Table 6.1 shows the 1962 means of the regional characteristics that potentially
triggered a college opening. Column 1 states the mean for regions that never
experienced a college opening and column 2 gives the corresponding mean for
213
Table 6.1: Balancing test of regions with and without a college opening in the
time under review using administrative data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regions. . . Predict
opening
using
regression
. . .w/o college . . .w/ opening
opening 1962–1990
Pot. college det. Mean Mean Diff. OLS
Number of kids p.c. 10.497 10.437 −0.150 −0.033
(total population) (0.522) (0.283) (0.121) (0.052)
. . . students 0.016 0.011 −0.008∗ −10.723
(0.019) (0.011) (0.004) (10.653)
. . . divorced 0.023 0.017 −0.005 −1.000
(0.069) (0.006) (0.016) (40.185)
. . .widowed 0.088 0.091 0.007∗∗ 20.035
(0.015) (0.008) (0.003) (20.357)
. . . females 0.525 0.528 0.002 −20.918
(0.041) (0.013) (0.01) (10.851)
. . .migration 0.021 0.018 −0.006 −10.698
(0.022) (0.017) (0.005) (10.545)
. . . unemployed 0.002 0.002 0.001∗∗ 250.484
(0.001) (0.001) (0.00) (190.743)
Sectoral composition of employment
- primary 0.029 0.046 0.023∗ 0.390
(0.055) (0.053) (0.013) (0.497)
- secondary 0.543 0.551 0.008 0.147
(0.088) (0.069) (0.02) (0.367)
# of regions 206 21 227 227
Notes: Own calculation using German Micro Census data from 1962 (see Lengerer et al., 2008). Information on colleges
are taken from the German Statistical Yearbooks 1959–1991 (German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 1991). Due to data policy
restrictions Micro Census data are aggregated on regions deﬁned through the degree of urbanization (Gemeindegro¨ßenklasse
indicators) and broader administrative units (Regiergungsbezirk level). This aggregation results in 206 regions that never
experienced a college opening until 1990 or later (the mean value of the considered characteristics in these regions is
given in column 1), 21 regions with a college opening between 1962 and 1990 (mean value in column 2), and 22 regions
that already had a college in 1962 (data of these regions is not considered in the table). Due to a different aggregation of
the Micro Census data, these numbers do not exactly correspond to those on the district level. The difference in column 3
is calculated by a simple regression of a college opening indicator on the potential characteristic and an intercept. Column
4 shows the coefﬁcients of the characteristics in a multiple regression. The number of regions with and without a college
opening differs slightly from Kamho¨fer et al. (2017) as we restrict our analysis to universities that had 1,000 or more
students in at least one of the years under review. Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
regions that experienced a college opening in the time under review. Column 3
gives the difference in means between the two. This reveals no signiﬁcant dif-
ference between the regions in terms of number of children, marital status, share
of females or other socioeconomic indicators such as share of migrants and un-
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employment rate. The share of students is lower in regions with an opening and
where the employment structure differs slightly (more primary sector employ-
ment in districts with opening). This illustrates that colleges were often opened in
order to foster accessibility for rather educationally alienated groups. In column
4 of Table 6.1, we regress an opening on all characteristics simultaneously. The
stated coefﬁcients give the difference of the factors in regions with and without
a college opening while holding the mean differences in the other characteristics
constant. The regression does not ﬁnd any single factor in 1962 that signiﬁcantly
predicts an opening in the years until 1990. These auxiliary results are encour-
aging for our identifying assumptions, although differences in levels are in any
case controlled for by the ﬁxed effect in our analysis. How exactly we utilize the
variation in college availability presented in this section is given in the following
section.
6.4 Data and empirical strategy
6.4.1 Survey data and important variables
German National Educational Panel Study
Our main data source are individual-level data from the German National Edu-
cational Panel Study (NEPS), see Blossfeld et al. (2011).7 NEPS data map the edu-
cational trajectories of more than 60,000 individuals in total. The data set consists
of a multi-cohort sequence design and samples six age groups: newborns and
their parents, preschool children, ﬁfth graders, ninth graders, college freshmen
students, and adults. These age groups are referred to as Starting Cohorts and
are followed over time. That is, each Starting Cohort consists of a panel structure.
For the purpose of our analysis we make use of the Adult Starting Cohort that
covers individuals born between 1956 and 1986 in, so far, seven waves between
2007/2008 (wave 1) and 2014/2015 (wave 7)8, see LIfBi (2015). Starting with
about 8,500 women, the ﬁnal sample includes 4,300 women who (i) were edu-
cated in West Germany, (ii) are aged 40 or older, and (iii) have complete infor-
mation in key variables. One of those key variables is the district of residence
7This paper uses data from the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS): Starting Cohort
Adults, doi:10.5157/NEPS:SC6:7.0.0. From 2008 to 2013, NEPS data was collected as part of the
Framework Program for the Promotion of Empirical Educational Research funded by the German
Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). As of 2014, NEPS is carried out by the Leib-
niz Institute for Educational Trajectories (LIfBi) at the University of Bamberg in cooperation with
a nationwide network.
8For every individual we use only the most recent observation.
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at the time of the college decision or earlier, which we use to assign our instru-
ment. Besides detailed information on education and fertility, including the years
of childbearing, the data includes retrospective information on the respondents’
labor market history and early living conditions at age 15, for instance, the num-
ber of siblings, secondary school grades, and parental education. As those factors
are potentially confounding the effect of education on fertility, we consider them
as control variables, see Table A6.1 in the Appendix for details.
The explanatory variable “college degree” takes the value 1 if an individual has
any higher educational degree, and 0 otherwise. Dropouts are treated as all other
individuals without college education. About one-ﬁfth of the sample have a col-
lege degree, while four-ﬁfth do not.
Dependent variables
The key dimensions along which we analyze fertility are the extensive margin
(probability of becoming a mother) and the intensive margin (number of children
conditional on being a mother). Table 6.2 gives the mean values of the dependent
variables by college education. From the one-ﬁfth of college-educated women
about three-quarters have at least one child. For women without a college ed-
ucation, the share of mothers is about nine percentage points higher. Interest-
ingly, once a woman decides to become a mother, the average number of chil-
dren is almost the same for women with and without a college education (if any-
thing, college-educated mothers have slightly more children). In other words, the
main difference in the descriptives between college-educated and non-college-
educated women is on the extensive rather than the intensive fertility margin.
As we consider the timing of birth as a crucial mechanism through which college
transmits into fertility, Table 6.2 also gives the age of ﬁrst birth. Mothers with
a college education have, on average, their ﬁrst child at the age of 30. Mothers
without a college education are, on average, four years younger at the time of
the ﬁrst birth. Given a regular study duration of 4.5–5 years in order to receive
a than-common Diplom degree, we interpret the descriptive evidence as pointing
toward a strong role of college education.
Instrument
The processes of the college expansion discussed in Section 6.3 provide, on the
one hand, a powerful shift in the availability of higher education for many indi-
viduals. On the other hand, the multi-faceted college expansion that took place
over several decades is hard to boil down into one or a few still powerful in-
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Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
College stauts
all with w/o share
women college college w/ college
Motherhood
all women (num. obs.) 4,288 924 3,364 21.6
mothers (num. obs.) 3,485 685 2,800 19.7
non-mothers (num. obs.) 803 239 564 29.8
share of mothers (in %) 81.3 74.1 83.2
Number of children
all women (incl. 0 kids) 1.65 1.52 1.69
mothers (i.e., kids≥1) 2.05 2.10 2.04
Age at ﬁrst birth if mother 27.0 29.9 26.3
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Adult Starting Cohort data.
struments.9 This is especially the case as we observe college openings. Using,
for instance, a scalar for the distance to the closest college as suggested by Card
(1995) might in the case of college openings even be misleading as newly opened
colleges are in the initial years often too small to affect an individual’s college
decision. Moreover, the generally local nature of the IV results (see next subsec-
tion) makes it desirable to have an instrument that affects as many individuals as
possible and therefore als captures, for instance, the expansion in the capacities of
the already existing colleges. To achieve such a powerful instrument, we follow
Kamho¨fer et al. (2017) and create an index that weights the non-linear effect of
the college distance with the relative number of students in the 325 West-German
districts:
Zit =
325
∑
j
K(distij)×
(
#studentsjt
#inhabitantsjt
)
. (6.1)
This college availability index Zit, that is, the instrument, basically includes the
total number of college spots (measured by the number of students) per inhab-
itant in district j (out of the 325 districts), individual i faces in year t weighted
by the distance between i’s home district and district j. Weighting the number
of students by the population of the district takes into account that districts with
the same number of inhabitants might have colleges of a different size. This local
9Westphal et al. (2017) use the same source of variation in an IV setting but assess the most
powerful instruments of many potential indicators using machine learning techniques.
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availability is then weighted by the Gaussian kernel distance K(distj) between the
centroid of the home district and the centroid of district j. The kernel gives a lot
of weight to close colleges and a very small weight to distant ones. Since individ-
uals can choose between many districts with colleges, we calculate the sum of all
district-speciﬁc college availabilities within the kernel bandwidth. Using a band-
width of 250km, this basically amounts to K(distj) = φ(distj/250) where φ is the
standard normal pdf. While 250km sounds like a large bandwidth, this implies
that colleges in the same district receive a weight of 0.4, while the weight for col-
leges that are 100km away is 0.37, which is reduced to 0.24 for 250km. Colleges
that are 500km away only get a very low weight of 0.05. A smaller bandwidth
of, say, 100km would mean that already colleges that are 250km away receive
a weight of 0.02 which implies the assumption that individuals basically do not
take them into account at all. Table A6.2 in the Appendix gives an overview of
the variation in the instrument as well as providing some descriptives on some
main driving forces behind this variation (changes in the distance to the nearest
college, within a 100km radius and changes in college spots).10
6.4.2 Empirical strategy
Themost natural starting point is an ordinary least square (OLS) estimationwhere
we regress our fertility measures Yitd for individual i who graduated from high
school in district d and year t on a binary college indicator Ditd (that takes on the
value 1 for college, and is 0 otherwise) and a vector of control variables X ′itd:
Yitd = β0 + β1Ditd +X ′itdβ2 + uitd. (6.2)
In order to separate the general trend in college education from the reverse trend
in fertility (as depicted in Figure 6.1), the vector of confounders, X ′itd, also in-
cludes district-speciﬁc linear trends in addition to general time and district ﬁxed
effects. The district-speciﬁc trends accommodate temporal confounding factors,
for instance, because of global and district-speciﬁc trends in secondary school
graduation (see, e.g., Figure A6.2 in the Appendix and Westphal, 2017).
However, if individuals simultaneously select themselves into education and de-
sired fertility beyond some underlying trend, β1 is still likely to be biased. The
direction of the bias is a priori unclear and depends on the effect of the omitted
confounder on fertility and its correlation with education. If the omitted factors
are, for instance, career preferences or preferences for a traditional family model
10For alternative speciﬁcations of the instrument, see Kamho¨fer et al. (2017).
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that are already established before college, OLS would overestimate the true col-
lege effect.11 On the other hand, OLS may underestimate the true effect if factors
such as the family’s wealth are omitted from the model.12 Also, general prefer-
ences for having a family do not necessarily lead to an overestimation of OLS,
as females with these preferences may very well decide to study (as college is
considered to be one of the largest marriage markets).
In order to address the selection of individuals in education and fertility along
unobserved preferences we exploit the variation in college availability using the
index of college availability we deﬁne in Eq. 6.1 as an instrumental variable in
a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) approach. The ﬁrst stage of the 2SLS approach
reads:
Ditd = δ0 + δ1Ztd +X ′itdδ2 + vitd. (6.3)
Our main identifying assumption is that conditional on X ′itd, variation in our col-
lege accessibility measure (Ztd) randomizes the otherwise endogenous decision to
go to college, that is, variation in Ztd does no depend either on the error term, vi,
or on general preferences about or other unobserved characteristics with respect
to fertility.
To make this assumption as plausible as possible, we condition on district ﬁxed
effects to effectively use only the openings of new colleges and within-district
increases in college seats. With the additional assumption that any instrument-
speciﬁc shift in D only affects some of our employed fertility measures via college
graduation (i.e., the exclusion restriction), we can attribute the reduced-form ef-
fect of the instrument solely to college graduation, ruling out any other channel.
Technically, this is done by regressing the ﬁrst-stage ﬁtted value D̂itd on the fertil-
ity measures, Yitd:
Yitd = β0 + β1D̂itd +X ′itdβ2 + uitd, (6.4)
Given our identifying assumptions, β1 is the causal effect of college education.
Imposing a monotonicity assumption on the instrument, β1 is a causal effect for
a speciﬁc group of women: those who would potentially go to college because of
the instrument (called compliers). Because this group is typically a subset of all
individuals, β1 is referred to as the local average treatment effect (LATE, see Im-
11In the case of career preferences women may sacriﬁce children for a career-boosting educa-
tion. If women prefer a traditional family model, they may forgo college education in favor of
starting a family at an earlier age.
12Although the observable confounders include the parents’ education, we cannot directly
control for the family income at the time of the college decision. If the family income buys
high-quality child care and the woman’s education beyond what is captured by through the con-
trol variables, this would downward-bias OLS. Another potential unobservable confounder that
would bias OLS in the same direction is a high degree of openness – one of the so-called Big
Five personality traits in psychology – describing the appreciation and curiosity for a variety of
experiences, e.g., college life and having children.
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bens and Angrist, 1994). In our example, the compliers are most likely those who
could go to a university because either a university opened up in their proximity
or because existing universities in the neighboring districts expanded. As this
process potentially affected many people, one would expect the share of com-
pliers to be rather large – a claim we are going to investigate in the following
section.
Before turning to the results, we want to brieﬂy assess whether our assumptions
are plausible. The conditional independence assumption would be violated by
district-speciﬁc, non-linear fertility trends that are correlated with an opening.
These trends could be caused by different access to modern contraceptives like
the combined oral contraceptive pill that was introduced in Germany at the be-
ginning of the 1960s. If women in regions with a stronger increase in college
availability also had better access to the pill, we may falsely attribute the contra-
ceptive effect to education (to alleviate this concern, we include district-speciﬁc
trends). We consider this as rather unlikely because Table 6.1 suggests that the
levels of aggregate fertility measures are uncorrelated with the opening of a uni-
versity. What is more likely is that college-educated women were more willing
to use contraceptives in order to regulate fertility (see Oddens et al., 1993), which
would be a channel of the effect rather than a violation of the identifying assump-
tions.
6.5 Baseline results
6.5.1 The effect of the college expansion on educational partici-
pation
First-stage evidence from Micro Census data
Before looking into the effect of the college expansion on the probability of study-
ing using the survey data that includes fertility measures, we look at the effect
of the college build-up on educational participation in the German Micro Census
from 1962 to 1969 (the ﬁrst years available). The openings of the ﬁrst four post-
war era colleges (in the cities of Bochum, Dortmund, Konstanz, and Regensburg)
fall into these years. To shed some light on the exact impact of college openings,
we conducted an event study to see the relative change in the share of students
within a 100km radius relative to the timing of the opening of these colleges (time
of opening centered to 0).
The results are depicted in Figure 6.4 which shows a twofold takeaway. First,
there is no evidence on pre-trends, indicating that the colleges were not opened
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in regions where already existing colleges were expanding relatively more than
the colleges in regions without an opening. Second, the ﬁgure reveals a relatively
sharp discontinuity: after a college was opened in t = 0, there was a rather large
and signiﬁcant increase in the relative share of students in the region even two
years after the opening. Given that the colleges had just opened, this is a re-
markable effect. As we take all students in regions within a 100km radius, the
increase in the number of students not only captures the somewhat mechanical
effect in the region of the opening itself but it also suggests that individuals from
neighboring regions were also affected by the opening, for instance, because the
newly built college was within commuting distance. We take this as evidence
that there was an excess demand of secondary school graduates who wanted to
go to college.
-.5
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Figure 6.4: Relative change in the share of students in counties within 100km of
college opening between 1962 to 1969
Notes: Own representation based German Micro Census data from 1962–1969 (see Lengerer et al., 2008) and German
Statistical Yearbooks (see German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 1991). The ﬁgure depicts the coefﬁcients βτ from the following
“event-study” regression where β0 is set to zero:
ln(#studentsbt) = αt + ∑
τ∈{−7,−1}
βτ 
[
max(t− topeningb ,−3) = max(τ,−3)
]
+ ∑
τ∈{1,7}
βτ 
[
min(t− topeningb , 3) = min(τ, 3)
]
+ γb + bt,
where ln(#studentsbt) is the log number of students in region b and year t (1962–1969). αt are year ﬁxed effects. t
opening
b
equals the the year in which a college opened in region b. To control for differences in levels between these regions, region
ﬁxed effects γb are included. Regions include all regions within a 100km radius surrounding the centroid of the region
where the new colleges are located. The reason for the choice of this radius is that we want to go beyond a somewhat
mechanical effect which emerges by the inﬂux of students in the region of the opening. A sufﬁciently large radius partials
out this effect for two reasons. First, it captures the bulk of the catchment area of a college and therefore only a minority
of students do not come from the area deﬁned by the radius. Second, within each region that exhibited an opening
of a college (Bochum, Dortmund, Konstanz, Regensburg) there are already well-established existing colleges (Mu¨nster,
Cologne, Freiburg or Nuremberg). Hence, there had been possibilities to enroll into a college in the deﬁned area also in
the absence of a college opening in period 0.
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First-stage evidence from survey data and the complying subpopulation
The regression results of the ﬁrst stage from Eq. 6.3 using NEPS data are shown
for both the ﬁnal sample and for certain subgroups in Table 6.3. The overall ﬁrst-
stage effect is very strong and is precisely estimated. To ease the interpretation of
the compound instrument (deﬁned in Eq. 6.1), we illustrate the ﬁrst-stage effect
with an example: a college is newly opened in a district with 250,000 inhabitants
and 15,000 students are enrolled in the college ﬁve years after the opening. In this
case, the probability of studying increases for a woman who graduates from high
school in this district by about 6 percentage points (pp) based on the results in
Table 6.3: 2.08 (coefﬁcient from the table) × K(0) × 15/250 = 2.08 × 0.4 × 0.06 =
5pp (rounded, see Eq. 6.1). With an overall baseline probability of studying of 21.5
percent for women, the ﬁrst stage is not only statistically signiﬁcant (the resulting
F-statistic is well above the rule-of-thumb value of 10) but is also substantial in
size.
This ﬁrst stage determines the share of individuals for which the second-stage
conditions the effect on college education (that is, the compliers). By comparing
the ﬁrst-stage effect of increased college availability on the probability of study-
ing across different subgroups, it is possible to gauge whether certain individuals
were more likely to comply with the college expansion and, thereby, be captured
by the second stage. To this end, we repeat the ﬁrst-stage estimation along three
potentially important characteristics by which we separate our data. The ﬁrst
subgroup is deﬁned by the school degree of the father. This separation may be
informative since it sheds light on the question of whether the educational ex-
pansion increased educational mobility. High-educated fathers are deﬁned as
having at least an intermediate track education, and hence more than the most
common educational degree of that time. The shares of both subgroups are ap-
proximately balanced. However, the ﬁrst stage is much stronger for women with
lower-educated fathers as is evident from Table 6.3. Calculating the relative fre-
quency of compliers of low-educated fathers relative to high-educated fathers
(0.63/0.37 = 1.7, see table notes for details) indicates that a woman with a fa-
ther we deﬁne as low educated is nearly twice as likely to comply with the col-
lege expansion as a woman with a high-educated father. Hence, in the example
above, the college opening is supposed to increase the probability of studying by
0.06× 1.7 = 10.2pp for daughters of lower educated fathers.
Splitting the sample by the women’s year of birth one can calculate the corre-
sponding complier shares. The results show that the ﬁrst-stage effect and, hence,
also the share of compliers, is only slightly larger for women born after 1960, sug-
gesting that our instrument has power throughout the educational expansion.
This piece of evidence is moreover likely to be informative regarding the external
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Table 6.3: First stage and some characteristics of complying mothers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefﬁcient Share Share
of the of the of
First Stage population compliers Obs.
Overall ﬁrst stage 2.08∗∗∗ 1 1 4,288
(0.11)
First stage by education of fathera
– High-educated
fathers
1.63∗∗∗ 0.48 0.37 2,045
(0.16)
– Low-educated fa-
thers
2.49∗∗∗ 0.52 0.63 2,243
(0.15)
First stage by year of birth (median separation)
– Before 1960 1.78∗∗∗ 0.47 0.41 1,996
(0.23)
– 1960 or later 2.19∗∗∗ 0.53 0.59 2,292
(0.12)
First stage by urban-rural separation
– Urban 2.12∗∗∗ 0.76 0.78 3,275
(0.12)
– Rural 1.89∗∗∗ 0.24 0.22 1,013
(0.23)
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Adult Starting Cohort data. The shares of compliers are calculated as follows:
For mutually exclusive groups (denoted by subscripts 1 and 2), the overall ﬁrst stage coefﬁcient is a weighted average
of the respective subgroups if the group indicator is also interacted with the set of controls. In this case, weights are
determined by the group shares ω1 and ω2 of the overall population. Thus,̂δoverall = δ̂1ω1 + δ̂2ω2. Accordingly, the
shares of compliers can be determined as πj = δ̂j/̂δoverall × ωj, for j ∈ {1, 2}. In this table, the group indicators are
not interacted with all the controls, in order to present the same ﬁrst stage result as employed for the main results.
Therefore, the weighted average may not hold with equality until we normalize the weights πj such that π1 + π2 = 1.
This procedure has also been applied in Akerman et al. (2015). Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
a High-educated fathers are deﬁned to have at least an intermediate track education, and hence more than the most
common educational degree of that time.
validity of the results. As the ﬁrst-stage effect does not seem to be conﬁned to cer-
tain years in the time under review, it is not implausible to conjecture that more
recent policies have also had similar effects on promoting educational education.
The last dimension by which we analyze the ﬁrst stage is the degree of urban-
ization. The ﬁrst-stage coefﬁcient is slightly higher in urban regions compared to
the overall effect. Yet, as most college openings occur in cities, this urban-rural
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gradient of the educational expansion should not come as a surprise.13 But in
rural regions there is a substantial share of compliers that is nearly as high as the
share of rural high school graduates in the overall population.
All in all, we interpret the ﬁnding of the subgroup analysis as suggesting that the
complying population, although modestly selected, is not conﬁned to any speciﬁc
subgroup.
6.5.2 The effect of college education on fertility
Starting with overall completed fertility, shown in panel A in column 1 of Table
6.4, the OLS effect (that is, the association) of college education on the number of
children is -0.1. In other words, given controls, women who went to college have,
on average, 0.1 fewer children than women without a college education. Taking
into account selection that goes beyond the observable factors, the 2SLS estimate
in panel B yields a reduction in the average number of children of -0.3. Given an
average number of 1.7 children in Table 6.2, this corresponds to a reduction of 19
percent – a rather sizeable effect. With 4.5 years of college education, the per-year
reduction that goes along with college education is, on average, 0.02 children in
the OLS model and 0.05 children in the 2SLS speciﬁcation.
Taking a closer look at the composition of the overall effect, we take the fertility
margins as dependent variables. The OLS point estimate of college education on
the extensive margin (that is, motherhood) is -0.08 (-0.02 per year of college). Put
differently, women who went to college are 8pp less likely to ever bear a child,
given the controls. Addressing endogeneity, the 2SLS estimate in panel B yields
a reduction in the probability of becoming a mother through college education of
about 21pp (5pp per year). Again, the effect is precisely estimated and is large in
size (the baseline probability is 83.2 percent for females without college).
Turning to the intensive margin in column 3 of Table 6.4, we see that the negative
effect from the extensive margin does not propagate here. The differential in the
number of children is slightly positive when it is controlled for observables. Go-
ing to the structural estimate, college-educated mothers have, on average, 0.267
children more than their peers without college education. Given that mothers
have an average of 2.1 children, the relative effect amounts to a 12.7 percent in-
crease in the number of children of college-educated mothers. Although only sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, the effect size is substantial. However,
13That regions with college openings have, on average, a larger share of primary industries -
and are thereby more rural - may seem to contradict the result of Table 6.1. However, the degree of
urbanization used here is only based on the number of inhabitants, not on the population density.
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Table 6.4: Baseline regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Effect Fertility margins Timing
# of children Extensive: Intensive: Maternal
for all motherhood # of children age at
women indicator for mothers 1st birth
Panel A: OLS regression
College degree −0.106∗ −0.081∗∗∗ 0.123∗ 2.752∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.019) (0.051) (0.232)
Panel B: Second-stage 2SLS regression
College degree −0.313∗ −0.209∗∗∗ 0.267∗ 6.463∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.054) (0.134) (0.741)
Number of observations: 4,288 4,288 3,316 3,259
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Adult Starting Cohort data. Control variables include full sets of year
of birth and district ﬁxed effects as well as state-speciﬁc trends. Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
this result for the intensive margin may be taken with a grain of salt as it refers
to the selected sample of women who decide to have children. The composition
of this sample in terms of the desired family size may depend on the individual
effect of college education on motherhood. Put differently, the estimate for the
intensive margin only yields the causal effect of college education if the desired
family size does not systematically differ for college-educated mothers compared
to women who do not become mothers because of college education. Keeping
this limitation in mind, we still deem the countervailing signs of the effects on
the two margins an interesting ﬁnding that we ought to have a closer look at in
the following section.
Before building the bridge to potential mechanisms that may contribute to ex-
plaining the results, the rather new margin of education considered here calls for
a careful comparison of our ﬁndings with the literature on the secondary school-
ing effects on fertility. For Germany, the OLS estimate for the effect of an addi-
tional year of secondary schooling on the average number of children provided
by Cygan-Rehm and Maeder (2013) is -0.020 – this is remarkable close to our per-
year OLS estimate of -0.024. Instrumenting secondary education with compul-
sory years of schooling, Cygan-Rehm and Maeder (2013) ﬁnd an effect ranging
from -0.10 to -0.17 depending on the speciﬁcation. This is more than twice as
big as the pre-year effect of college education. The bigger effect may seem con-
tradictory at ﬁrst sight, given that college education is probably more relevant
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for later career opportunities and affects individuals in their prime reproductive
ages. However, while interpreting the effect size, one has to keep in mind that
the compulsory schooling reform affects individuals at the lower end of the edu-
cational distribution and – given the baby gap in education – the average number
of children is higher at this margin. Accordingly, the 2SLS effect on childlessness
by Cygan-Rehm and Maeder (2013), about 5pp (compared to a baseline proba-
bility of 18 percent) exceeds our effect of college education on motherhood by
about 5.7 percent (that is, (-0.209/0.813)/4.5 years=0.057). Fort et al. (2016) ﬁnd
similarly large effects of compulsory schooling on the number of children and
childlessness for England and pooled Continental European countries.
Moreover, our results conﬁrm another interesting pattern found by several stud-
ies on the secondary schooling effect (e.g., Cygan-Rehm and Maeder, 2013, Fort
et al., 2016 and Monstad et al., 2008): the OLS results underestimate the 2SLS
effects in absolute terms. This indicates that the bias in the OLS results stems
from omitted variables such as unaccounted family income and openness to new
experiences rather than from pre-college career preferences or preferences for a
traditional family (where more children are preferred to a mother’s college educa-
tion). Another explanation as to why OLS underestimates the 2SLS result might
be that OLS captures the average treatment effect while the 2SLS model yields
the LATE for the complying subpopulation. However, as the complier analysis in
Section 6.5.1 indicates that college expansion is not limited to particular groups of
individuals, the local nature of the 2SLS estimate seems rather unlikely to drive
the pattern of the results presented here.
Moving on to potential explanations of the education-fertility nexus, the most
obvious effect of college education on fertility is through the timing of births. If
the distribution of the age at the ﬁrst birth is simply shifted by the time women
spend in college (usually 4.5 to 5 years in Germany), some women may become
too old to bear a child, which may then explain the negative effect on the exten-
sive margin. This is investigated in column 4 of Table 6.4. Whereas the average
observable-adjusted difference on age at ﬁrst birth is 2.8 years between college-
educated and non-college-educated mothers, the 2SLS effect is higher. Because of
college, mothers defer their ﬁrst birth by nearly 6.5 years, which is even higher
than the time they usually spend in college. Because this effect is more than a me-
chanical shift, unraveling the exact timing of its occurrence seems to be promising
for giving a more complete picture of the fertility pattern.
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6.6 Heterogeneity and potential mechanisms
6.6.1 Effect heterogeneity along age
Unfolding the college effect by age
By its very nature, the decision to go to college affects an individual’s life differ-
ently while the individual is in college (investment period) and after she leaves
college (consumption period). Such effect heterogeneity in the returns to college
education along women’s fertile ages is not only informative in its own right but
it may also help to explain the ﬁndings of the previous section. To describe the
effect of education on “the desire/time/opportunity to have a child” while in
school, Black et al. (2008, p.1044) coin the term “incarceration effect.” Although
they look at the fertility returns to education at the secondary schooling margin,
such an incarceration effect is likely to matter at the college margin as well since
the time in college is, on the one hand, often characterized not only through more
ﬂexible working hours, but also through an increased workload and pressure as
well as tighter budget constraints. To detect this kind of heterogeneity, we es-
timate our baseline models for the extensive and the intensive fertility margins
fully saturated by women’s age to get age-speciﬁc effects. To this end, we re-
shape the data from individual level i to individual-age level ig, where g now
indicates the age of the woman for each year from 17 to 40. The second stage of
the 2SLS model is then:14
dig = β0 + β1D̂i +
40
∑
g=17
ηg (ageig = g)
+
40
∑
g=17
[
γg (ageig = g)× D̂i
]
+X ′iβ2 + uig. (6.5)
The indicator functions  (·) return the value 1 if the observation refers to indi-
vidual i at age g, and 0 for other fertile ages but g. In other words, the ﬁrst sum
gives a full set of age ﬁxed effects and the second sum interacts the age ﬁxed ef-
fects with the college indicator. The interpretation of the dependent variable dig
and, thereby, the interpretation of the coefﬁcients of interest differs depending on
whether fertility is measured at the extensive or the intensive margin:
• At the extensive margin, dig is a binary indicator that takes on the value 1 if
woman i becomes a mother at age g (and 0 otherwise), given that she does
not have a child until age g − 1. The age ﬁxed effects ηg give the baseline
14For the sake if simplicity, the subscripts for the time and the district are now implicit. The
standard errors are clustered on an individual level as shocks are likely to be time persistent.
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hazard rate of having the ﬁrst child (given that one does not already have
a child) at age g. The coefﬁcients of interest γg give the effect of college
education on the baseline hazard. That is, they answer the question “How
does college education affect the probability of bearing the ﬁrst offspring at
age g, conditional on having never given birth before?”
• At the intensive margin, dig is 1 if woman i gives birth at age g (and 0 other-
wise) – independent of whether woman i already has a child or not. Accord-
ingly, ηg is the baseline rate of having any child at age g given the woman
is going to have a child by the age of 40 (as the sample for the intensive
margin only consists of women who become mothers). The coefﬁcients γg
answer the question “How does college education affect the probability of
giving birth at age g for women who have at least one child by the age of
40?”
Pre-, in- and post-college effects on fertility
Figure 6.5 shows the estimation results of Eq. 6.5 for the extensive margin of fer-
tility in panel (a) and intensive margin in panel (b).15 The bars state the baseline
hazard rate of becoming a mother and the baseline probability of giving birth at a
certain age in panel (a) and (b), respectively.16 The oranges lines give the effect of
college education on these baseline probabilities. For the sake of interpretation,
we may think of the fertile ages as three phases for which we expect distinct ef-
fects: pre-college teenage years, years in college, and post-college years. In the
ﬁrst phase, giving birth (that is, teenage motherhood) is rather unlikely at both
margins – as indicated by the small left-most bars in both panels of Figure 6.5. In-
terestingly, women who go to college a couple of years later already have lower
probabilities of giving birth at pre-college ages (indicated by the orange lines be-
low zero). An explanation for this may be that some women have such a strong
family preference established prior to college age that they sacriﬁce additional
education in favor of early motherhood and become a mother immediately after
leaving secondary school. These women are never-takers of the college expan-
sion.
15As the age-speciﬁc estimates in panel (a) after age 17 refer to the hazard of giving birth to
the ﬁrst child conditioning on not yet being a mother, the estimates may not be taken for the
unconditional causal effect of becoming a mother at a certain age. Similarly, the estimates in
panel (b) may not state the causal effects if the number and timing of children depends of the
effect of college education on motherhood.
16Note, the baseline rates plotted in Figure 6.5 state the unconditional means. On the contrary,
ηg in Eq. 6.5 are the conditional means after adjusting for college education and controls for non-
college-educated women. We interpret the effect size (depicted by the orange line) relative to the
unconditional mean as conventional for linear probability models.
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(a) Extensive margin: effects on hazard rates of becoming
mother
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(b) Intensive margin: effects of bearing offspring for mothers
Figure 6.5: Timing of births
Notes: Both panels depict the age-speciﬁc regression coefﬁcients from the second stage of the 2SLS model in Eq. 6.5 that
capture the effect of college education. Panel 6.5a reports the effects of college education on the hazard rate of becoming
a mother by age. Panel 6.5b depicts the respective effects on the probability of giving birth conditional on being a mother.
The next phase in fertile ages are the years in college around the ages 19 to 25
when women with a college education are in college and those without a college
education usually complete their apprenticeship training and start working. Both
baseline probabilities of motherhood/giving birth increase from year to year in
this phase. Unsurprisingly, the negative effect of college education is most pro-
nounced in the in-college years. While the baseline hazard of becoming a mother
in panel (a) increases from 5 to 18 percent, the hazard rate for women in college
is 11 to 25pp lower. Similarly, the baseline probability of giving birth in panel (b)
ranges between 7 and 17 percent, while college education reduces the probability
up to 17pp. It may at ﬁrst sight be puzzling that the college effect exceeds the
baseline probabilities. However, the baseline hazard rate/probability is much
stronger for women who do not go to college (up to 14pp at age 25 when the
baseline hazard for becoming a mother in college is just 7 percent, see Table A6.3
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in the Appendix). Indeed, the increase in the hazard/probability of childbirth for
women without a college education together with an increasing negative college
effect in the in-college years, supports the incarceration explanation. While non-
college-educated women completed their vocational training-on-the-job and gain
in ﬁnancial security from year to year in their mid-20s, the workload and stress
level of women in college increases as they face their ﬁnal examinations.
The third and ﬁnal phase in fertile ages starts when individuals with a college
education leave college – around the age of 25. At these ages college-educated
women will reveal their preferences about fertility. Among the college-educated
women who have not yet had a child, some may decide to remain childless (as
indicated by the negative extensive margin in the baseline results), while others
who postponed motherhood start a family. At this phase the pattern differs con-
siderably between the extensive margin in panel (a) and the intensive margin in
panel (b). At the extensive margin, the post-college ages can be further divided
into two stages. First, from ages 26 to 32, the negative effect of college education
decreases but college-educated women remain signiﬁcantly less likely of becom-
ing a mother. In other words, some college-educated women catch up with their
non-college peers and give birth to their ﬁrst child. Still, the college effect remains
negative as some women who would have become mothers without a college ed-
ucation decide against children because of college education. At the second stage
of the post-college fertile ages, starting around age 32, there is no signiﬁcant dif-
ference in the probability of college- and non-college-educated women becoming
mothers. Put differently, there is no catch-up effect in the ﬁrst birth after the age
of 32. The pattern in panel (a) suggests two things: First, the negative effect at the
extensive margin in the baseline results is driven through the lower fertility of
college-educated women during the years in college and about seven years after
leaving college – that is, the time in which they build a working career. Second,
the reduction in the negative college effect for women at the end of their 20s and
the indistinguishable hazard rates (zero effects of college education) afterwards
indicate that women who wish to catch up in terms of becoming a mother do
catch up. Form a policy perspective this absence of an age-related reduction in
fertility (we refer to this as the “biological effect”) is a noteworthy ﬁnding. It in-
dicates that the catch-up effect not meeting the incarceration effect is driven by
preferences or opportunities for a career or family life. On the contrary, a constant
relative increase in the hazard rate of the ﬁrst birth of college-educated women at
the end of their 30s would indicate that some women may wish to catch up but
are not able to do so before age-related fertility problems become an issue.
At the intensive margin, the baseline probability of giving birth is more pyramid-
shaped with lower probabilities at older ages compared to the extensive margin.
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As for the extensive margin, the effect of college education on childbirth in the
post-college ages can be divided into two stages. The ﬁrst stage, until age 32, is
characterized by a catch-up effect that already starts in the last years of college
education, at around 23. Compared to the extensive margin, the catch-up effect is
much more pronounced at the intensive margin and college-educated women are
signiﬁcantly more likely to give birth from age 28 onwards. However, the posi-
tive effect shrinks between age 32 to the end of the 30s (although college-educated
mothers are still more likely to have a child than their non-educated peers, see Ta-
ble A6.3). Thus, for women who decide to become a mother, the negative effect of
incarceration in college in the ﬁrst half of their 20s is compensated by an increased
fertility until the end of the 30s. The effect remains positive and signiﬁcant after
the age of 30. The probability that a college-education women will give birth is
around 10 percent at age 34 and falls to 5 percent at age 37 and 2 percent at age
39. This indicates that a biological effect can potentially restrict the desired fer-
tility of college-educated mothers because if infertility affects both women at the
same rate, college-educated mothers are more affected since they are still trying to
catch up at those ages. If such an effect exists (it is, for instance, unclear whether
the drop in the probability childbirth between 37 and 39 is already affected by
fertility problems or not), it is rather humble in size, however.
Summing up the results for both margins, it seems likely that there are different
types of college-graduated females – those who catch up in their fertility imme-
diately after leaving college and those who postpone childbearing even further
after the in-college incarceration and may never have children. For the latter
group, the prolonged postponement and the seemingly absent age-related fer-
tility decline raises the question of other causes for this lower fertility? Or, put
differently, what shapes the smaller catch-up effect? Black et al. (2008) consider a
“human capital effect” – that is, college education increases wages and, thereby,
opportunity costs of family life. Besides such a career channel, the literature on
secondary schooling and fertility suggests that education may change the prefer-
ences for and opportunities of family life. Education can enable women to ﬁnd
a more-educated and higher-earning partner and to have not only more but also
better-educated offspring that could in turn affect the desired fertility (see, e.g.,
McCrary and Royer, 2011, for assortative mating and Currie and Moretti, 2003,
for the intergenerational transmission of education). We now go on to investigate
the effects of college on career and family variables for women with and without
children that might explain the catch-up effects.
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6.6.2 Opportunities and revealed preferences for career and fam-
ily life
Table 6.5 presents the effect of college education on the post-college career path.
Although an effect of college education does not allow us to conclude whether
and, if so, to which extent the potential mediators actually affect the fertility pat-
terns, the analysis of labor market factors might be insightful for two reasons.
First, labor market returns to college education change the family’s resources in
terms of ﬁnancial means as well as available time. Second, a heterogeneity in
the returns between mothers and non-mothers potentially reveals different ca-
reer opportunities or preferences. Table 6.5 states the effect of college education
on a working full-time indicator and the log hourly wage. There is a clear asso-
ciation between college education and working full-time (as opposed to working
part-time or not at all) in the OLS model in column 1: college-educated women
are 8pp more likely to work full-time. For the 2SLS estimate the effect increases
to 13pp; however, a larger standard error diminishes the statistical signiﬁcance
of the relationship to the 10 percent level. Before coming to wages, column 2
reestimates the effect of college education on the full-time indicator using the
subsample of mothers.17 This corresponds to going from the extensive to the in-
tensive fertility margin. While college education is still positively associated with
working full-time, the magnitude is smaller. In fact, the 2SLS effect is only half as
big when compared to the entire sample and not statistically different from zero
at the conventional levels.
Going on to the hourly wage, we ﬁnd a strong and statistically signiﬁcant re-
lationship between college education and earnings. In the OLS estimates (in
columns 3 and 4) the wage increase amounts to about 25 percent. As is com-
mon in the labor economics literature, the 2SLS coefﬁcients exceed the OLS ones
in size (although one would expect to ﬁnd that OLS overestimates the true effect,
see Westphal et al., 2017, for a careful discussion of the heterogeneity in the labor
market returns), amounting to nearly 50 percent of the full sample (or equiva-
lently 10 percent per year of college education) and 40 percent among mothers.
Thus, mothers not only expand their labor supply less than non-mothers but they
also face a smaller college premium in the hourly wage. A reason for the smaller
labor market returns might be different – and maybe more family-friendly – oc-
cupations college-educated mothers choose compared to college-educated non-
17As before, if the tendency to become a mother in spite of a college education correlates with
labor supply or wage returns, the subsample analysis may not identify the causal relationship.
Moreover, as working women are a subgroup of all women, the wage estimates may suffer a
selection bias – although Westphal et al. (2017) provide evidence that such a bias seems humble
in the time under review.
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mothers. Mothers, for example, tend to choose occupations with a greater ﬂexi-
bility of working shorter hours, which may lead to a wage penalty (Goldin, 2014).
Taken together with the small and postponed catch-up effect in fertility at the
extensive margin, the bigger labor market returns for non-mothers speak for a
college-induced early-career effect that prevents some women from becoming
mothers.
Table 6.5: Post-college career outcomes as potentially mediating forces
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Working full-time Log wage
all only all only
women mothers women mothers
Descriptives
Sample mean 0.175 0.153 2.83 2.79
OLS regression
College degree 0.080∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.020) (0.038) (0.048)
Second-stage 2SLS regression
College degree 0.131∗ 0.075 0.499∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.059) (0.086) (0.107)
# observations: 4,288 3,485 1,500 1,213
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Adult Starting Cohort data. Control variables
include full sets of year of birth and district ﬁxed effects as well as state-speciﬁc trends.
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Table 6.6 considers the effect of college education on revealed family character-
istics that may shape a fertility-career trade-off. As marriage often serves as a
gatekeeper for planned fertility, the increasing trend in the age at ﬁrst marriage
(as depicted in Figure 6.1) could, if triggered by education, constitute an impor-
tant mechanism as to why individuals put a stronger focus on family life or career
opportunities. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.6 show the effect of a regression of an
indicator for being married at the age of 40 on college education for all women
and mothers, respectively. In the OLS model, college education is associated with
reducing the probability of being married by about 6pp while the effect is more
than twice as strong when estimated with 2SLS. When looking only at mothers,
these relationships vanish. Given a baseline probability of 84 percent, college
seems to be an important determinant of marriage preferences, which may have
direct repercussions on family life. In other words, the college effect on mother-
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hood already manifests itself in marriage. A reason why college education may
prevent marriage – and a potential mediator of education-fertility nexus – may be
assortative mating. While men are often said to prefer to “marry down,” women
who went to college may be more selective when looking for a suitable partner.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6.6 indicates that women with a college degree seem
indeed to be 36pp more likely to have a partner who also went to college – in-
dependent of the woman being a mother or not. Given that men with college
education earn more than their peers without a college education (see Westphal
et al., 2017), we interpret this as evidence that a lower fertility of college-educated
couples is unlikely to be driven by the ﬁnancial need for the mother to work.
Finally, maternal education may change not only the preferences about the off-
spring’s education but also the capability of transmitting a better education to the
children. For example, if there is a trade-off between child quality and quantity
(Becker and Lewis, 1973), it could mean that the effects on the intensive margin
would be even higher in the absence of this trade-off. Moreover, looking at the
effect on the educational outcomes of the child is important because it shows (to-
gether with the quantitative effects) how maternal college education affects the
socioeconomic composition of fertility (Raute, 2016). Column 5 of Table 6.6 gives
the effect of the mother’s college education on an indicator that shows whether
the ﬁrstborn visits or has visited an academic track secondary school (compared
to a less academically demanding school track). We ﬁnd strong positive effects
here which may emphasize the importance of college education on the socioeco-
nomic composition of fertility and/or that the effects of the intensive margin are
likely to be hypothetically higher in the absence of this effect.
To summarize the mediator analysis, we ﬁnd evidence of a lower college wage
premium for mothers. However, for more educated partners (who potentially
earn more than their less-educated peers) it seems unlikely that ﬁnancial reasons
alone prevent college-educated women from having children.
6.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the nexus between education and fertility – two fun-
damental decisions in life that, when considered on an aggregated level, have
greatly changed societies within the past 60 years. These dynamics are unlikely
to be conﬁned to the past – particularly with regard to recent policies such as the
Higher Education Pact 2020 in which the German states committed to further in-
crease access to higher education. This emphasizes the need to understand the
long-term consequences of higher education that go beyond the monetary effects.
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Table 6.6: Post-college family characteristics as potentially mediating forces
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Marriage: Assortative mating: Child
married age 40 partner college quality
all only all only academic
women mothers women mothers track
Descriptives
Sample mean 0.842 0.916 0.316 0.310 0.526
OLS regression
College degree −0.058∗∗ −0.025 0.362∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025)
Second-stage 2SLS regression
College degree −0.124∗ −0.018 0.690∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.041) (0.062) (0.072) (0.081)
# observations: 4,288 3,491 4,127 3,427 3,316
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Adult Starting Cohort data. Control variables include full sets of year
of birth and district ﬁxed effects as well as state-speciﬁc trends. Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
The aspect of fertility is especially interesting in this context as higher education
affects women – unlike previously studied secondary schooling – within their
prime reproductive age. To analyze how education impacts individual fertility
decisions in the in-college years and afterwards we make use of arguable exoge-
nous variation in the accessibility of college education in Germany. We ﬁnd that
the overall quantitative fertility effects are driven by the extensive margin: the
probability of becoming a mother is reduced by one-quarter. In contrast, women
who decide to be a mother despite a college education, have, on average, more
children.
We shed light upon the sources of these effects by unraveling the timing of child-
bearing along the extensive and intensive margin. This analysis indicates that
there is a postponement of fertility in the early years of the working career that
goes beyond the “incarceration” in college. However, this college-induced post-
ponement in fertility does not seem to push planned children toward ages where
biological infertility might become an issue. From a policy perspective, this is
a noteworthy ﬁnding as a biological effect would restrict a woman’s choice set
when she maximizes her utility. On the other hand, the decision to forgo marriage
and/or childbearing is per se not undesirable when disregarding the negative
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externalities for the society. The absence of such biological effects together with
the overall decline in completed fertility points toward changed preferences for
motherhood and/or a career because of college education. Wage and working-
time differentials between college-educated mothers and non-mothers suggest an
early-career path that shapes fertility and labor market returns to college educa-
tion.
Although we ﬁnd evidence that the massive college expansion and effect of col-
lege education on the probability of becoming a mother at least partly fueled the
demographic transition in recent decades, the positive effect of college education
on the number of children for mothers indicates that education does not per se
decrease fertility. We consider this to be an important policy implication of this
study. Policies that particularly aim at triggering college-educated women into
motherhood, for instance, through more ﬂexible working hours or means-tested
materiality leave beneﬁts, seem promising for reducing the baby gap between
women with and without a college education.
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Appendix
Figures
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Figure A6.1: Spatial variation of colleges across districts and over time
Notes: Own illustration based on the German Statistical Yearbooks 1959–1991 (German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 1991).
The maps show all 326 West German districts (Kreise, spatial units of 2009) but Berlin in the years 1958 (ﬁrst year in the
sample), 1970, 1980, and 1990 (last year in the sample). Districts usually cover a bigger city or some administratively
connected villages. If a district has at least one college, the district is depicted darker. Very few districts have more
than one college. For those districts the number of students is added up in the calculations but multiple colleges are not
depicted separately in the maps.
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Figure A6.2: Trends in academic secondary school and college education for
females
Notes: Own calculations using data from Ko¨hler and Lundgreen (2014).
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Figure A6.3: Trends in colleges and female students across federal states
Notes: Own calculations using data from the German Statistical Yearbooks 1959–1991 (German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce,
1991).
238
Tables
Table A6.1: Control variables and means by university degree
Variable Deﬁnition Respondents
with univ. w/o univ.
degree degree
General information
Year of birth (FE) Year of birth of the respondent 1959.62 1959.61
Migrational back-
ground
=1 if respondent was born abroad 0.007 0.009
No native speaker =1 if mother tongue is not German 0.002 0.003
Mother still alive =1 if mother is still alive in 2009/10 0.676 0.626
Father still alive =1 if father is still alive in 2009/10 0.472 0.420
Pre-college living conditions
Married before college =1 if respondent got married before the
year of the college decision or in the
same year
0.010 .005
Parent before college =1 if respondent became a parent be-
fore the year of the college decision or
in the same year
0.002 0.003
Siblings Number of siblings 1.555 1.814
First born =1 if respondent was the ﬁrst born in
the family
0.325 0.283
Age 15: lived by single
parent
=1 if respondent was raised by single
parent
0.0633 0.057
Age 15: lived in patch-
work family
=1 if respondent was raised in a patch-
work family
0.013 0.027
Age 15: orphan =1 if respondent was a orphan at the
age of 15
0.009 0.022
Age 15: rural district =1 if district at the age of 15 was rural 0.181 0.249
Age 15: mother em-
ployed
=1 if mother was employed at the re-
spondent’s age of 15
0.583 0.610
Age 15: mother never
unemployed
=1 if mother was never unemployed
until the respondent’s age of 15
0.448 0.487
Age 15: father em-
ployed
=1 if father was employed at the re-
spondent’s age of 15
0.985 0.964
Age 15: father never
unemployed
=1 if father was never unemployed un-
til the respondent’s age of 15
0.931 0.894
Pre-college health and education
Final school grade: ex-
cellence
=1 if the overall grade of the highest
school degree was excellent
0.034 0.015
Final school grade:
good
=1 if the overall grade of the highest
school degree was good
0.231 0.185
Continued on next page
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Table A6.1 – continued
Variable Deﬁnition Respondents
with univ. w/o univ.
degree degree
Final school grade: sat-
isfactory
=1 if the overall grade of the highest
school degree was satisfactory
0.141 0.185
Final school grade: suf-
ﬁcient or worse
=1 if the overall grade of the highest
school degree was sufﬁcient or worse
0.006 0.009
Repeated one grade =1 if student needed to repeat one
grade in elementary or secondary
school
0.163 0.166
Repeated two or more
grades
=1 if student needed to repeat two
or more grades in elementary or sec-
ondary school
0.018 0.011
Parental characteristics (M: Mother, F: Father)
M: year of birth (FE) Year of birth of the respondent’s
mother
1930.87 1931.70
M: migrational back-
ground
=1 if mother was born abroad 0.063 0.047
M: at least inter. edu =1 if mother has at least an intermedi-
ate secondary school degree
0.298 0.092
M: vocational training =1 if mother’s highest degree is voca-
tional training
0.256 0.245
M: further job qualiﬁca-
tion
=1 if mother has further job qualiﬁca-
tion (e.g., Meister degree)
0.063 0.024
F: year of birth (FE) Year of birth of the respondent’s father 1927.76 1928.561
F: migrational back-
ground
=1 if father was born abroad 0.063 0.047
F: at least inter. edu =1 if father has at least an intermediate
secondary school degree
0.298 0.092
F: vocational training =1 if father’s highest degree is voca-
tional training
0.256 0.245
F: further job qualiﬁca-
tion
=1 if father has further job qualiﬁcation
(e.g., Meister degree)
0.061 0.024
Number of observations 941 3,389
Notes: Information taken from NEPS–Starting Cohort 6. Mean values refer to the health satisfaction sample. In the case of
binary variables, the mean gives the percentage of 1s. FE = variable values are included as ﬁxed effects in the analysis. a
Only available for males who did military eligibility test (2,359 observations).
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Table A6.2: Descriptive statistics of instruments and background information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Instrument: College availability 0.459 0.262 0.046 1.131
Background information on college availability (implicitly included in the instrument)
Distance to nearest college 27.580 26.184 0 172.269
At least one college in district 0.130 0.337 0 1
Colleges within 100km 5.860 3.401 0 16
College spots per inhabitant within 100km 0.034 0.019 0 0.166
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Adult Starting Cohort data and German Statistical
Yearbooks 1959–1991 (German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 1991). Distances are calculated as the
Euclidean distance between two respective district centroids.
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Table A6.3: Baseline fertility rates and college effects by age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Age
Baseline hazard
Effect
Baseline probability
Effect
no college college no college college
17 0.024 0.002 −0.059 0.030 0.003 −0.048
18 0.045 0.002 −0.087 0.054 0.003 −0.091
19 0.067 0.006 −0.113 0.080 0.009 −0.123
20 0.084 0.015 −0.131 0.097 0.021 −0.129
21 0.102 0.019 −0.136 0.114 0.026 −0.115
22 0.128 0.030 −0.177 0.135 0.041 −0.152
23 0.147 0.047 −0.222 0.147 0.063 −0.166
24 0.167 0.061 −0.239 0.155 0.081 −0.142
25 0.210 0.070 −0.210 0.179 0.089 −0.095
26 0.233 0.109 −0.168 0.179 0.135 0.005
27 0.243 0.138 −0.178 0.164 0.164 0.042
28 0.241 0.150 −0.157 0.142 0.164 0.075
29 0.216 0.186 −0.101 0.110 0.191 0.119
30 0.213 0.201 −0.114 0.096 0.188 0.113
31 0.198 0.213 −0.082 0.079 0.177 0.126
32 0.161 0.202 0.018 0.057 0.151 0.138
33 0.141 0.168 0.045 0.045 0.110 0.112
34 0.135 0.170 0.025 0.040 0.101 0.097
35 0.105 0.153 0.020 0.029 0.084 0.064
36 0.068 0.116 0.019 0.017 0.057 0.039
37 0.059 0.102 0.026 0.014 0.047 0.046
38 0.044 0.077 0.011 0.011 0.034 0.034
39 0.031 0.060 −0.003 0.007 0.025 0.021
40 0.022 0.040 −0.029 0.005 0.016 0.008
Notes: Own calculations based on NEPS–Adult Starting Cohort data. The effects are those de-
picted in Figure 6.5 and estimated according to Eq. 6.5. Unlike the ﬁgure, the baseline hazard
and the baseline probability are stated by college status.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis covers ﬁve empirical essays in the economics of education. In each
essay, I analyze the short- and, if possible, long-term returns to a change in ed-
ucation that affects individuals at a different point in their education trajectory.
Although data restrictions and the aspiration to combine a meaningful interven-
tion with a plausible identiﬁcation strategy makes it necessary to consider not
only different countries where the education takes place but individuals affected
in different centuries, all essays have two things in common. First, at the heart
of each paper is the pursuit to disentangle the causal effect of education from
a mere correlation caused by a selection of individuals into education. Second,
the outcome variables always include, but are not necessarily restricted to, non-
monetary factors. While the focus of economic evaluations of the returns to edu-
cation was traditionally on labor market effects, non-market aspects of education
are rather understudied despite of their own relevance and their contribution to
the understanding of the monetary returns to education suggested in the litera-
ture.
The chapters are ordered along the age of the individuals when they are affected
by the change in the education, starting with children in preschools at the age of
four. As such a young age is shown to be particularly important for the formation
of skills, I analyze how a curriculum-based language training in preschool af-
fects the formation of grammar skills – an important determinant for subsequent
learning – up to the children’s age of eight. Because the data at hand provide a
large array of potential confounders, it seems reasonable in this application to ad-
dress a potential selection into the language training by comparing only children
with the same probability of receiving the treatment. In Chapter 3, I analyze the
returns to individual absence in elementary school grades 1 and 4. In order to es-
timate the long-term education, labor market, and even mortality consequences, I
rely on a combination self-digitized historical school records taken from Swedish
245
archives and Census and tax register information. To account for unobservable
factors, I employ various ﬁxed effects strategies – among others a siblings ﬁxed
effects approach that removes all unobserved characteristics that are shared by
siblings, for instance, the genetic endowment and a constant parenting style. In
Chapter 4, I move on to students at the end of secondary education and estimate
the cognitive skill and wage returns to an additional year of schooling at this
margin. Identiﬁcation stems from an arguably quasi-experimental increase in the
legal minimum years of schooling and the build-up of secondary schools that of-
fer more than the minimum years of education in Germany. In Chapters 5 and 6,
I follow a similar strategy when investigating the effect of college education on
wage, cognitive skills, and health as well as fertility preferences, respectively. As
for secondary schools, Germany experienced a massive build-up of new colleges
and an increase in the capacities of the existing colleges the 1970s and ’80s. Using
regional variation in the exposure to this college expansion, it is arguably possible
to overcome individual selection in higher education.
Trying to summarize the results of the thesis in one sentence, this might be
“Additional education has the potential to increase an individual’s monetary
and non-monetary prosperity, but it is not always realized for all individuals.”
The thesis reﬂects this in at least two ways. First, the returns to some forms of
education suggest a considerable heterogeneity along (groups of) individuals.
Unfolding, for instance, the average effect of language training along observed
characteristics indicates heterogeneous returns w.r.t. the child’s math skills as a
proxy for innate abilities. The results indicate that only children with interme-
diate skills beneﬁt from the additional language training; children with rather
low or already quite high skills do not beneﬁt. Allowing for an essential het-
erogeneity along the unobserved desire for studying, the wage, cognitive skill,
and health returns to college education may even be zero for individuals who are
rather reluctant to study. The second dimension in why education might not al-
ways be beneﬁcial is the margin of education. As demonstrated when analyzing
the returns to secondary education, schooling beyond the ninth grade does not
seem to contribute to the development of basic skills in Germany. When intro-
ducing new policies aiming the increasing the economy’s stock of human capital,
political decision-makers are therefore well-advised not to increase any kind of
education in the hope that this will enhance human capital and, thereby, lead to
higher wages, for instance. The results of the essays in this thesis clearly indicate
that both the target group under heterogeneous returns and the margin of the
educational intervention matters for its effect on human capital as well as mone-
tary and non-monetary outcomes. A well-deﬁned policy intervention aiming at
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a clear target group is capable of increasing not only wages but its beneﬁts are
potentially also reﬂected in a number of non-monetary characteristics.
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